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Résumé 
L’Europe a subi la crise la plus sévère de sa récente histoire à la suite de la crise 
financière globale de 2008. C’est pourquoi cette thèse a l’objectif d’identifier de façon 
empirique les déterminants de cette crise dans le cadre de 15 principaux membres de l’UE 
(UE-15). Dans ce sens, nous développons d’abord un index de pression fiscale continu, 
contrairement aux travaux empiriques précédents, afin d’identifier des périodes de crise dans 
les pays UE-15 de 2003 à 2015. Ensuite, nous utilisons trois différentes techniques 
d’estimation, à savoir Cartes auto-organisatrices, Logit et Markov.  
Nos résultats d’estimation démontrent que notre indicateur de crise identifie le timing et 
la durée de la crise de dette dans chacun des pays de UE-15. Résultats empiriques indiquent 
également que l’occurrence de la crise de dette dans l’UE-15 est la conséquence de la 
détérioration de balances macroéconomiques et financières sachant que les variables comme 
le ratio des prêts non-performants sur les crédits totaux du secteur bancaire, la croissance du 
PIB, chômage, balance primaire / PIB, le solde ajusté du cycle PIB. De plus, variables 
démontrant la qualité de gouvernance tel que participation et responsabilisation, qualité de la 
réglementation, and efficacité gouvernementale, jouent également un rôle important dans 
l’occurrence et sur la durée de la crise de dette dans le cadre de l’UE-15. En outre, les 
résultats de prévision des modelés Logit et Markov montrent que nos modèles sont capables 
de prédire correctement tous les épisodes de crise et non-crise dans la période de 2003-2015. 
Etant donne que les résultats économétriques indiquent l’importance de la détérioration 
fiscale dans l’occurrence de la crise de dette européenne, nous testons la convergence fiscale 
des pays membre de l’UE. Dans ce sens, nous utilisons deux variables dépendantes basée sur 
les critères de Maastricht, à savoir le ratio de la dette publique sur le PIB et le ratio du déficit 
budgétaire sur le PIB, ainsi que des tests de racine unitaire traditionnels (ADF), non-
traditionnels de type ruptures structurelles (Zivot-Andrews et Lee-Strazicich) avec des tests 
non-linéaires (KSS). Les résultats montrent que Portugal, Irlande, Italie, Grèce et Espagne 
diverge des autres pays de l’UE-15 en termes de dette publique / PIB alors qu’ils convergent, 
à part la Grèce, avec les autres pays membres de l’UE-15 en termes de déficit budgétaires / 
PIB. Ceci indique que l’accumulation de la dette publique dans ces pays-là n’est pas liée aux 
déficits budgétaires, mais autres facteurs comme les déficits commerciaux et/ou courants.   
Mots-clés : Crise de dette européenne, Index de pression fiscale, Indicateurs d’alerte, 
Convergence fiscale, Logit, Modèle de Markov à changement de régime, Cartes auto-
organisatrices.  
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Abstract 
 
Europe went through the most severe economic crisis of its recent history following the 
global financial crisis of 2008. Hence, this thesis aims to empirically identify the determinants 
of this crisis within the framework of 15 core EU member countries (EU-15). To do so, the 
study develops a continuous fiscal stress index, contrary to previous empirical studies that 
tend to use event-based crisis indicators, which identifies the debt crises in the EU-15 and the 
study employs three different estimation techniques, namely Self-Organizing Map, 
Multivariate Logit and Panel Markov Regime Switching models.  
Our estimation results show first that the study identifies correctly the time and the 
length of the debt crisis in each EU-15-member country by developing a fiscal stress index. 
Empirical results also indicate, via three different models, that the debt crisis in the EU-15 is 
the consequence of deterioration of both financial and macroeconomic variables such as 
nonperforming loans over total loans, GDP growth, unemployment rates, primary balance 
over GDP, and cyclically adjusted balance over GDP. Besides, variables measuring 
governance quality, such as voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and government 
effectiveness, also play a significant role in the emergence and the duration of the debt crisis 
in the EU-15. Moreover, logit and Markov forecast results show that the models could 
correctly predict nearly all crisis and noncrisis episodes over the period of 2003-2015. 
As the econometric results clearly indicate the importance of fiscal deterioration on the 
occurrence of the European debt crisis, this study also aims to test the fiscal convergence 
among the EU member countries. To do so, the study employs two dependent variables based 
on Maastricht Criteria, i.e. public debt over GDP and budget deficit over GDP, and uses 
traditional unit root tests (ADF), nontraditional one (Zivot and Andrews)- and two-structural 
breaks (Lee and Strazicich) along with nonlinear unit root tests (KSS). The results indicate 
that Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS) diverge from other EU-15 countries in 
terms of public debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, results also show that all PIIGS countries 
except for Greece converge to EU-10 in terms of budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. This result is 
interesting since the accumulation of public debt is not mainly related to budget deficits but 
other structural factors like trade and/or current deficits.   
 
Keywords: European Debt Crisis, Fiscal Stress Index, Leading Indicators, Fiscal 
Convergence, Logit, Markov Regime Switching Model, Self-Organizing Maps.  
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Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis that emerged in the United States (US) in 2007 first spread to 
Europe through strong trade and financial linkages, then other advanced and developing 
countries, following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Consequently, the 
world economy suffered a significant recession leading to increasing unemployment rates 
with important social costs. More importantly, massive interventions of governments and 
central banks to limit the negative impacts of the crisis both on real and financial sectors, i.e. 
zero-bound or even negative nominal interest rates, expansionary budget policies, and bank 
recue plans including measures such as bail-outs, recapitalization and nationalization of 
illiquid and insolvent banks, resulted in a dramatic rise in public debt stock leading then to 
sovereign debt crisis in some Eurozone member countries. Hence, researchers have made 
efforts to understand the emergence of the global financial crisis, but also to find its leading 
indicators. Besides, the recent debt problem, particularly in some Eurozone countries, has also 
motivated some economists to identify empirically the determinants of debt crises (e.g. 
Arellano & Kocherlakota, 2008; Fioramanti, 2008; Candelon & Palm, 2010; Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2011; Baldacci et al, 2011a, 2011b).  
The study aims to bring a wider perspective to debt crises in the context of the European 
Union (EU)-15 countries. To do so, the study first tries to identify and date debt crises by 
defining a new fiscal stress index. Second, the study employs a very large data set composed 
of 51 leading indicators to explain the debt crises. More importantly, the study includes an 
important number of governance indicators that have largely been ignored in explaining debt 
crises. Third, the Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), the Multivariate Logit Model (MLM), and 
the Panel Markov Regime Switching Model (PMRSM) are used to identify the determinants 
causing the European debt crisis contrary to the classic estimation methods used in previous 
studies. Our study, hence, offers the opportunity of a comparative analysis between different 
model estimations, which has not been done yet in the literature. Fourth, forecast performance 
for each estimated model is provided. Fifth, the fiscal convergence between EU member 
states is analyzed using both traditional unit root tests and nontraditional one- and two-
structural breaks along with nonlinear unit root tests. 
This study is composed of three chapters. The first chapter presents different definitions 
for fiscal stress indexes. As we demonstrate, early empirical papers tend to use event-based 
crisis indicators. This leads to important structural problem that we try to resolve by 
13 
 
 
developing a continuous fiscal stress index for each EU-15 country within the period of 2003-
2015. Note that this continuous fiscal stress index, inspired by the currency crisis indicators, 
offers the opportunity to analyze the data by using different estimation techniques such as the 
Markov approach. Once the fiscal stress index is constructed, we attempt to determine the 
optimal threshold values in order to identify periods of debt crisis. In accordance with 
Candelon et al. (2012), this study uses accuracy measures, sensitivity-specificity graphics, and 
KLR cut off methods to determine the optimal threshold value. Next, we compare the dates of 
debt crisis episodes for the EU-15 countries with the results of previous studies for robustness 
and consistency issues. The empirical results show that our fiscal stress index identifies more 
‘debt crisis’ episodes and also indicates a longer crisis period, in particular for the so-called 
PIIGS, than previous empirical studies applied to debt crises (e.g. Baldacci et al., 2011a; Berti 
et al., 2012; Hernandez de Cos et al., 2014). Because our index measures the pressure or 
stress level in a country contrary to other fiscal stress definitions that focus mainly on default 
events. We think that our fiscal stress index gives more realistic results, at least for some 
countries, contrary to ‘over-optimistic’ results found in previous studies. 
The second chapter first presents 51 explanatory variables that are likely to cause a debt 
crisis. The set of explanatory variables covers different sectors of the economy and also 
includes some governance quality measures, often ignored in the past literature. The chapter 
then presents three estimation methods employed in the study: SOM, Logit, and Markov 
models. Unlike other econometric approaches, the SOM approach allows the researcher to 
work with large datasets and has the ability to visually monitor, via crisis maps created for 
each country for the period of 2003-2015, the transition from noncrisis (tranquil) to crisis 
states. Besides, through the SOM analysis, we are able to determine the variables’ order of 
importance in explaining the occurrence of the debt crises in the EU member countries. In 
other words, the SOM analysis serves us as a filter to determine which indicators should be 
included into the Logit and Markov model estimations. Note also that this study is the first 
one that uses the Markov approach in estimations of debt crises. Empirical results obtained 
from three different models indicate that the debt crisis in the EU-15 is the consequence of 
deterioration of both financial and macroeconomic variables such as nonperforming loans 
over total loans, GDP growth, unemployment rates, primary balance over GDP, and cyclically 
adjusted balance over GDP. Besides, variables measuring governance quality, such as voice 
and accountability, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness, also play a significant 
role in the emergence and the duration of the debt crisis in the EU-15. Moreover, logit and 
14 
 
 
Markov forecast results show that the models could correctly predict nearly all crisis and 
noncrisis episodes over the period of 2003-2015. 
As the econometric results clearly indicate the importance of fiscal deterioration on the 
occurrence of the European debt crisis, the third chapter of this study aims to test the fiscal 
convergence among the EU member countries over the period from 1995Q1 to 2017Q2. To 
do so, the study employs two dependent variables based on Maastricht Criteria, i.e. public 
debt over GDP and budget deficit over GDP, and uses traditional unit root tests (ADF, Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979), nontraditional one-structural break (Zivot and Andrews, 1992)- and two-
structural breaks unit root tests (Lee and Strazicich, 2003) along with nonlinear unit root tests 
(KSS). The results indicate that Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS) diverge 
from other EU-15 countries in terms of public debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, results also 
show that all PIIGS countries except for Greece converge to EU-10 in terms of budget deficit-
to-GDP ratio. This result is interesting since the accumulation of public debt is not mainly 
related to budget deficits but other structural factors like trade and/or current deficits.  
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Chapter 1 
Dating Debt Crises in EU-15 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Understanding why and how the financial crises occur has become an important issue 
since financial crises lead to high social and economic costs both for the public sector and 
private investors in terms of economic contraction, high unemployment, and high interest 
rates. Hence, a large number of theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted to 
understand crises. Empirical papers, frequently called early warning systems (EWS), are 
generally used to identify crisis episodes, find their determinants, predict their occurrence, 
and if possible to prevent future crisis episodes. 
The empirical studies have employed different parametric and non-parametric 
techniques. Parametric techniques generally include discrete-choice models (logit and probit), 
and the Markov approach, while non-parametric techniques have mostly been limited to the 
signal approach.1 Whatever the techniques used to generate EWS estimations, identifying 
crisis episodes is crucial, since they enter EWS models as dependent variables. However, 
there is no consensus on how to define a crisis which is a source of discrepancies for crisis 
dates and inconsistencies for the significance of explicative variables in model estimations. 
This led some researchers to construct crisis indicators or indexes based on economic theory 
(e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1996).  
Although there is a relatively rich literature on currency crisis definitions, there is a 
limited number of definitions for banking or debt crises. More importantly, debt crises (like 
banking crises) are usually identified and dated by a combination of events, such as the 
inability of borrowers to pay the interest or principal on time, large arrears, or large IMF loans 
to help the borrower avoid a default. In other words, dating debt crises is generally event-
based and is typically founded on the available ex post figures (i.e. Detragiache and 
Spilimbergo, 2001; Baldacci et al., 2011a, 2011b). However, this dating method has several 
shortcomings. It is based primarily on information about government actions undertaken in 
response to fiscal stress and depend on information obtained from regulators and international 
organizations or rating agencies. In addition, the events method identifies crises only when 
                                                 
1 There also exist some empirical studies that use other methods based on artificial neural network. 
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they are severe enough to trigger market events; crises successfully contained by prompt 
corrective policies are neglected. This means that empirical work suffers from a selection 
bias. Therefore, in order to fulfill these shortcomings, we develop a fiscal stress index like 
currency crisis indictors a la Eichengreen et al. (1996) or Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) in 
order to identify the dates of debt crisis episodes occurred in EU-15 countries over the period 
of 2003-2015. 
Our fiscal stress index identifies more ‘debt crisis’ episodes than previous empirical 
studies applied to debt crises, since it measures the pressure or stress level in a country 
contrary to other fiscal stress definitions that focus mainly on default events. To be more 
precise, our index indicates high fiscal pressure in 14 out of 15 countries included into the 
sample following the outbreak of the global financial crisis. The only country where the index 
does not find high fiscal stress is Germany. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a literature 
review on crisis definitions. Section 1.3 presents the data and methodology. Section 1.4 
presents and evaluates the estimation results. Section 1.5 concludes. 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
 
Different definitions are used in the literature to identify a debt crisis. According to 
canonical definition, a debt crisis is said to occur when borrowers are unable to pay the 
principal or interest as planned (Dornbusch, 1989; Cottarelli, 2011). Debt crises also arise 
when the fiscal authority does not raise tax revenues to pay its current or future debt stock 
(Bordo & Meissner, 2016). Although there is no consensus on how to define a debt crisis, one 
can say there exists a common ‘view’: debt crisis is defined as sovereign defaults, large 
arrears, large IMF loans, and fiscal distress events (Pescatori & Sy, 2007, Correa & Sapriza, 
2014).  
In general, credit-rating agencies focus on default events for analyzing debt crises. For 
instance, Moody’s Investor Service (2003) accepts the assumption that countries have failed 
to pay their debts if one or more of the following criteria are met: 
1- There is a missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal, even if the 
delayed payment is made within the grace period, if any. 
2- A distressed exchange occurs, where: 
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a) The issuer offers bondholders a new security or package of securities that amount to a 
diminished financial obligation such as new debt instruments with lower coupon or par value.  
b) The exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid a “stronger” 
event of default (such as a missed interest or principal payment). 
Another credit rating agency, Standard and Poor’s (Beers & Chambers, 2002), assumes 
that default events occur when any of the following conditions occur: 
1- For local and foreign currency bonds, notes, and bills, when either each issuer’s debt 
is considered in default either when a scheduled debt-service payment is not made on the due 
date or when an exchange offer of new debt contains less favorable terms than the original 
issue; 
2- For central bank currency, when notes are converted into new currency of less than 
equivalent face value; and 
3- For bank loans, when either scheduled debt service is not paid on the due date or a 
rescheduling of principal and/or interest is agreed to by creditors at less-favorable terms than 
the original loan. Such rescheduling agreements covering short- and long-term bank debt are 
considered defaults even where, for legal or regulatory reasons, creditors deem forced rollover 
of principal to be voluntary. 
In addition, many rescheduled sovereign bank loans are ultimately extinguished at a 
discount from their original face value. Typical deals have included exchange offers (such as 
those linked to the issuance of Brady bonds), debt/equity swaps related to government 
privatization programs, and/or buybacks for cash. Standard & Poor’s considers such 
transactions as defaults because they contain terms less favorable than the original obligation. 
As seen, credit rating agencies mainly deal with default events when defining debt 
crises, but as default events are not so easy to identify, different definitions are given for debt 
crisis, as mentioned above. For instance, Sy (2004) defines debt crisis as an event that occurs 
when the average spreads on the most liquid sovereign bonds are above 1,000 basis points (10 
percentage points). Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) classify an observation as a debt 
crisis if either or both of the following conditions occur: 
 1- There are arrears of principal or interest on external obligations toward commercial 
creditors (banks or bondholders) of more than 5% of the total outstanding commercial debt. 
2- There is a rescheduling or debt-restructuring agreement with commercial creditors 
listed in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance. 
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Debt crises are defined by the Fiscal Stress Index in the empirical literature. One of 
the most accepted definitions in the literature for the Fiscal Stress Index belongs to Baldacci 
et al. (2011a, 2011b). They assume the existence of one of four criteria as a fiscal stress: a) 
public debt default or restructuring based on Standard & Poor’s definition, b) a large IMF-
supported program which is access to 100% of quota or more, c) excessively high inflation 
rate which is an inflation rate greater than 35% per annum for developed countries and greater 
than 500% per annum for developing countries, and d) exceptionally high sovereign bond 
yields which is defined as sovereign spreads greater than 1,000 basis points or 2 SDs from the 
country average, both for advanced and developing countries. 
Gerling et al. (2017) added two new sub-criteria to the Baldacci et al.’s (2011a, 
2011b) definition for the Fiscal Stress Index. These criteria are the accumulation of domestic 
arrears and a measure of market-access loss. The main reason for adding the first criterion is 
said to be the lack of interest, which focuses solely on yields. Loss of market access includes 
excessive market pressure, and the two sub-criteria for this contain periods of low/no volume 
and sovereign-yield spikes.  
In addition to these approaches, there are also studies that define debt crises as a 
consequence of banking crises. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) find banking crises to often lead 
to debt crises. The main reason why banking crises turn into debt crises stems from the vital 
importance of banks in the payment system. Thus, a problem that arises in the banking sector 
can easily be spread to the private and public sectors. If governments attempt to rescue banks, 
as they have done in Europe following the failure of Lehman Brothers, a debt crisis can easily 
arise to the extent that systemic bailouts lead to a dramatic deterioration of a country’s fiscal 
situation or balance (Correa & Sapriza, 2014). 
 
1.3. Data and Methodology 
 
The data for variables used for constructing the fiscal stress index (FSI) is gathered from 
Oxford Economics and IMF International Financial Statistics for the period of 2003-2015. 
Our fiscal stress index is defined as a continuous variable rather than event-based, contrary to 
previous studies. The bond yield pressure, imputed interest rate on general government debt 
minus the real GDP growth rate, public sector borrowing requirements, general government 
gross debt and cyclically-adjusted primary balance variables have been used in calculating our 
fiscal stress index. The selection of variables in the construction of the index is based on 
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Baldacci et al. (2011a, 2011b) and Hernandez de Cos et al. (2014). Note also that the 
variables are standardized or weighted according to the empirical crisis literature. The weights 
of the components of the crisis index are chosen to equalize their volatility and thus avoid the 
possibility of one of the components dominating the index, hence to obtain consistent results 
concerning dates of debt crises. 
However, there is no consensus, in the literature, on how to weight the variables of the 
crisis index. Von Hagen and Ho (2003) and Eichengreen et al. (1996) divide variables into 
their respective standard deviations, while Bussierre and Fratzcher (2006) and Bussierre 
(2013) prefer to weight variables by dividing them into their variances. Another weighting 
method is to equate the volatility of each variable to the volatility of the exchange rate instead 
of weighting the variables through their own standard deviations (i.e., Kaminsky et al., 1998; 
Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Bunda & Ca’Zorri, 2010; Lestano & Jacobs, 2007; Candelon et 
al., 2012, and Yiu et al., 2009). On the other hand, some authors also utilize arbitrary weights: 
for instance, in Corsetti et al. (2001) the weights assigned to exchange rate and reserves are, 
respectively, 0.75 and 0.25. Herrera and Garcia (1999) uses standardized (or equal) weights 
for each index component  
However, all these different weighting procedures may not solve the volatility 
problem over time because the variables used in the construction of the index do not react to 
the structural changes occurring in the economy at the same magnitude. In addition, the 
different fiscal regime preferences applied in the analyzed period may affect the variables 
used in the construction of the fiscal pressure index at different degrees (Chui, 2002). Aziz et 
al. (2000), Nitithanprapas and Willett (2000) and Caramazza et al. (2004) use the method of 
deseasonalizing or detrending the index components to prevent the problem of volatility of 
the data. Moreover, Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996) and Nitithanprapas and Willett (2002) 
also suggest testing different weights for sensitivity issues. But they also conclude that the 
weighting method does not change significantly dating of crisis episodes. Note also that it is 
more appropriate to use country-specific weights for the index components as every country 
has specific economic features, instead of common weights for all the sample countries, as 
done in Sachs et al. (1996) and Edison (2003). Although these methods are mostly employed 
in currency crises, our study uses them to construct the fiscal stress index. The fiscal stress 
index is calculated as follows: 
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where BYP (Bond Yield Pressure) is government bond spreads (relative to 10-year US 
Treasury bonds), r-g is the imputed interest rate on general government debt minus real GDP 
growth rate, GGGD is General Government Gross Debt, and CAPB indicates Cyclically 
Adjusted Primary Balance/GDP. Sub-indices represent t as time, i as country, and   is the 
differential operator. Increases in BYP, r-g, PSBR, and GGDD augment fiscal pressure, while 
increases in CAPB reduce financial pressure. Because the increases in CAPB indicate a 
balanced budget, hence its effect is expected to be negative. The Fiscal Stress Index indicates 
or signals a debt crisis when it exceeds a certain threshold value. The crisis index then 
becomes a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if a crisis occurs and 0 otherwise.  
,
,
1  if FSI >optimal threshold 
0  otherwise
i t
i tC

 
       
(1.2)  
What is important here is to choose an ‘optimal’ threshold value. Several papers 
determine an arbitrary threshold; if the indicator value exceeds this specified threshold, any 
month, quarter or year is classified as a crisis episode. Note that higher the threshold level is 
the less the number of detected crisis is, and vice versa. Therefore, this arbitrary threshold 
method results in different number and effective dates of currency crises as empirically shown 
by Kamin et al. (2001), Edison (2003), and Lestano and Jacobs (2007) in the cases of 
currency crises. This actually constitutes one of the biggest problems in the crisis literature. 
On the other hand, Zhang (2001) and Edison (2003) state that values of threshold for crisis 
indexes are sample-dependent. Hence, when a severe crisis occurs, which might lead to large 
movements in the most volatile series in the index, the sample mean and the sample standard 
deviation can change substantially, causing changes in crisis dates. In other words, the 
sample-dependent nature of threshold definition implies that future data can affect the 
identification of past crisis (Abiad, 2003). 
In order to avoid problems related to threshold level, we consider different methods 
based on Candelon et al. (2012) to determine the optimal threshold value for the fiscal stress 
index of each EU-15 country. For this purpose, we use accuracy measures, sensitivity-
specificity graphics and KLR cut-off method (Kaminsky et al., 1998) to select the optimal 
threshold. The test evaluation matrix describes the threshold methods as shown in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1. Test evaluation matrix 
  Actual Value Obtained from FSI  
  Debt Crisis No Debt Crisis Total 
 Debt Crisis True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP) TP+FP (A) 
Model Estimation Results No Debt Crisis False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN) FN+TN (B) 
 Total TP+FN (C) FP+TN (D) Obs. 
Note: A = All predicted debt crises; B = All predicted non-debt crises; C = All actual crises; D = All actual non-
debt crises; and Obs. = Observations.  
 
In Table 1.1, the test is called the sensitivity for capturing correct crisis periods and is 
calculated by TP / (TP + FN). In addition, if the test is successful in capturing normal periods, 
it is said to have specificity calculated by TN / (FP + TN). In graphic methods for sensitivity-
specificity, the optimal cut-off value is determined so as to maximize sensitivity and 
specificity simultaneously and conditionally. The definition for optimal threshold and how 
performance level is determined is presented graphically in Figure 1.1. According to the 
sensitivity-specificity graphics, the cut-off value is at the intersection of sensitivity and 
specificity at the right. On the left side of the Figure 1.1., there is the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic Curve (ROC), which is often used to estimate the predicted model 
performances. Here, the area under the ROC curve takes a value between 0.5 and 1. 
Accordingly, the larger the area under the ROC curve, the higher the success rate of the 
model. The perfect model and the estimated model results are shown in Figure 1.1. 
In addition, accuracy measures are calculated as (TP + TN) / (TP + FP + FN + TN). 
Finally, the optimum threshold is obtained by the KLR method to minimize the adjusted 
noise-to-signal ratio (FP / [FP + TN] / [TP / TP + FN]).  
 
Figure 1.1. ROC curve and determination of optimal threshold using the sensitivity-
specificity graph. 
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1.4. Estimation Results 
 
We first construct a fiscal stress index for each EU-15 country according to the 
equation (1). In order to identify debt crisis periods, we need to determine optimal threshold 
(cut-off) values which are calculated by three different ways as mentioned in the previous 
section (see Table 1.2). Bold figures in the below Table indicate the optimal cut-off values for 
each country. 
Figure 1.2 present the crisis and noncrisis periods for EU-15 countries: shaded zones 
indicate crisis periods, in other words the period where the index value exceeds the optimal 
threshold value. As clearly seen from the Figure, all EU-15 countries except for Germany 
seem to have gone through the debt crisis following the global financial crisis. As expected, 
the debt crisis in Greece, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Portugal seem to 
have lasted longer compared to other countries. In addition, Greece seems to not have fully 
recovered from the debt crisis yet by the end of 2015.  
 
Table 1.2. Optimal cut-off values for EU-15  
 Accuracy measures  Sensitivity-Specificity graphic  KLR 
Country Cut-off Sensitivity Specificity  Cut-off Sensitivity Specificity  
Cut-off 
(S) 
Cut-off 
(G) 
Austria 0.410 100.0 90.90  0.410 100.0 90.90  2.535 6.381 
Belgium 2.376 50.0 90.90  1.298 100.0 90.90  3.343 6.381 
Denmark 0.371 100.0 81.80  2.254 100.0 100.0  4.211 6.381 
Finland 1.157 100.0 91.70  3.433 100.0 100.0  4.137 6.381 
France 1.035 100.0 91.70  1.788 100.0 100.0  2.161 6.381 
Germany 1.218 100.0 91.70  3.516 100.0 100.0  6.157 6.381 
Greece 0.154 100.0 80.0  0.752 100.0 100.0  9.407 6.381 
Ireland -0.277 100.0 85.70  0.435 100.0 100.0  13.521 6.381 
Italy 0.229 100.0 83.30  0.426 85.70 83.30  3.721 6.381 
Luxembourg 3.855 100.0 91.70  9.994 100.0 100.0  10.985 6.381 
Netherlands 1.058 100.0 90.90  2.523 100.0 100.0  3.972 6.381 
Portugal 1.164 100.0 87.50  1.729 100.0 100.0  5.809 6.381 
Spain 0.695 100.0 87.50  1.998 100.0 100.0  7.378 6.381 
Sweden -0.231 100.0 90.0  0.275 100.0 100.0  2.071 6.381 
United Kingdom 0.991 100.0 90.0  1.753 100.0 100.0  3.748 6.381 
Note: S and G indicate optimal threshold values for specific and all EU-15 countries, respectively. 
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Table 1.3. Debt crisis episodes from selected studies 
Country Our results: 
Crisis dates 
Hernandez de Cos et al. (2014): 
Crisis dates 
Baldacci et al. (2011a): 
Start of crisis 
Berti et al. 
(2012): 
Austria 2009 No crisis No crisis No crisis 
Belgium 2003, 2008-
2009 
No crisis No crisis No crisis 
Denmark 2008-2009 n.a. No crisis No crisis 
Finland 2009 No crisis No crisis No crisis 
France 2009 No crisis No crisis No crisis 
Germany 2005 No crisis No crisis No crisis 
Greece 2008-2015 2008-2010 2008 n.a. 
Ireland 2008-2013 2008-2010 2008 n.a. 
Italy 2007-2014 2008-2010 2008 No crisis 
Luxembourg 2008 n.a. n.a. No crisis 
Netherlands 2008-2009 No crisis No crisis No crisis 
Portugal 2009-2013 2008, 2010 2008, 2010 2009-2010 
Spain 2009-2013 n.a. 2010 2009, 2012 
Sweden 2009, 2013-
2014 
n.a. No crisis No crisis 
United 
Kingdom 
2008-2010 n.a. No crisis 2009 
Note: "n.a." indicates that the country is not covered in the study. 
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Figure 1.2. Fiscal Stress Indexes and their threshold values for EU-15 countries 
Note: Dashed areas indicate crisis periods
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When we compare our results with those of Hernandez de Cos et al. (2014), we observe 
that they do not find any crisis episode in the cases of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and 
the Netherlands in the post-2003 period. On the contrary, our results show that Austria in 
2009, Belgium in 2003, 2008, and 2009, Finland in 2009, France in 2009, and the Netherlands 
in 2008 and 2009 had a debt crisis. Besides, Hernandez de Cos et al. (2014) state that Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, and Portugal had a debt crisis from 2008 to 2010 while our index indicate that 
Greece from 2008 to 2015, Ireland from 2008 to 2013, Italy from 2007 to 2014, and Portugal 
from 2009 to 2013 suffered a debt crisis. Baldacci et al. (2011a) and Berti et al. (2012) have 
quite similar results when compared to the results of Hernandez de Cos et al. (2014) since 
they all use similar definitions for debt crisis (see Table 1.3).  
Moreover, our fiscal stress index identifies more ‘debt crisis’ episodes than previous 
empirical studies applied to debt crises, since it measures the pressure or stress level in a 
country contrary to other fiscal stress definitions that focus mainly on default events. To be 
more precise, our index indicates high fiscal pressure in 14 out of 15 countries included into 
the sample following the outbreak of the global financial crisis. The only country where the 
index does not find high fiscal stress is Germany. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to construct a weighted continuous fiscal stress index to identify 
debt crisis episodes occurred in the EU-15 countries over the period 2003-2015. Besides, we 
used three different methods to calculate ‘optimal’ threshold values for each country which is 
used to date debt crises. When the index exceeds the optimal threshold values, it signals a 
debt crisis and takes the value of 1.  
Our results indicate that 14 out of 15 countries suffered a debt crisis following the 
global financial crisis in 2008. To be more precise, 2008 is the start year of the debt crisis in 7 
out of 15 EU member countries, while 2009 is the outbreak date of debt crisis in 6 countries. 
Besides, our results show that Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (so-called PIIGS) 
spearhead other EU-15 countries in terms of crisis severity and length: 8 years for Greece, 7 
years for Italy, 6 years for Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  
On the other hand, our fiscal stress index identifies more ‘debt crisis’ episodes and 
indicates a longer crisis period for the so-called PIIGS than previous empirical studies applied 
to debt crises (Baldacci et al., 2011a; Berti et al., 2012; Hernandez de Cos et al., 2014). 
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Because our index measures the pressure or stress level in a country contrary to other fiscal 
stress definitions that focus mainly on default events. We think that our fiscal stress index 
gives more realistic results, at least for some countries, contrary to ‘over-optimistic’ results 
found in previous studies.  
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Chapter 2 
Determinants of The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: 
Application of Logit, Markov Regime Switching Model and Self 
Organizing Maps 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, the European Union went through the most severe economic and 
political crisis since its creation following the World War II. Some economists (i.e. Wolf, 
2012) stated that the crisis was the result of contagion of the US subprime crisis to Europe: as 
the crisis spread to Europe, governments and central banks heavily intervened in real and 
financial sectors to limit the negative impacts of the crisis. These expansionary policies and 
bank recue plans (in other words, nationalization of private debt) resulted in a dramatic rise in 
public debt stock leading then to sovereign debt crisis in some Eurozone member countries. 
Some argued that the crisis is related to increasing fiscal deficits and rising public debt 
stock, but these problems are the consequences of the structural factors associated with the 
Eurozone. The main argument here is the Eurozone is not an optimum currency area a la 
Mundell (1961), since there is no a risk sharing system such as an automatic fiscal transfer 
mechanism to redistribute money to areas/sectors which have been adversely affected by the 
capital and labor mobility. Moreover, Eurozone is a monetary union without a fiscal union: 
this design, permitting the free riding of fiscal policies within a framework of common 
monetary policy, led to differences in inflation rates within the Eurozone member countries. 
Inflation differences in turn caused a decrease in the trade competitiveness of high-inflation 
countries, i.e., Greece, Spain. As the option of improving the competitiveness of the economy 
through exchange rate depreciation was not available, because of the common currency, trade 
deficits steadily rose in the Southern peripheral countries leading then to constant increases in 
public debt stock (Ari, 2014). This was not an important problem until the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis. Because with the transition to European Monetary Union (EMU), 
increasing capital inflows towards peripheral countries resulted in low interest rates 
facilitating the rollover of the debt stock. In addition, low interest rates led to a decrease in 
household savings and increased consumption, causing external deficits and an increase in 
private debt stock.  
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This chapter aims to empirically identify the determinants of the European debt crisis. 
To do so, we employ three different estimation techniques, namely SOM, Logit, and Markov 
models. The main reason to use different methods is the fact that using different 
methodologies have led to inconsistent results in terms of crisis determinants and crisis 
prediction (see Berg and Patillo, 1999; Beckman et al., 2006; Comelli, 2014; Ari and 
Cergibozan, 2018 for further discussion). Hence, we first apply the SOM approach which 
allows us to visualize, via crisis maps created for each country, the transition from noncrisis to 
crisis states. Besides, the SOM analysis gives us variables’ order of importance in explaining 
the occurrence of the debt crises in the EU member countries. In other words, the SOM 
analysis serves us as a filter to determine which indicators should be included into the Logit 
and Markov model estimations. Then, we estimate logit and Markov models with the 
variables found to be significant by the SOM approach. 
According to the results obtained from different estimation techniques, in addition to 
financial and macroeconomic variables such as nonperforming loans over total loans, GDP 
growth, primary balance over GDP, unemployment, cyclically-adjusted balance over GDP, 
governance variables (i.e. voice and accountability, regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness) also play a significant role in the emergence of the European debt crisis. 
Besides, the logit and Markov models could also predict nearly all crisis and noncrisis 
episodes in EU-15 over the period of 2003-2015. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a literature 
review on empirical papers on debt crises. Section 2.3 presents the data for explanatory 
variables. Section 2.4 describes three different estimation methods used in the chapter. 
Section 2.5 discusses estimation results and forecast performance of the models. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
Although there is a large empirical literature on banking and currency crises, there is a 
limited number of empirical studies on debt crises. Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) 
examine the determinants of debt crises in sample consisting of 69 countries over the period 
from 1971 to 1998. Using logit models, they find that the probability of a debt crisis increases 
with the proportion of short-term debt (public and private) and debt service coming due and 
decreases with foreign exchange reserves. IMF (2002) analyzes the possible causes of the 
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relatively high frequency of debt crises in Latin America. The study indicates that although 
total external debt is not high relative to GDP by international standards, it is concentrated in 
the public sector and is high relative to exports and relative to tax revenue. This means that 
devaluation provides a limited boost to economic activity, hence government revenues, but it 
causes a large increase in debt-service expenditure. Besides, the macroeconomic volatility 
worsens liquidity problems and increases default risk.  
Manasse et al. (2003) test, via Logit and binary recursive tree models, the impact of core 
macroeconomic indicators on the occurrence of a debt crisis in sample of 47 countries over 
the period of 1970-2002. Their empirical results indicate that external debt ratios measuring 
solvency and sustainability (high total external debt to GDP ratio), measures of illiquidity 
(high short-term debt to reserves ratio) or refinancing risk (periods of tight international 
liquidity as proxied by the US treasury bill rate), measures of external imbalance (high current 
deficits as a percentage of GDP), negative domestic developments (low real GDP growth and 
high inflation rates), and political factors such as elections increase the probability of debt 
crisis. 
Hemming et al. (2003) empirically analyze whether there are systematic patterns in 
fiscal variables in the periods before and after crises in the cases of 29 emerging market 
countries over the period of 1970-2000, by employing a Probit model. They find that a high 
proportion of sovereign debt denominated in foreign currency, short-term debt to reserves, 
and net claims of the banking sector on central government (as a ratio of GDP) are found to 
be significant variables in explaining debt crises. 
Baldacci et al. (2011a) develop an early warning system based on the signaling 
approach of Kaminsky et al. (1998) for a large set of 165 countries over the period of 1970-
2010. Their results indicate that in advanced countries the top predictors of fiscal stress are 
gross public financing needs and fiscal solvency risks, while in emerging economies, the best 
predictors of fiscal stress are risks associated with public debt structure and exposure to 
spillovers from financial markets. Berti et al. (2012) follow the methodology used in Baldacci 
et al. (2011a), but in a limited sample consisting of 33 countries over the period from 1970 to 
2012. They show that private sector credit flow over GDP, current account over GDP, and 
yield curve are among the best predictors of fiscal stress. 
Hernandez de Cos et al. (2014) use the signaling approach with country-specific 
thresholds for a limited set of 11 Eurozone countries over the period of 1970-2010. They first 
indicate that using a country-specific threshold increases the predictive power of early 
30 
 
 
indicators in the signaling approach. Second, fiscal balance over GDP, real effective exchange 
rate, short-term debt over GDP, leverage of financial corporations, private sector credit flow 
over GDP, and real GDP growth are found to have the highest predictive power. Gerling et al. 
(2017) examine the determinants of fiscal crises for a large sample of 188 IMF member 
countries for the period of 1970-2015, via fixed effect panel regression. They find that a fiscal 
crisis tends to be preceded by loose fiscal policy measured by real expenditure growth, hence 
primary balance deterioration, and by large deterioration in the external current account.  
Bruns and Poghosyan (2018) use the extreme bound analysis (based on the pooled logit 
moel) to determine the variables leading to fiscal distress in the cases of 81 developing and 
advanced countries over the period of 1970-2015. They find that fiscal distress tends to follow 
a period of overheating in the real sector (widening of output gap) which can be associated 
with a build-up of financial imbalances, hence detrimental to systemic stability. In addition, 
adverse developments in the external sector (high current account deficit, low level of 
reserves/GDP ratio, and higher trade openness) tend to precede fiscal distress episodes. 
Moreover, foreign exchange debt to GDP ratio, primary and overall fiscal balance to GDP 
ratios, are robust indicators of debt crises. 
Cerovic et al. (2018) adopt two alternative estimation techniques, namely the signal 
approach and multivariate logit model in order to identify the structural weaknesses leading to 
debt crises in a sample of 118 countries over the period of 1970-2015. the results show that 
variables linked to domestic economic activity (large output and credit gaps), fiscal policy 
(overall or primary deficit, use of central bank credit to finance the fiscal deficit), and external 
imbalances (current account deficit and degree of openness) increase the probability of a 
future crisis 
 
2.3. Data and Leading Indicators 
 
This section presents the leading indicators that may have caused the occurrence of the 
European debt crisis. While many different leading indicators are used in explaining debt 
crises in the literature, some of them give more meaningful results in explaining debt crises. 
Hence, having a large set of leading indicators will be useful. For example, in Bussierre and 
Fratzscher (2006), 28 leading indicators of currency crises were collected in five groups. 
These groups are external competitiveness, external exposure, domestic real and public sector, 
domestic financial sector, global factor or contagion indicator. Only six of these indicators are 
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included in the final model. In our study, a very wide set of leading indicators has been used 
to explain debt crises like in Bussierre and Fratzscher (2006).  
Our dataset consists of 51 leading indicators. The selection of leading indicators is 
based on the studies by Manasse et al. (2003), Baldacci et al. (2011a, 2011b), Berti et al. 
(2012), and Hernandez de Cos et al. (2014). Our preferred approach is that all indicators are 
first used in the SOM analysis to determine which indicators are important in explaining the 
European debt crisis. Then, significant variables are used in Logit and Markov model 
estimations. Table 2.1 presents definitions and sources for the selected leading indicators used 
in the study. Their descriptive statistics are given in Table 2.2. The first set consists of public 
and real sector variables: GDP, Inflation, Unemployment, Government Expenditure / GDP, 
Primary Balance / GDP, Cyclically Adjusted Balance / GDP, Revenue / GDP, Interest 
Payments / Revenue, Interest Payments / Expenses, Cash Surplus / GDP, REER, Savings / 
Expenditures, Tax Revenue / GDP, and Wages. The second category includes financial 
indicators that exert an influence on sovereign debt situations: Bank capital / Asset, Non-
performing Loans / Total Loans, Banking Sector Leverage, M2 / GDP, and Banking Crisis 
Index. The study uses Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) definition of banking crisis.  
Our third set of indicators encompasses different debt ratios: External Debt / Export, 
External Debt / GDP, External Debt Government / GDP, External Debt Private / GDP, Net 
Debt / GDP, and Household Debt / GDP. Social indicators constitute our fourth set: Health 
Expenditure / GDP, Public Health Expenditure / GDP, Gini Coefficient, Gross Enrollment 
Ratio, Fertility Rate, and Age Dependency Ratio. Excessive increases in health expenditures, 
deterioration in income distribution, decline in education level, decline in fertility rate, and 
increase in age dependency ratio are expected to increase the likelihood of debt crisis.  
Finally, our fifth and last set includes governance indicators. Only a very small number 
of studies have examined the effect of governance quality on the likelihood of debt crises 
(Manessa et al, 2003; Guscina, 2008). The governance indicators used in the study are 
Political Stability Risk Rating, Credit Rating, Trade-Credit Risk Rating, Government 
Effectiveness, Political Stability and Freedom from Violence / Terrorism, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability. The deterioration of countries’ governance 
indicators is expected to increase the likelihood of a debt crisis. We have used Kaufmann et 
al. (2011) for defining governance indicators. Accordingly, voice and accountability cover 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, election of government, and free media for a 
nation’s citizens.  
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Table 2.1. Notation, Source, and Expected Sign of Variables  
INDICATOR ABBREVIATION SOURCE EXPECTED SIGN 
Current account of balance of payments  
(% of GDP) 
CA/GDP WB (-) 
GDP, real, annual growth GDP growth WB (-) 
Exports, goods & services (% of GDP) X/GDP WB (-) 
Inflation, consumer prices index (annual %) Inflation WB (+) 
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) H. Expenditure (Total)/GDP WB (+) 
Unemployment rate (%) Unemployment WB (+) 
Government expenditure as % of GDP GOV.EXP/GDP WB (+) 
Foreign direct investment, inward, share of GDP FDI/GDP WB (+) 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) CPS/GDP WB (+) 
Health expenditure, public (% of government expenditure) H.EXP (Public)/GOV.EXP WB (+) 
Primary net lending/borrowing (also referred as primary balance) (% of GDP) Primary Balance/GDP IMF (-) 
Cyclically adjusted balance (% of potential GDP) Cyclically Adjusted Balance 
/GDP 
IMF (-) 
Revenue (% of GDP) Revenue/GDP IMF (-) 
Reserves, foreign exchange, excluding gold, US$ Reserves WB (-) 
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) Cash Balance/GDP IMF (-) 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) Tax Revenue/GDP WB (-) 
Savings/Expenditures Savings/Expenditures WB (-) 
Imports, goods & services (% of GDP) M/GDP WB (+) 
Trade balance /GDP Trade/GDP WB (-) 
External debt, total, share of exports EX-DEBT/X WB (+) 
Political stability risk rating (7=lowest risk) PSRR OE (-) 
Credit rating, average Credit Rating OE (-) 
Exchange rate, effective real REER OE (+) 
External debt, total, share of GDP EX-DEBT/GDP WB (+) 
External debt government/GDP EX-DEBT-GOV/GDP WB (+) 
External debt private/GDP EX-DEBT-PRIVATE/GDP WB (+) 
Foreign direct investment, outward, share of GDP OFDI/GDP WB (+) 
Wages, hourly, US$ WAGE OE (-) 
Net debt (% of GDP) NET_DEBT/GDP IMF (+) 
Bank capital to assets ratio (%) CAPITAL/ASSETS WB (-) 
Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%) NPL/TGL WB (+) 
Trade credit risk rating (7=lowest risk) TCRR OE (-) 
Household Debt/GDP Household Debt/GDP OE (+) 
Control of Corruption Corruption WB (-) 
Government Effectiveness GOV.EFFECT WB (-) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism PSAVTT WB (-) 
Regulatory Quality Regulatory Quality WB (-) 
Rule of Law Rule of Law WB (-) 
Voice and Accountability Voice and Accountability WB (-) 
Gini coefficient GINI COEFF WIID, 
SWIID 
(+) 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%) Enrolment Tertiary WB (-) 
Gross enrollment ratio, primary, both sexes (%) Enrolment Primary WB (-) 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary, both sexes (%) Enrolment Secondary WB (-) 
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) Fertility Rate WB (-) 
Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population) Age Dependency WB (+) 
Interest payments (% of revenue) INT_PAY/REVENUE WB (+) 
Interest payments (% of expense) INT_PAY/EXPENSE WB (+) 
Banking sector leverage Bank Leverage WB (+) 
M2/GDP M2/GDP OE (+) 
Fiscal Stress Index FSI Authors 
Calculation 
 
Democracy Democracy PP (-) 
Index of Banking Crises  Banking Crises (Laeven and 
Valencia, 
2013) 
(+) 
Note: Abbrev, Obs, Mis. Val, M, Min and Max denote abbreviation, observations, missing value, mean, minimum and maximum, 
respectively. WB, IMF, OE, PP, WIID and SWIID indicate World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Oxford Economics, Polity Projects, 
World Income Inequality Database and Standardized World Income Inequality Database, respectively. 
 
Political stability and the freedom from violence/terrorism demonstrate the possibility of 
government destabilization or overthrow through unconstitutional political violence or 
terrorism. The government effectiveness indicator is the government’s policy-making and 
implementation quality and the credibility of its commitment to such policies as well as the 
degree to which public services are independent of political repression. Rule of law shows the 
implementation of contracts in addition to opportunities for crime and violence; the quality of 
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the police, courts, and property rights; and the level of trust and compliance of individuals 
with society. Control of corruption refers to the use of public power for special gains, with 
small or large corruption in addition to elite and private interests seizing public power. 
Political stability refers to the stability of the current government and the entire political 
system. Trade-credit risk rating means that the trading partner cannot fulfill its obligations. 
The democracy index refers to the country’s level of democracy. 
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Data Set 
INDICATOR OBS MIS.VAL. MEAN STD.DEV. MIN MAX 
Current account of balance of payments  
(% of GDP) 
 195 0(0%)  0.94  5.48  -14.43 11.93 
GDP, real, annual growth  195 0(0%) 1.17  2.82  -9.17 8.40 
Exports, goods & services (% of GDP)  195 0(0%) 54.52  39.96  18.54 213.85 
Inflation, consumer prices index (annual %)  195 0(0%) 1.79  1.36  -4.46 4.93 
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)  180 15(7.69%)  9.52  1.20  6.80 11.97 
Unemployment rate (%)  195 0(0%)  8.46  4.65   2.33 27.51 
Government expenditure as % of GDP  195 0(0%) 48.11  5.90  32.96 65.65 
Foreign direct investment, inward, share of GDP  193 2(1.02%) 37.58  138.23  -6.75 1,144.76 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 195 0(0%) 110.77 35.83 54.56 202.19 
Health expenditure, public (% of government expenditure) 180 15(7.69%) 15.11 2.14 9.29 20.86 
Primary net lending/borrowing (also referred as primary 
balance) (% of GDP) 
195 0(0%) -0.94 3.71 -29.73 6.04 
Cyclically adjusted balance (% of potential GDP) 195 0(0%) -2.53 3.39 -18.61 4.01 
Revenue (% of GDP)  195 0(0%)    45.03          6.18    32.79      57.44 
Reserves, foreign exchange, excluding gold, US$ 195 0(0%) 25,169.38 24,607.29 143.55 119,026 
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) 179 16(8.20%) -3.51 4.23 -32.37 4.11 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 179 16(8.20%) 22.22 5.85 0.31 35.08 
Savings/Expenditures 194 1(0.51%) 0.28 0.14 0.08 0.85 
Imports, goods & services (% of GDP) 195 0(0%) 50.45 31.81 22.92 177.65 
Trade balance /GDP 195 0(0%) 4.08 9.10 -12.55 36.20 
External debt, total, share of exports 190 5(2.56%) 673.46 498.41 258.78 2,807.26 
Political stability risk rating (7=lowest risk) 195 0(0%) 5.81 0.62 4.26 6.83 
Credit rating, average 195 0(0%) 17.88 4.15 0.00 20.00 
Exchange rate, effective real 195 0(0%) 101.52 5.46 88.99 127.40 
External debt, total, share of GDP 190 5(2.56%) 511.16 983.55 82.98 5,490.03 
External debt government/GDP 179 16(8.20%) 41.96 25.61 1.65 152.47 
External debt private/GDP 177 18 (9.23%) 214.75 195.45 33.51 1,067.07 
Foreign direct investment, outward, share of GDP 182 13(6.67%) 39.26 128.79 -3.95 833.68 
Wages, hourly, US$ 182 13(6.67%) 32.44 10.10 8.19 51.67 
Net debt (% of GDP) 164 21(10.77%) 42.88 47.10 -69.74 176.57 
Bank capital to assets ratio (%) 170 25(12.82%) 5.77 1.51 3.00 13.97 
Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%) 187 8(4.10%) 4.58 5.93 0.08 34.67 
Trade credit risk rating (7=lowest risk) 152 23(11.79%) 5.32 1.99 0.00 7.00 
Household Debt/GDP 125 70(35.90%) 84.16 36.15 46.78 217.51 
Control of Corruption 195 0(0%) 1.54 0.71 -0.25 2.55 
Government Effectiveness 195 0(0%) 1.51 0.51 0.21 2.36 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 195 0(0%) 0.81 0.46 -0.47 1.66 
Regulatory Quality 195 0(0%) 1.43 0.38 0.34 1.92 
Rule of Law 195 0(0%) 1.49 0.48 0.24 2.12 
Voice and Accountability 195 0(0%) 1.35 0.24 0.56 1.83 
Gini coefficient 135 60(30.77%) 36.66 3.09 28.51 44.56 
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%) 156 39(20%) 67.44 16.33 10.33 110.26 
Gross enrollment ratio, primary, both sexes (%) 172 23(11.79%) 103.98 4.86 95.71 120.90 
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary, both sexes (%) 172 23(11.79%) 110.46 13.14 91.39 164.81 
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 180 15(7.69%) 1.64 0.24 1.21 2.06 
Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population) 195 0(0%) 25.90 3.99 15.25 35.08 
Interest payments (% of revenue) 195 16(8.20%) 6.77 3.79 0.27 17.29 
Interest payments (% of expense) 179 16(8.20%) 6.16 3.13 0.28 14.20 
Banking sector leverage 180  15(7.69%) 16.03 9.52 3.89 51.56 
M2/GDP 182 13(6.67%) 81.31 22.09 41.62 133.32 
Fiscal Stress Index 195 0(0%) 0.72 2.83 -9.78 15.99 
Democracy 195 0 (0%) 9.84 0.48 8.00 10.00 
Index of Banking Crises (Laeven and Valencia, 2013) 195 0 (0%) 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Note: Obs, Mis. Val, M, Min and Max denote observations, missing value, mean, minimum and maximum, respectively. 
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2.4. Methodology 
 
This section presents the three different methods used to determine the indicators that 
play a role in the emergence of the European debt crisis. The methods used in the study are 
Self Organizing Maps (SOMs) or Kohonen Maps, Multivariate Logit Model (MLM), and 
Panel Markov Regime Switching Model (PMRSM). The previous literature testing the 
likelihood of a debt crisis rests on models such as Logit-Probit, Signal Approach, and Markov 
Regime Switching. In this study, the results of SOM, Logit, and are given in a comparative 
way. In addition, we test the stability of estimates. Last but not least, predicting performance 
of each method is presented. The first method used in the study is the SOM. This model 
allows the simultaneous use of more variables compared to other methods, and the error based 
on omitted variables is reduced to a minimum by including many of the variables that can 
cause debt crisis. The SOM results help determine the important factors that played a role in 
the emergence of the European debt crisis. After determining the significant variables via the 
SOM, we use these variables in Logit and estimations. 
 
2.4.1. Self-Organizing Map 
 
The SOM, or Kohonen map, is a very effective tool for analyzing existing patterns in 
high-dimensional datasets. SOM basically shows the relationship between input data much 
easier by visually simplifying relationships that are hard to see in large datasets. SOM does 
this by offering low-dimensional images of high-dimensional data. In other words, SOM size 
reduction tools provide the researcher with the convenience of complex datasets. SOM is an 
unsupervised competitive learning methodology introduced in the artificial neural network 
literature by Kohonen (1982). SOM is a nonlinear and nonparametric method, unlike other 
methods used in economics and does not rely on rigid assumptions. Based on this, SOM 
provides important advantages for researchers. For instance, including too many variables at 
the same time in the majority of econometric methods results in multicollinearity where too 
many parameters cannot be predicted due to observation constraints. Although the SOM 
method has been used extensively in a large number of scientific fields since it first appeared 
in the literature, its use economics is very rare. Some examples of the use of SOM in 
economic studies include Serrano-Cinca (1996), Kiviluoto (1998), Lee et al. (2005), 
Shanmuganathan et al. (2006), Giovanis (2010), Sarlin (2011a), Sarlin and Peltonen (2013), 
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Louis et al. (2013), Claveria et al. (2016), and Deichmann et al. (2017). Applied examples of 
SOM in economics are Sarlin (2011a, 2011b, 2013) and Sarlin and Marghescu (2011). The 
topological structure of SOM networks is shown in the Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1. The topology of the SOM network. 
 
 
Each circle in the left graph shows neurons. Neurons are represented by rectangles or 
hexagons. A SOM network consists of two-layers of nodes: the input and the output. Note 
that high-dimensional inputs are transformed into a two-dimensional map. The main purpose 
of the SOM is to reflect this similarity to the output layer, preserving its similarity with the 
input data. At this point, the whole relationship can be preserved at first, and this can be 
transformed into more easily explainable visuals. As seen in the Figure 2.1, each of the input 
neurons is connected to the output neurons with specific weights. These weights are randomly 
determined at the beginning of process, but the most successful neuron is activated by SOM’s 
competitive learning algorithm, and the similarity between input and output layers is 
maintained at the highest level; this means that these weights are learned and adjusted. Here, 
the winning neuron is known as the best matching unit (BMU). The important point here is 
that each output layer has a single coordinate and that the distance between the output layers 
can be easily calculated. On this count, each output layer will be positioned in a two-
dimensional map based on the similarity of the weights of the output layers. While neurons 
with similar weights are positioned closer, non-similar neurons will be located further away. 
In SOM, each input data is basically expressed by an n-dimensional input vector
 1 2, ,...,
T n
nX X X X R  , where each element represents the property value of the input 
data. In addition, each input in the SOM depends on the specific weight mij of each node. This 
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weight is expressed by 1 2, ,...,
Tn n
ij ij ij ijm m m m R     usually as a codebook vector. Here the 
size of the codebook vector is obviously equal to the number of inputs (Stefanovic & 
Kurasova, 2011). The SOM process has four basic elements: initialization, competition, 
cooperation, and adaptation, realized in five steps by the SOM algorithm (Vesanto & 
Alhoniemi, 2000; Sarlin & Peltonen, 2013): 
Step 1. Initialization: All connections are provided with an initial weight. 
Step 2. Competition: By using Euclidean distances, compare each input vector xj with 
each output vector mi and find the best match mb. The winning node is commonly known as 
the Best Matching Unit (BMU). 
minb i
i
x m x m  
       (2.1) 
Here, the smallest Euclidean distance may be defined as the BMU. 
Step 3. Cooperation and adaptation: In the input space, the BMU and its topological 
neighbors are closely located to the input vector. The update rule for the prototype vector of 
unit i is 
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )]i i bi im t m t t h t x t m t         (2.2) 
where t is the number of iterations, ( )t  is the adaptation coefficient, and ( )bih t  denotes the 
neighborhood Kernel centered on the BMU. Neighborhood function is often calculated using 
the Gaussian neighborhood function: 
2
( ) 2
exp
2 ( )
b i
bi j
r r
h
t
 
  
 
 
       (2.3) 
where rb and ri are two-dimensional coordinates of the reference vectors, mb and mi, 
respectively, and the radius of the neighborhood σ(t) is the monotonically decreasing learning 
factor at time t. 
Step 4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 for sufficient iterations and convergence. 
Step 5. By using the SOM-based K-means clustering method, gather the nodes into a 
small number of clusters. 
The flow chart for the SOM used in this study is shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
Giving a simple numerical example for a better understanding of SOM’s algorithm 
would be appropriate. Suppose there are 30 countries that have four qualities to be analyzed. 
The main purpose of using the SOM in this sample is to separate the homogeneous subgroups 
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by considering the four basic characteristics of these 30 heterogeneous countries. In this 
respect, countries with similar characteristics will be gathered in the same groups. The sample 
data is also shown in Table 2.3. The four characteristics of the 30 countries are identified by 
A1, A2, A3, and A4, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.2. Flowchart of the SOM method 
 
 
 
In this example, the SOM network consists of four input nodes and four output nodes. 
Small numbers of input and output nodes are chosen for the simplicity of calculation. An 
example of the SOM architecture is represented in Figure 2.3. 
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Table 2.3. Sample Dataset 
 Attributes 
Country A1 A2 A3 A4 
1 0.81 0.70 0.75 0.07 
2 0.90 0.03 0.25 0.05 
3 0.12 0.27 0.50 0.53 
4 0.91 0.04 0.69 0.77 
… … … … … 
30 0.17 0.22 0.56 0.44 
Note: Due to the space constraint, the entire table is not included. The numbers are derived randomly between 0 
and 1. 
 
Figure 2.3. An example of SOM architecture 
 
 
As emphasized above in the SOM analysis, initial weights must be determined at 
random (see Table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4. Initial Weights 
Attributes W1 W2 W3 W4 
1 0.18 0.81 0.25 0.10 
2 0.26 0.86 0.80 0.96 
3 0.14 0.08 0.43 0.01 
4 0.13 0.39 0.91 0.77 
Note: W indicates initial weights. Different weight values are selected for the four nodes. 
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Suppose that our first calculation is made for the randomly chosen second country. In 
this case x (0) = (0.90, 0.03, 0.25, 0.05) shows the response of the second country, or its 
qualification. The Euclidian distances calculated for the four output nodes in the model for 
determining the node that gives the best result for the second country are listed below: 
 
         
         
         
       
2 2 2 2
1
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
3
2 2 2
4
0 0.90 0.18 0.03 0.26 0.25 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.768
0 0.90 0.81 0.03 0.86 0.25 0.08 0.05 0.39 0.917
0 0.90 0.25 0.03 0.80 0.25 0.43 0.05 0.91 1.337
0 0.90 0.10 0.03 0.96 0.25 0.01 0.05
d
d
d
d
        
        
        
        
2
0.77 1.443 
 
 
The results show the node in d1(0) = 0.768 to have the minimum Euclidean distance. 
Accordingly, the first output node gives the most similar result to the input data. In the other 
30 countries, the best matching output node can be identified in the same way. Now that the 
BMU has been identified, the neighbors’ weights can be updated accordingly. To make it 
simple from the beginning, let’s assume that the learning rate ( ) is 0.9, which is close to 1, 
meaning the best value. If the learning rate is zero, there will be no remaining updates as if the 
weights of the vectors had been predicted. For the BMU, the current weights calculated 
according to Equation 2.2 will be: 
 
 
 
 
 
11
12
13
14
1 0.18 0.90 0.18 0.83
1 0.26 0.03 0.26 0.05
0.9
0.14 0.25 0.14 0.241
0.13 0.05 0.13 0.061
w
w
w
w
          
          
                       
                      
 
 
As observed, the higher the learning rate is, the higher the similarity with the input. The 
updated weights for the neighboring units as calculated according to the Gaussian 
neighborhood function in Equation 2.3 are shown below at t = 0: 
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 
 
 
 
 
 
       
     
2
12 2
2
13 2
2
14 2
2 2 2 2
12
2 2 2
13
0.910
0 exp 0.662
2. 1
0.994
0 exp 0.611
2. 1
0.961
0 exp 0.631
2. 1
0.18 0.81 0.26 0.86 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.39 0.910
0.18 0.25 0.26 0.80 0.14 0.43 0.13 0
h
h
h
where
d
d
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
        
        
       
2
2 2 2 2
14
.91 0.994
0.18 0.10 0.26 0.96 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.77 0.961d

        
 
 
The calculated weights for output node 2 are: 
 
 
 
 
 
21
22
23
24
1 0.81 0.90 0.81 0.86
1 0.86 0.03 0.86 0.37
0.9 0.662
0.08 0.25 0.08 0.181
0.39 0.05 0.39 0.191
 
     
w
w
w
w
          
          
                       
                      
 
The calculated weights for output node 3 are: 
 
 
 
 
 
31
32
33
34
1 0.25 0.90 0.25 0.61
1 0.80 0.03 0.80 0.05
0.9 0.611
0.43 0.25 0.43 0.011
0.91 0.05 0.91 0.441
w
w
w
w
          
          
                       
                      
 
 
The calculated weights for output node 4 are: 
 
 
 
 
 
41
42
43
44
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Finally, as the weights have been determined for all output nodes, the adjusted weight 
vectors of the winning node and its neighborhood are given below: 
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Figure 2.4 shows the distance matrix, Unified Distance Matrix (U-Matrix) and 
clustering results based on SOM. The U-Matrix is formulated as follows (Stefanovic and 
Kurasova, 2011): 
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(2.4) 
where uij|i(j+1) uij|j(i+1)j, Mij, and Mi(j+1) refer to the distance between neighboring neurons. First, 
the U-Matrix in the middle of Figure 2.4 shows the distance between neurons, while the scale 
displays the distance between neurons. The convergence of the scale to red indicates increases 
in the distance between neurons, while the convergence of the scale to blue indicates 
decreases in the distance between neurons. Blue and near blue scale values shows similar 
cluster groups, and scale values of red and near red indicate the separation point of the 
clusters. On the left side of Figure 2.4, there is the distance matrix which is the 3D 
representation of the U-Matrix. This representation clearly shows the distances and 
proximities between neurons. Similar neurons are located in the same clusters, and different 
clusters pass from the point where the distance increases. High values in the distance matrix 
indicate the borders of different cluster groups, while low values show the groups. The size of 
the low values indicates that the factors belonging to that group are also large. As emphasized 
in Mostafa’s (2010) study, the U-Matrix is used in many studies to be able to see the clusters’ 
structure. But classifying via the U-Matrix is very difficult due to the lack of clarity in 
clusters’ visuality. In order not to encounter such a problem in the study, we use the SOM-
based K-means clustering method. The right side of the Figure shows the clusters obtained 
based on SOM. Here, the Davies-Bouldin Validity Index (DBVI) is used to select the best 
among the differences. At this point, an attempt is made to determine the optimal number of 
clusters. DBVI is obtained as follows (Vesanto & Alhoniemi, 2000): 
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(2.5) 
where SG represents the internal cluster distance, dGE stands for cluster distance, and G 
indicates cluster number. DBVI is a very convenient way to determine the optimal number of 
clusters because it gives the lowest values that indicate the best clustering results. 
Accordingly, the U-Matrix result shows the two regions are very close to red, so all the 
data have two different cluster boundaries. The three different clusters obtained by dividing 
all the data by two cut points are shown on the right. Note that, unlike the U-Matrix, borders 
and clusters are quite noticeable. Thus, different clusters are seen more clearly. 
 
Figure 2.4. Distance matrix, U-Matrix, and SOM-based clusters. 
 
Note: From left to right: distance matrix, U-matrix and the SOM based clusters. 
 
Once SOM estimates are made, the quality of the estimates should be tested. This is a 
very important factor for the success of the estimation results. Two measurement methods are 
used for this, namely Quantization Error (QE) and Topographic Error (TE). QE is an 
important tool used to show how compatible the input data is with the generated map. 
Basically, this method is based on calculating the mean distance from the best matching input 
vector (Asan & Ercan, 2012). QE is calculated as follows: 
   
1 T
QE b
t
E X t m t
T
 
       
(2.6) 
where X is the input vector and mb is the winning neuron. The second method used to measure 
SOM quality is TE. As the map is a protected map, TE expresses how well the properties of 
the input data are preserved. Accordingly, TE is calculated as follows: 
  
1 T
QE
t
E u X t
T
 
        
(2.7) 
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where T is the number of inputs. In addition, when the winning vector of vector X is closer to 
the neuron, u(X(t)) = 0. Otherwise, u(X(t))=1 (Stefanovic & Kurasova, 2011). 
No clarity exists on determining the importance of variables in studies using the SOM 
method in economics. The components of SOM are interpreted without any definite 
relationship is established. However, some techniques are used in natural sciences to identify 
more clearly the significance of variables in SOM analysis. These are structuring index (SI), 
relative importance index (RI), cluster description index (CD), and Spearman rank correlation 
index (SRC) (Ki et al., 2016).  
The SI index is originally developed and used by Park et al (2005) and Tison et al (2004, 
2005). A variable used in the model with a low SI value indicates that the effect of that 
variable on the cluster of the SOM map is also low. Therefore, variables with high SI values 
explain a significant portion of the differentiation between cluster groups. The SI value of 
variable i can be calculated as follows: 
1
1 1
jS
ij ik
i
j k j k
w w
SI
r r

 




        
(2.8) 
where the nominator and denominator respectively show the weight and topological 
differences between j and k map units, while S represents the total number of map units. 
Another index used to determine the significance level of variables in the emergence of SOM-
based clusters is the Relative Importance Index. In RI indexes, each variable is expressed 
based on the distance matrix as a pie chart proportional to the sum of the variables. In 
addition, the sum of these effects is standardized at 100. In other words, the importance of the 
variables in the model depends on what size they have in the pie chart. Accordingly, i is 
expected to have a high RI value if it is to have a high effect on the SOM structure. 
Vesanto (2002) uses the CD index which expresses the variation in each cluster. Thanks 
to the CD index, the internal properties of each cluster can be displayed. The CD index is 
calculated as follows: 
1 1
1, 1
( 1)
     where  
CC C
D Cli li
i li liC C
l l imim m
C S
CC S S
S

 
 

   

    (2.9) 
where σli and σi respectively indicate the standard deviations of the variable in cluster l and the 
whole data set, while C shows the total number of clusters. A high CD value calculated for a 
variable means that the variable has high significance when it occurs in different clusters.  
However, these methods can give quite different order of importance in estimates. In 
other words, while a variable is found to be important for an index, it may have a lower 
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significance for other indexes. This inconsistency poses problems in interpreting the 
estimation results. Hence, we use all four techniques mentioned above, namely SI, RI, CD, 
and SRC following the literature. Then, we also calculate two different overall to avoid any 
contradictory results. The Overall Index (1) is calculated with the following steps: 
1- First, four different index values are converted into percentage values. For this, the 
highest value of each index is accepted as 100 and all other values are calculated 
based on this value. The main purpose of doing this is to get a chance to compare 
different indices from the same unit. 
2- As each index is expressed as a percentage, the following calculation is made so 
that each index has an overall weight equal to: 
 
       
1
4
 i i i i
X SI X RI X CD X SRC
Overall Index
  

  (2.10) 
where Xi represents the SI, RI, CD and SRC values of the variable i.  
The Overall Index (2) is calculated as follows: 
 2 SI CD SRCRI
SI RI CD SRC
SI CD SRCRI
Overall Index
  
   
  
      (2.11) 
where SI , RI , CD  and SRC  show the standard deviations for the SI, RI, CD and SRC 
indexes, respectively. SI  , RI  , CD  and SRC  indicate the means of the SI, RI, CD and SRC 
indexes, respectively. Here the main purpose of dividing the indices into their standard 
deviations by subtracting their averages is to standardize the indices and ensure that no factor 
dominates the overall index. In other words, the effect of extreme results is minimized with 
the aim of obtaining more consistent results. Similarly, indexing is a frequently used method 
in the crisis literature.2  
 Finally, the SOM’s performance matrix is used to determine the factors that cause the 
European Debt Crisis. The SOM forecast performance matrix is expressed as follows: The 
success of predicting crisis and noncrisis episodes after SOM estimates are expressed using 
the above matrix. According to this, the percentage of correctly estimated debt crisis periods 
is calculated as TP / (TP + TN), while the percentage of correctly estimated non-debt crisis 
periods is calculated as TN / (FP + TN).  
 
 
                                                 
2 For more information on the different indexing methods, see Arı and Cergibozan (2016). 
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Table 2.5. SOM Forecast Performance Matrix 
  Actual Value Obtained from FSI  
  Debt Crisis No Debt Crisis Total 
 Debt Crisis True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP) TP + FP (A) 
SOM Predicted Results No Debt Crisis False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN) FN + TN (B) 
 Total TP + FN (C) FP + TN (D)  
 Note: A: All predicted debt crises, B: All predicted non-debt crises, C: All actual crises, D: All actual non-debt 
crises 
 
2.4.2. Multivariate Logit Model 
 
This sub-section presents the logit model which is used to test the statistical significance 
of the variables found to be significant in the SOM analysis in explaining the emergence of 
the European debt crisis. Logit method is widely used in crisis literature (e.g. Eliasson and 
Kreuter, 2001; Kumar et al., 2003; Lestano et al., 2005; Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006; 
Candelon et al., 2012). Since crises have a nonlinear structure, logit models, nonlinear by 
natures, are frequently used in crisis estimations. As a dependent variable in the logit model, 
the Fiscal Stress Index is converted into a binary variable. According to this, the Fiscal Stress 
Index has a value of "1" for values above the threshold and "0" for other cases. "1" refers to 
debt crisis periods while "0" means normal periods.   
Logit models are known as binary selection or qualitative response models, and the 
resultant Y of these models is "1" when the event occurs, and "0" otherwise. In this study, the 
event can be expressed as the occurrence or non-occurrence of a debt crisis. The linear 
probability model is the simplest binary-choice model, and in these models the likelihood of 
an occurrence of event is defined as a linear function depending on p, an explanatory variable 
or variables (Dougherty, 2007): 
1 2( 1)i i ip p Y X            (2.12) 
Here, the p value cannot be observed. In this case, the only data is the model’s result, Y. 
In linear probability models, a dummy variable is used for this dependent variable. 
Unfortunately, linear probability models have significant shortcomings. The first shortcoming 
is confronted as problems related to the error term. Generally, there are two non-statistical and 
random parts of the dependent variable Yi for observation i. The non-stochastic part depends 
on the Xi variable and the parameters and is equal to the conditional expected value of Yi, E(Yi 
| Xi). Here the random part is the error term. 
( | )i i i iY E Y X u                                                                                                                         (2.13) 
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Calculating the non-stochastic part for observation i is quite simple because Y can only 
take two values, 1 with pi probability and 0 with (1 - pi) probability: 
1 2( ) 1 0 (1 )i i i i iE Y p p p X                                                         (2.14) 
The expected value of observation i is 1 2 iX  , meaning that the model can be 
rewritten as follows: 
1 2i i iY X u                                                                                      (2.15) 
The probability function is, thus, the simultaneous non-stochastic part of the 
relationship between Y and X. From this perspective, the error term must be 1 2(1 )iX    in 
order for the Yi result to take the value 1. For the model result to be 0, the error term must be -
ß1 ⎼ ß2Xi. So, the distribution of the error term consists of only two values, and this 
distribution is not normal or even continuous. This means that standard errors and general test 
statistics are invalid. In addition to this, the two values for error distribution vary with X, so 
the distribution is also heteroscedastic. The population variance of ui can be shown as 
1 2 1 2( )(1 )i iX X       which varies with Xi (Dougherty, 2007). 
Both the logit and probit model approaches can overcome the limitation of the linear 
probability model whose negative and positive estimates values are greater than 1. This 
constraint is overcome by using a function that effectively transforms the regression function. 
After this transformation, values adjusted to the model are limited to range between 0 and 1. 
The visually adjusted regression model is S-shaped as opposed to linear probability models. 
The logistic function F, which is the function of any z, is expressed as follows (Brooks, 
2014): 
1
( )
1 1
i
i i
z
i z z
e
F z
e e
 
 
                                                                               (2.16) 
where e is exponential under the logit approach. The main reason for naming the model this 
way is that the F function is a cumulative logistic distribution. Thus, the predicted logistic 
model is as follows: 
1 2 2( ... )
1
1 i k ki ii x x u
P
e       


                                                                            (2.17) 
where Pi is the probability that the result is 1i  . In the framework of the logistic model, 0 
and 1 are the function’s asymptotes. Hence, even if the probabilities never drop to exactly 0 or 
reach 1, they can converge. In Equation 2.16, when zi approaches infinity, i
ze  approaches 
zero and 1/ (1 )ize  approaches 1; when zi approaches negative infinity, i
ze  approaches 
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infinity and 1/ (1 )ize  approaches 0. This model is not explicitly linear and cannot be 
linearized with any transformation. Therefore, it cannot be predicted using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS), but with maximum likelihood estimation (Brooks, 2014). Note that Logit and 
probit regressions often produce similar results (Stock & Watson, 2010). 
Some important problems are encountered when using the logit model in empirical 
studies. The first one is to determine the optimal threshold for the fiscal stress index to 
transform it into binary crisis variable. Another problem is how to determine the critical value 
(cut-off) used to assess the predictive performance of the estimated model. Choosing a lower 
threshold value would raise the number of correctly predicted crises, but at the expense of 
increasing the number of false alarms (Type II errors). By contrast, choosing a higher 
threshold value would reduce the number of false alarms, but at the expense of increasing the 
number of missed crises (Type I errors). Here, the modeler solves this trade-off problem by 
defining a threshold probability according to the relative importance given to Type I versus 
Type II errors (Bussierre & Fratzscher, 2006). Researchers often set a value of 0.5 as the 
critical value. However, as stated by Chui (2002) the sample is relatively unbalanced in favor 
of noncrisis periods. Therefore, choosing a threshold value of 0.5 would underestimate the 
predictive power of the EWS model (Esquivel & Larrain, 1998). For this reason, lower critical 
values (i.e. 0.25 and 0.2) are used to evaluate the predictive performance of the models  
Finally, the performance evaluation matrix of the logit model is used to determine the 
factors that have led to the European debt crisis. The logit forecast performance matrix is 
similar to that of SOM. The success of the logit model is calculated by taking into account the 
different cut-off values (0.50, 0.25, 0.20) as noted above, unlike the SOM. However, the 
correct percent estimate of the crisis periods is calculated as TP / (TP + FN) and the estimated 
percentage of normal periods as TN / (FP + TN). 
 
Table 2.6. Logit Forecast Performance Matrix 
  Actual Value Obtained from FSI  
  Debt Crisis No Debt Crisis Total 
 Debt Crisis True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP) TP + FP (A) 
Logit Results No Debt Crisis False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN) FN + TN (B) 
 Total TP + FN (C) FP + TN (D)  
 Note: A: All predicted debt crisis, B: All predicted non-debt crisis, C: All actual crisis, D: All actual non-crisis  
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2.4.3. Panel Markov Regime-Switching Model 
 
The Markov model is the third method used in this chapter. This estimation technique is 
also frequently used in recent papers on financial crises (i.e. Martinez-Peria, 2002; Arias and 
Erlandsson, 2004, Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten, 2006; Brunetti et al., 2008; Candelon et al., 
2012). One of the main reasons that motivate economists to employ the Markov approach is 
due to the transformation of the continuous crisis indicator into a binary variable through 
arbitrary threshold values. Because, this transformation may lead to a loss of information 
regarding crisis duration. The Markov model addresses this issue, as the crisis index is used in 
a continuous format, unlike the logit model. In other words, the Markov model does not 
require a prior dating of crises; instead, identifying crisis periods are determined within the 
model itself (Abiad, 2007). Therefore, event-based studies still use logit/probit models. 
Besides, the Markov model in which the regimes (crisis and noncrisis) are modeled within the 
model without an arbitrary cut-off value. 
In addition, as stated in Fratzscher (2003) and Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten (2006), the 
Markov model allows measuring the impact of non-observed factors such as shifts in 
investors’ expectations on the occurrence of crises. Therefore, the Markov method is 
preferred to logit model in order to include the factors that cannot be observed but that have 
an effect on debt crises in estimations. The Markov model may be written as follows for the 
purpose of the study: 
        
          
t tt S t S t
y x u         1,....,t T                
2~ . . .(0, )
tt S
u i i d       0 1(1 )tS t tS S          (2.18) 
        1
(1 )
tS t t
S S    
          
2 2 2
0 1(1 )tS t tS S                  
where y shows the fiscal stress index, and x is the matrix of explanatory variables.  ,   and 
   are assumed to depend on the invisible state variable. 
Let st be a random variable that can take only integer values between  1,2,..., N . 
Assuming that the probability of st being equal to a certain value j depends only on the value 
of st-1 (Hamilton, 1994), we have: 
   1 2 1| , ,... |t t t t t ijP s j s i s k P s j s i p                                       (2.19) 
Such a process  
, 1,2,...,ij i j N
p

 is an N-state Markov chain. Transition probability pij gives 
the probability of occurrence of j following i. Note that:  
1 2 ... 1i i iNp p p                                                                                  (2.20) 
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Generally, it is easy to show the transition probabilities (N x N) as the transition matrix 
P: 
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                                                                              (2.21) 
The transition probability of the element corresponding to row j and column i of matrix 
p is pij. Autoregressive processes, in which the autoregressive parameters are variable, are 
considered to be a consequence of a regime-switching variable. Here, the regime itself is 
defined as a result of an unobserved Markov chain. Note that the special case of these 
processes is independent and identically distributed.  
Let st (st = 1, 2, . . . , or N) be an unobserved random variable that defines the regime at 
time t for a given period of time with N possible distributions. While the process is in regime 
1, observed variable yt has 21 1( , )N    distribution; when the process is in regime 2, the 
observed variable yt has 22 2( , )N    distribution, and so on. Thus, for the j value of the st 
variable, the conditional density function of yt (Hamilton, 1994) is: 
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y
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
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
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  
                                         (2.22) 
for j = 1, 2, . . . , N where   is the vector of population parameters including 1,..., N   and 
2 2
1 ,..., N  . The unobservable regime is based on a probability distribution of  ts  and the 
unconditional probability of st being j  
at the j value is: 
 ;t jP s j     for  j= 1, 2, . . . , N.                                                         (2.23) 
1,..., N   probabilities are also defined for  : 
2 2
1 1 1( ,..., , ,..., , ,..., )N N N        .                                                           (2.24) 
For example, to find the combined event of probabilities at st = j and yt between [c, d]: 
 ( , ; ) ( | ; ). ;t t t t tp y s j f y s j P s j                                                 (2.25) 
In this case, one must integrate yt according to all values between c and d. Equation 2.25 
is called the combined density distribution function of yt and st. According to Equations 2.22 
and 2.23, this function is rewritten as follows: 
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The unconditional density function of yt can be found through Equation 2.26 for all 
values of j: 
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                                                   (2.27) 
As the st regime is not observed, the corresponding density function describing the 
observed real data yt is the function of Equation 2.27. If distributions of the regime variable st 
at time t are independent and identically distributed, the loglikelihood function of the 
observed data can be calculated as follows from Equation 2.27: 
1
( ) log ( ; )
T
t
t
f y 

                                                                                    (2.28) 
The maximum likelihood estimation of   for j = 1, 2, …, N according to constraints 
1 2 ... 1N       and 0j   is obtained by maximizing Equation 2.28. This calculation 
can be done by numerical methods or EM algorithms (Hamilton, 1994). 
Our study calculates the LR test upper bound probabilities while examining linear 
models against the regime switching model (Cevik et al., 2014; Davies, 1987). One can test 
whether the number of regimes and the use of the nonlinear model are correct. The Panel-
Markov regime switching model is preferred over time series regime switching models in 
determining the factors that cause debt crisis. The main reason for this is that crisis regimes in 
the Europe ensure that each country is included simultaneously. We also choose the Panel-
Markov regime switching model in our study because it has not been used in studies dealing 
with financial crises yet. Following Asea and Blomberg (1998) and Chen (2007a, 2007b, 
2008), we estimate the Panel Markov model where T (t = 1,…,T)  indicates the time period, i 
(i = 1,…,N) the individual, and K (k = 1,…,K) the properties of countries. To estimate the 
model, we consider the following equation: 
1
K
it i k kit it
k
y c X 

           (2.29) 
In the equation, 
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where yi, jT and εi are the Tx1 dimensional row matrix and Xi the TxK dimensional matrix. If 
Equation 2.29 is rewritten: 
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Or, we have: 
Dc X                      (2.32) 
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where  1 2   N     is the Kx1 dimensional row vector and D is the NTxN dimensional 
matrix. Therefore, the above equation is called the Dummy Variable Least Squares Model. To 
obtain the panel Markov, the regime switching mechanism needs to be added to the least 
squares model with the dummy variable. Accordingly, the panel Markov can be written as 
follows: 
     ,  for tDc j X j j S j                    (2.34) 
where     20,j N j   and St indicates the unobservable state variable. 
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             (2.35) 
In this study, a normal period for St has a value of 1, or periods when there is no debt 
crisis, whereas “2” means a debt crisis period. In order to evaluate the performance of the 
panel Markov model in predicting debt crises, the average filtered probabilities have to be 
calculated among N individuals: 
   
1
1
 Pr | Pr |
N
t t
t tave S j S jN
          (2.36) 
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where t  is the information set consisting of the history of all variables up to time t. 
Finally, as in other models, the performance matrix is used for determining the 
indicators that cause the European debt crisis given by the Markov model (see Table 2.7). 
Following the Markov estimates, we assess the prediction performance of model which is 
expressed using this matrix. Like the logit model, the Markov model forecast performance is 
calculated by considering different cut-off values. Here again, the percent correction estimate 
of the crisis periods is calculated as TP / (TP + FN) and the corrected estimate of the normal 
periods as TN / (FP + TN).   
 
Table 2.7. MRSM Forecast Performance Matrix 
  Actual Value Obtained from FSI  
  Debt Crisis No Debt Crisis Total 
 Debt Crisis True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP) TP + FP (A) 
MRSM Results No Debt Crisis False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN) FN + TN (B) 
 Total TP + FN (C) FP + TN (D)  
 Note: A: All predicted debt crisis, B: All predicted non-debt crisis, C: All actual crisis, D: All actual non-crisis  
  
2.5. Estimation Results 
 
SOM is the first estimation technique that we employ in this chapter and it allows us to 
consider a large number of 51 indicators. The results obtained from the SOM analysis are 
shown in Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9. As seen in below Figures, each variable has its 
own component matrix with two-dimensional visuality. One can then easily observe, via 
temperature maps, the value that each variable takes in crisis and noncrisis periods, obtained 
from the Davies-Bouldin Index, and the scale on the right-hand side of each graph 
(component matrix) increases the readability. To be more precise, each graph in Figures 2.5, 
2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 represents the values for the different neurons of the respective variable 
using a color code ranging from dark blue (low values) to dark red (high values). 
Figure 2.5 suggests that countries in debt crisis have low growth rates, low export-to-
GDP ratio, high inflation and unemployment rates, and high budget deficit-to-GDP ratios. On 
the other hand, FDI over GDP, the ratio of health expenditures to public expenditures, and 
total health expenditures do not seem to have a significant impact on debt crisis in EU-15 
countries. Figure 2.6 indicates that countries in crisis have high budget deficits, low reserves, 
low shares of public revenues and taxes to GDP, low credit ratings, and low political stability 
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risk-rating values. Savings/expenditures, the ratio of imports to GDP, and the ratio of foreign 
trade balance to GDP do not seem to have a effect on the occurrence of the European debt 
crisis.  
Figure 2.7 indicates that higher public and private external debt as the share of GDP, 
higher household debt, and higher non-performing loans lead to debt crisis in EU-15. 
However, it seems that there is no relationship between the occurrence of debt crisis and 
OFDI over GDP, Capital over Asset, and TCRR. Figure 2.8 shows the impact of governance 
indicators on the outbreak of the European debt crisis. We observe in the Figure that high 
income inequality, high corruption, low government effectiveness, low political stability 
(PSVATT), low Regulatory Quality, low Rule of Law, and low Voice and Accountability are 
increase the crisis probability. On the other hand, indicators related to education do not seem 
to have an impact on debt crisis. Hence, one may argue that the EU-15 have a similar 
structure in terms of education level. Finally, Figure 2.9 shows that the likelihood of the debt 
crisis jumps with an increase in age dependency ratio, bank leverage, M2 over GDP, banking 
crisis index, interest payments, and financial pressure index. 
We can clearly claim that the SOM results are consistent with the economic 
expectations. In order to clearly reveal the unobserved relationships of the component 
matrixes, we present in Table 2.8 the mean and standard deviation of each leading indicator in 
crisis and noncrisis periods. Overall, results from the SOM analysis are consistent with the 
results presented in Table 2.8. for instance, the growth rates of countries in crisis zone tend to 
be low. The fact that these countries have low growth rates has brought two main problems. 
The first is the decrease in these countries’ tax revenues and the second is increasing 
unemployment which led to a rise in both social transfers and unemployment benefits that 
resulted in higher budget deficits. This is indeed confirmed by the SOM results since the 
indicators related to the budget balance clearly deteriorated before and during the crisis period 
and the debt ratios of both public and private sectors increased.  
Besides, with the decline in growth rates and the increase in unemployment rates, 
income level and savings rate also decreased in these countries. Along with a decline in 
income levels, import expenditures and export revenues also decreased, since intra-EU trade 
in goods and services is quite high. Moreover, economic slowdown is also associated with a 
dramatic increase in the ratio of nonperforming loans over total loans. As a result, the 
deterioration of banking balance sheets can trigger a banking crisis that in turn leads to 
massive bailout programs that exert severe constraints on public finances. Specifically, the 
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banking crisis index rises to high levels before and during debt crisis episodes. In such 
periods, the increase in risk premiums leads to higher interest rates, implying a vicious cycle 
for crisis countries. 
Our results show that the governance indicators do matter in the occurrence of debt 
crises. This is why some European countries (i.e. France) that have experienced significant 
deterioration in macroeconomic and financial variables have been affected from the crisis to a 
lower extent and also could exit from the crisis more quickly than Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, and Ireland which had exhibited bad performances in their governance indicators. 
Table 2.9 presents the ranking of 51 explanatory variables according to six different 
indexes. When we check the results of two overall indexes in Table 2.9, we observe that the 
ratio of nonperforming loans over total loans, primary balance over GDP, public sector 
borrowing requirement, Corruption, Cash Balance over GDP, Unemployment, Voice and 
Accountability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, GDP growth, Government Effectiveness, 
and Cyclically Adjusted Balance over GDP are the most important 10 indicators in explaining 
the outbreak of the European debt crisis. These 10 variables will be used in both logit and 
Markov estimation.
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Figure 2.5. Net output of a SOM analysis: clusters based on unified distance matrix (U-matrix) and component matrixes for 11 variables. 
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Figure 2.6. Net output of a SOM analysis: clusters based on unified distance matrix (U-matrix) and component matrixes for 11 variables. 
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Figure 2.7. Net output of a SOM analysis: clusters based on unified distance matrix (U-matrix) and component matrixes for 11 variables. 
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Figure 2.8. Net output of a SOM analysis: clusters based on unified distance matrix (U-matrix) and component matrixes for 11 variables. 
59 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Net output of a SOM analysis: clusters based on unified distance matrix (U-matrix) and component matrixes for 8 variables.  
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Table 2.8. Self-Organizing Map-Based Cluster Results 
VARIABLES NO CRISIS (M) CRISIS (M) NO CRISIS (SD) CRISIS (SD) 
Frequency (%) 64.290 35.710 64.290 35.710 
CA/GDP 3.566 -3.874 3.852 4.569 
GDP Growth 1.754 0.066 2.527 3.017 
X/GDP 64.514 35.858 43.348 23.399 
Inflation 1.725 1.918 1.125 1.711 
H. Expenditure (Total)/GDP 9.547 9.475 1.109 1.345 
Unemployment 6.705 11.762 2.009 6.175 
GOV.EXP/GDP 48.450 47.522 6.285 5.095 
FDI/GDP 55.846 3.998 169.145 6.140 
CPS/GDP 104.953 121.710 34.557 35.854 
H.EXP (Public)/GOV.EXP 15.651 14.096 2.0931 1.941 
Primary Balance/GDP 0.115 -2.949 2.264 4.919 
Cyclically Adjusted Balance /GDP -1.184 -5.046 2.289 3.683 
Revenue/GDP 47.309 40.774 5.796 4.403 
Reserves 27,640.150 20,564.050 24,962.110 23,407.870 
Cash Balance/GDP -1.956 -6.317 2.271 5.378 
Tax Revenue/GDP 23.469 19.660 5.451 6.406 
Savings/Expenditures 0.308 0.218 0.147 0.117 
M/GDP 57.648 36.955 35.300 17.497 
Trade/GDP 6.866 -1.097 8.773 7.232 
EX-DEBT/X 674.356 670.413 588.113 269.289 
PSRR 6.154 5.171 0.303 0.530 
Credit Rating 19.254 15.310 3.091 4.645 
REER 102.214 100.212 6.097 3.733 
EX-DEBT/GDP 644.485 266.116 1188.315 257.153 
EX-DEBT-GOV/GDP 34.552 54.269 19.030 30.138 
EX-DEBT-PRIVATE/GDP 216.908 211.008 149.895 254.582 
OFDI/GDP 60.280 4.005 159.224 6.483 
WAGE 37.241 24.375 6.667 9.795 
NET_DEBT/GDP 23.572 77.249 40.604 37.454 
CAPITAL/ASSETS 5.532 6.149 1.567 1.330 
NPL/TGL 2.177 8.817 1.874 7.942 
TCRR 5.945 4.367 1.708 2.025 
Household Debt/GDP 71.747 108.856 27.480 39.372 
Corruption 1.922 0.817 0.367 0.631 
GOV.EFFECT 1.790 0.981 0.246 0.445 
PSAVTT 1.011 0.421 0.333 0.423 
Regulatory Quality 1.615 1.082 0.218 0.378 
Rule of Law 1.752 1.014 0.213 0.476 
Voice and Accountability 1.483 1.109 0.138 0.205 
GINI COEFF 35.677 38.523 2.752 2.888 
Enrollment Tertiary 66.145 69.360 17.513 13.812 
Enrollment Primary 103.028 105.829 4.228 5.458 
Enrollment Secondary 111.447 108.453 14.072 11.030 
Fertility Rate 1.714 1.508 0.197 0.266 
Age Dependency 25.413 26.806 3.725 4.334 
INT_PAY/REVENUE 4.695 10.524 2.241 3.072 
INT_PAY/EXPENSE 4.571 9.026 2.100 2.607 
Bank Leverage 15.474 17.058 8.312 11.362 
M2/GDP 77.711 87.144 23.254 18.801 
FSI 0.038 1.981 2.394 3.154 
Democracy 9.772 9.971 0.566 0.170 
Banking Crises 0.520 0.691 0.502 0.465 
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Table 2.9. List of Significant Variables Ranked Based on Four Indices (SI—Structuring 
Index, RI—Relative Importance, CD—Cluster Description, and SRC—Spearman’s Rank 
Correlation) in a SOM 
Rank SI Values RI Values CD Values SRC Values 
1 GOV.EFFECT 1328.206 Primary Balance/GDP 2.487 NPL/TGL 4.238 GDP growth 
-
0.639*** 
2 PSRR 1320.574 EX-DEBT-GOV/GDP 2.370 Unemployment 3.074 Primary Balance/GDP 
-
0.527*** 
3 Voice and Accountability 1313.764 PSRR 2.347 Cash Balance/GDP 2.368 Cash Balance/GDP 
-
0.428*** 
4 Rule of Law 1313.293 Corruption 2.329 Rule of Law 2.235 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance /GDP 
-
0.398*** 
5 Corruption 1310.869 NET_DEBT/GDP 2.283 Primary Balance/GDP 2.173 NPL/TGL 0.386*** 
6 Regulatory Quality 1282.465 Unemployment 2.231 GOV.EFFECT 1.805 Banking Crises 0.373*** 
7 CA/GDP 1241.308 Regulatory Quality 2.194 PSRR 1.746 EX-DEBT/X 0.341*** 
8 INT_PAY/REVENUE 1215.579 M2/GDP 2.194 Regulatory Quality 1.736 CA/GDP 
-
0.324*** 
9 PSAVTT 1192.348 CAPITAL/ASSET 2.182 Corruption 1.722 Bank Leverage 0.323*** 
10 INT_PAY/EXPENSE 1176.359 INT_PAY/EXPENSE 2.181 
EX-DEBT-
PRIVATE/GDP 
1.698 GOV.EFFECT 
-
0.313*** 
11 NET_DEBT/GDP 1097.219 Cash Balance/GDP 2.168 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance /GDP 
1.609 PSRR 
-
0.306*** 
12 Trade/GDP 1048.616 GINI COEFF 2.136 EX-DEBT-GOV/GDP 1.584 Voice and Accountability 
-
0.302*** 
13 Age Dependency 1023.416 Reserves 2.132 Inflation 1.522 NET_DEBT/GDP 0.302*** 
14 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance /GDP 
992.023 Enrollment Tertiary 2.131 Credit Rating 1.503 Savings/Expenditures 
-
0.295*** 
15 WAGE 983.387 CPS/GDP 2.127 Voice and Accountability 1.491 EX-DEBT-GOV/GDP 0.280*** 
16 Revenue/GDP 927.769 Bank Leverage 2.120 WAGE 1.469 INT_PAY/REVENUE 0.269*** 
17 Enrollment Tertiary 927.575 Banking Crises 2.114 Household Debt/GDP 1.433 Rule of Law 
-
0.268*** 
18 NPL/TGL 926.662 Voice and Accountability 2.097 INT_PAY/REVENUE 1.371 TCRR 
-
0.267*** 
19 Unemployment 908.386 GDP growth 2.085 Bank Leverage 1.367 Trade/GDP 
-
0.262*** 
20 X/GDP 907.778 EX-DEBT/GDP 2.078 Fertility Rate 1.350 OFDI/GDP 
-
0.260*** 
21 Tax Revenue/GDP 904.0651 Trade/GDP 2.057 FSI 1.317 Corruption 
-
0.255*** 
22 Fertility Rate 892.051 Enrollment Secondary 2.046 Enrollment Primary 1.291 Credit Rating 
-
0.255*** 
23 M/GDP 868.569 NPL/TGL 2.016 PSAVTT 1.270 M2/GDP 0.249*** 
24 Cash Balance/GDP 865.003 FDI/GDP 1.98 INT_PAY/EXPENSE 1.242 PSAVTT 
-
0.247*** 
25 Democracy 853.076 TCRR 1.977 
H. Expenditure 
(Total)/GDP 
1.213 Household Debt/GDP 0.231*** 
26 EX-DEBT-GOV/GDP 852.431 
H.EXP 
(Public)/GOV.EXP 
1.917 GDP growth 1.194 Unemployment 0.229*** 
27 GOV.EXP/GDP 833.429 
H. Expenditure 
(Total)/GDP 
1.908 CA/GDP 1.186 GOV.EXP/GDP 0.223*** 
28 EX-DEBT/X 822.099 Inflation 1.903 TCRR 1.185 Regulatory Quality 
-
0.211*** 
29 M2/GDP 813.392 OFDI/GDP 1.881 Tax Revenue/GDP 1.175 X/GDP 
-
0.192*** 
30 Credit Rating 810.121 Enrollment Primary 1.873 Age Dependency 1.163 Enrolment Primary 0.186** 
31 Banking Crises 787.017 Age Dependency 1.854 GINI COEFF 1.045 M/GDP -0.173** 
32 
H. Expenditure 
(Total)/GDP 
774.519 Tax Revenue/GDP 1.849 CPS/GDP 1.038 INT_PAY/EXPENSE 0.171** 
33 Savings/Expenditures 761.388 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance /GDP 
1.847 Reserves 0.938 GINI COEFF 0.166* 
34 Bank Leverage 756.183 Revenue/GDP 1.835 Banking Crises 0.928 EX-DEBT/GDP 0.153** 
35 
EX-DEBT-
PRIVATE/GDP 
756.152 REER 1.829 
H.EXP 
(Public)/GOV.EXP 
0.927 Revenue/GDP -0.152** 
36 CPS/GDP 738.579 CA/GDP 1.801 NET_DEBT/GDP 0.922 
H.EXP 
(Public)/GOV.EXP 
-0.140* 
37 GINI COEFF 712.864 Household Debt/GDP 1.791 CAPITAL/ASSETS 0.849 Age Dependency 0.105 
38 Reserves 707.545 Credit Rating 1.759 Trade/GDP 0.824 Tax Revenue/GDP -0.103 
39 
H.EXP 
(Public)/GOV.EXP 
700.329 Fertility Rate 1.755 GOV.EXP/GDP 0.811 FDI/GDP -0.101 
40 Enrollment Secondary 683.320 GOV.EXP/GDP 1.745 M2/GDP 0.809 CPS/GDP 0.090 
41 Primary Balance/GDP 682.901 Rule of Law 1.735 Savings/Expenditures 0.793 
H. Expenditure 
(Total)/GDP 
0.087 
42 Enrollment Primary 667.923 X/GDP 1.730 Enrollment Tertiary 0.789 Reserves -0.071 
43 EX-DEBT/GDP 647.172 PSAVTT 1.691 Enrollment Secondary 0.784 Enrollment Secondary 0.061 
44 GDP growth 642.788 GOV.EFFECT 1.672 Revenue/GDP 0.760 CAPITAL/ASSET -0.059 
45 CAPITAL/ASSETS 638.174 EX-DEBT/X 1.551 REER 0.612 WAGE -0.058 
46 FSI 615.079 FSI 1.541 X/GDP 0.540 Fertility Rate -0.058 
47 TCRR 611.866 INT_PAY/REVENUE 1.497 M/GDP 0.496 
EX-DEBT-
PRIVATE/GDP 
0.034 
48 Inflation 608.657 Savings/Expenditures 1.488 EX-DEBT/X 0.458 REER 0.024 
49 Household Debt/GDP 567.960 M/GDP 1.477 Democracy 0.301 Democracy -0.026 
50 REER 564.612 Democracy 1.473 EX-DEBT/GDP 0.216 Enrollment Tertiary -0.020 
51 OFDI/GDP 531.554 WAGE 1.341 OFDI/GDP 0.041 Inflation 0.012 
52 FDI/GDP 484.981 
EX-DEBT-
PRIVATE/GDP 
1.193 FDI/GDP 0.036   
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Table 2.10. List of Significant Variables Ranked Based on SRC (Crisis and Non-Crisis 
Periods)—Spearman’s Rank Correlation and Overall Indexes) in a SOM 
 
Rank SRC (Crisis) Values SRC (No crisis) Values Overall Index (1) Values Overall Index (2) Values 
1 GDP growth 
-
0.752*** 
Primary Balance/GDP 
-
0.543*** 
NPL/TGL 14.112 NPL/TGL 5.992 
2 Banking Crises 0.547*** GDP growth 
-
0.510*** 
Primary Balance/GDP 12.135 Primary Balance/GDP 4.780 
3 Household Debt/GDP 0.516*** 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance /GDP 
-0.315** Cash Balance/GDP 11.617 PSRR 4.769 
4 EXDEBT/GDP 0.512*** Cash Balance/GDP 
-
0.284*** 
GDP growth 11.148 Corruption 4.257 
5 EXDEBT/X 0.490*** Bank Leverage 0.263*** Unemployment 11.059 Cash Balance/GDP 3.969 
6 Primary Balance/GDP 
-
0.476*** 
Trade/GDP 
-
0.259*** 
PSRR 10.725 Unemployment 3.902 
7 GOV.EXP/GDP 0.471*** WAGE 0.251*** Rule of Law 10.508 
Voice and 
Accountability 
3.472 
8 Bank Leverage 0.459*** Banking Crises 0.251*** GOV.EFFECT 10.221 Regulatory Quality 3.357 
9 EXDEBTPRIVATE/GDP 0.401*** EXDEBT/X 0.239*** Corruption 10.185 Rule of Law 2.978 
10 M2/GDP 0.393*** GOV.EXP/GDP 0.238*** 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance /GDP 
10.128 GDP growth 2.645 
11 Cash Balance/GDP 
-
0.333*** 
GINI COEFF 0.215** Voice and Accountability 10.029 GOV.EFFECT 2.548 
12 NPL/TGL 0.320*** Savings/Expenditures -0.194** Regulatory Quality 9.609 EX-DEBT-GOV/GDP 2.453 
13 Savings/Expenditures 
-
0.314*** 
CA/GDP -0.192** CA/GDP 9.302 NET_DEBT/GDP 2.420 
14 Enrollment Secondary 0.305** NPL/TGL 0.192** EX-DEBT-GOV/GDP 9.234 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance /GDP 
2.094 
15 X/GDP 0.302** EXDEBTGOV/GDP 0.172* NET_DEBT/GDP 8.860 INT_PAY/EXPENSE 1.880 
16 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Balance /GDP 
-0.264* CAPITAL/ASSETS -0.161* Bank Leverage 8.828 CA/GDP 1.855 
17 GINI COEFF -0.262** FSI 1 INT_PAY/REVENUE 8.728 Bank Leverage 1.174 
18 Unemployment 0.260** Democracy -0.156 Banking Crises 8.665 Banking Crises 1.038 
19 Credit Rating -0.240** X/GDP -0.145 PSAVTT 8.515 Trade/GDP 0.985 
20 EXDEBTGOV/GDP 0.239** OFDI/GDP -0.145 INT_PAY/EXPENSE 8.236 PSAVTT 0.811 
21 Fertility Rate 0.226* EXDEBT/GDP 0.139 Credit Rating 8.178 INT_PAY/REVENUE 0.526 
22 CAPITAL/ASSETS -0.220* M2/GDP 0.117 Trade/GDP 8.012 M2/GDP 0.358 
23 M/GDP 0.211* TCRR -0.100 TCRR 7.578 Credit Rating -0.182 
24 INT_PAY/EXPENSE -0.210* Tax Revenue/GDP -0.099 M2/GDP 7.492 Age Dependency -0.517 
25 FSI 1 
H. Expenditure 
(Total)/GDP 
0.097 Household Debt/GDP 7.352 GINI COEFF -0.551 
26 Inflation -0.188 M/GDP -0.094 EX-DEBT/X 7.161 TCRR -0.606 
27 Trade/GDP 0.173 Enrollment Primary -0.093 Savings/Expenditures 7.065 Tax Revenue/GDP -1.037 
28 WAGE 0.171 PSAVTT -0.085 Enrollment Primary 7.025 CPS/GDP -1.041 
29 OFDI/GDP -0.168 Enrollment Tertiary 0.085 GOV.EXP/GDP 6.854 Enrollment Tertiary -1.087 
30 
H.EXP 
(Public)/GOV.EXP 
-0.162 Rule of Law -0.068 Age Dependency 6.852 Enrollment Primary -1.182 
31 
H. Expenditure 
(Total)/GDP 
0.157 Unemployment 0.065 GINI COEFF 6.824 Revenue/GDP -1.206 
32 Reserves -0.152 Reserves 0.062 Tax Revenue/GDP 6.585 GOV.EXP/GDP -1.332 
33 Tax Revenue/GDP 0.142 NET_DEBT/GDP 0.062 Revenue/GDP 6.427 Household Debt/GDP -1.367 
34 REER 0.140 INT_PAY/REVENUE 0.057 Fertility Rate 6.327 Reserves -1.433 
35 CPS/GDP 0.135 FDI/GDP -0.057 X/GDP 6.301 
H. Expenditure 
(Total)/GDP 
-1.441 
36 NET_DEBT/GDP 0.119 Voice and Accountability -0.056 WAGE 6.297 Fertility Rate -1.506 
37 Enrollment Primary 0.117 REER 0.053 
H. Expenditure 
(Total)/GDP 
6.274 X/GDP -1.676 
38 Regulatory Quality -0.109 Age Dependency 0.052 CPS/GDP 6.170 EX-DEBT/X -1.694 
39 Enrollment Tertiary 0.084 Household Debt/GDP -0.051 
H.EXP 
(Public)/GOV.EXP 
6.159 
H.EXP 
(Public)/GOV.EXP 
-1.734 
40 Rule of Law 0.078 GOV.EFFECT -0.049 
EX-DEBT-
PRIVATE/GDP 
5.787 CAPITAL/ASSET -1.762 
41 Voice and Accountability -0.07 Enrollment Secondary 0.048 Reserves 5.780 Savings/Expenditures -2.043 
42 FDI/GDP 0.052 EXDEBTPRIVATE/GDP 0.048 M/GDP 5.721 Enrollment Secondary -2.128 
43 CA/GDP 0.049 
H.EXP 
(Public)/GOV.EXP 
0.041 Inflation 5.701 Inflation -2.279 
44 INT_PAY/REVENUE 0.032 CPS/GDP -0.040 Enrollment Tertiary 5.568 EX-DEBT/GDP -2.285 
45 TCRR -0.031 PSRR -0.036 OFDI/GDP 5.473 WAGE -2.418 
46 Revenue/GDP -0.027 Inflation 0.034 CAPITAL/ASSET 5.431 OFDI/GDP -2.931 
47 Age Dependency 0.021 Regulatory Quality 0.033 Enrollment Secondary 5.312 M/GDP -2.937 
48 Corruption 0.013 Fertility Rate -0.027 EX-DEBT/GDP 5.222 
EX-DEBT-
PRIVATE/GDP 
-3.759 
49 GOV.EFFECT -0.012 Revenue/GDP 0.024 FSI 4.927 FSI -3.906 
50 PSRR 0.005 Corruption -0.016 REER 4.232 REER -3.908 
51 PSAVTT 0.005 INT_PAY/EXPENSE -0.012 Democracy 4.046 FDI/GDP -3.950 
52 Democracy 0.004 Credit Rating 0.010 FDI/GDP 4.017 Democracy -4.365 
 
Through the SOM analysis, one can also observe the transition of each country from 
noncrisis to crisis over time, how long the country stayed in crisis zone and when it exited 
from the crisis. Austria’s movements over time are shown in Figure 2.10. Note that left side 
of the Figure 2.10 shows the period before the global financial crisis in 2007, while the right 
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side shows the period after the global financial crisis. From here, we observe that although the 
fiscal stress augmented in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Austria did not enter the 
crisis zone during the period of 2007-2015. In other words, Austria survived both the global 
crisis and the European debt crisis with little damage. 
 
Figure 2.10. Self-Organizing Map results for Austria from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.11. Self-Organizing Map results for Belgium from 2003-2015. 
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Figure 2.12. Self-Organizing Map results for Germany from 2003-2015. 
 
 
According to Figures 2.11 and 2.12, one can affirm that the fiscal stress seriously 
increased from 2007 to 2009 both in Belgium and Germany. However, neither Belgium nor 
Germany suffer a debt crisis. After 2009 the fiscal stress significantly lowered in both 
countries. On the other hand, Denmark seems to be far away from the crisis zone even during 
the period of 2007-2009 (see Figure 2.13). 
 
Figure 2.13. Self-Organizing Map results for Denmark from 2003-2015. 
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Figure 2.14 presents Spain’s movements from 2003 to 2015. One may clearly observe 
that Spain was already in crisis zone well before the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 
2007. This shows the fact that being an EU and Eurozone member country helped Spain not 
suffer a debt crisis before 2007. One may also argue that if the global financial crisis did not 
occur, Spain would maybe have never had a financial and debt crisis. This observation leads 
to an important consequence: Eurozone is not an optimum currency area since Spain does not 
have a similar macroeconomic structure. Besides, the below Figure shows that although Spain 
achieved a relative recovery in 2015, it remains in the crisis zone.  
 
Figure 2.14. Self-Organizing Map results for Spain from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Finland is the next country to analyze. According to the SOM results presented in 
Figure 2.15, Finland remained far from the crisis zone until 2015 where the fiscal stress seems 
to have seriously risen.  
France is an interesting case (see Figure 2.16). As one of the three leader countries in 
the EU along with Germany and United Kingdom, France seems to be seriously affected by 
the global financial crisis. It enters the crisis zone in 2008 and rapidly exits in 2009, but it 
remains very close to the crisis zone from 2009 to 2015.  
 
66 
 
 
Figure 2.15. Self-Organizing Map results for Finland from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.16. Self-Organizing Map results for France from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.17 indicates that the United Kingdom (UK) is one of the most affected 
countries by the global financial crisis. Because the UK enters the crisis zone in 2008 and 
remains within the crisis zone until 2014. This clearly shows the difficulties that the UK 
economy encountered during this period which may partly explain the Brexit decision.  
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Figure 2.17. Self-Organizing Map results for the United Kingdom from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.18. Self-Organizing Map results for Greece from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figures 2.18 and 2.19 present the situation of the Greek and Italian economies before 
and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Greece and Italy, like Spain, seem to have 
already been in crisis zone well before 2007 and they were still in crisis zone in 2015. This 
suggests that Greece and Italy should not have been Eurozone member countries as they do 
not meet the necessary conditions. 
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Figure 2.19. Self-Organizing Map results for Italy from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.20. Self-Organizing Map results for Ireland from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Ireland is very interesting case study as observed in Figure 2.20: Ireland was far away 
from the crisis zone in the pre-global crisis period, but the outbreak of the global crisis 
seriously affected the Irish economy. More importantly, despite several economic policies 
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implemented in the aftermath of the crisis, the Irish economy could leave the crisis zone only 
in 2014.  
 
Figure 2.21. Self-Organizing Map results for Luxembourg from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.22. Self-Organizing Map results for the Netherlands from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figures 2.21, 2.22, and 2.23 show how the economies of Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Sweden behaved during the period of global financial crisis and European 
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debt crisis. Although Luxembourg and Sweden did not suffer any crisis from 2007 to 2015, 
the Netherlands entered the crisis zone in 2009. However, like France, the Netherlands exited 
the crisis zone the following year. Besides, one may also observe that the fiscal stress 
seriously increases in 2015 in the Netherlands and Sweden. 
 
Figure 2.23. Self-Organizing Map results for Sweden from 2003-2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.24. Self-Organizing Map results for Portugal from 2003-2015. 
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Figure 2.24 indicates that Portuguese economy was already in crisis zone before the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, like Greece, Italy, and Spain. Hence, Portugal is 
another country whose membership to the Eurozone should be questioned. 
In order to show in detail, the extent to which the EU-15 countries have been affected 
by the crisis, we present the behavior of their economies on the maps from 2007 to 2015 (see 
Figures 2.25, 2.26, 2.27, 2.28, 2.29, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, and 2.33). In other words, we sum up the 
above Figures and show the transition of EU-15 countries from noncrisis to crisis state over 
time. Different maps (or Figures) show that, when Europe was hit by the global financial 
crisis in 2007, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal had already been in the crisis zone, while 
others Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom were not. In 2008, the global financial crisis 
starts to negatively affect the EU and, in particular Eurozone countries. Ireland, France, and 
the UK, in addition to Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, enter the crisis zone in 2008. In 
2009, France moves out of the crisis zone, but it’s the Netherlands that enters the crisis zone. 
In 2010, the Netherlands exits the crisis zone where Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
the UK remain. By 2014 and 2015, the UK and Ireland exit the crisis zone, respectively.  
This clearly shows Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and the UK to be the most 
affected European countries from the crisis. The countries heavily affected by the crisis are 
generally located in Southern Europe, whereas the countries that resisted the crisis better are 
located in Northern Europe. Interestingly, the southern countries' governance indicators are 
worse than the northern ones’, which seems to have a big influence on the severity of the 
crisis. On the other hand, this result also indicates that the Southern European countries do not 
meet the economic or institutional requirements to be a member of the EU and/or the 
Eurozone and they have enjoyed low borrowing costs as they benefited from the prestige of 
the Northern European ones. Besides, it seems that they have failed to deploy these financial 
resources efficiently due to poor governance and therefore have lost fiscal discipline which 
caused their debts to increase constantly. The importance of governance indicators is evident 
in countries like the UK and France which have suffered severe deterioration in their 
macroeconomic balances during the crisis, but they managed to recover contrary to Greece, 
Italy, Spain, and Portugal. 
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Figure 2.25. Mapping all countries in 2007. 
 
 
Figure 2.26. Mapping all countries in 2008. 
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Figure 2.27. Mapping all countries in 2009. 
 
 
Figure 2.28. Mapping all countries in 2010. 
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Figure 2.29. Mapping all countries in 2011. 
 
 
Figure 2.30. Mapping all countries in 2012. 
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Figure 2.31. Mapping all countries in 2013.  
 
 
Figure 2.32. Mapping all countries in 2014. 
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Figure 2.33. Mapping all countries in 2015.  
 
 
The forecast performance results from the SOM estimates are presented in Table 2.11. 
The SOM model could correctly predict 79.31% of crisis periods and 74% of the noncrisis 
episodes in the EU-15 from 2003 to 2015. Besides, the model could forecast 100% of crisis 
episodes in PIIGS countries. 
 
Table 2.11. Forecast Performance of SOM 
Criteria Model (EU-
15) 
Model (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain) 
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
79.31% 
(115/145) 
18.18% 
(6/33) 
   
% and number of correctly predicted crises 74.00% 
(37/50) 
100% 
(32/32) 
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Table 2.12. Logit Estimation Results  
Dependent variable: FSI          
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
NPL/TGL 0.150*** 
(0.038) 
0.063** 
(0.028) 
0.167*** 
(0.052) 
0.164*** 
(0.052) 
0.131*** 
(0.036) 
0.108*** 
(0.033) 
0.096*** 
(0.031) 
0.168*** 
(0.050) 
0.093*** 
(0.030) 
0.175*** 
(0.042) 
Primary Balance/GDP -0.280*** 
(0.071) 
-0.251*** 
(0.1348) 
-0.153* 
(0.081) 
-0.277***  
(0.073) 
-0.265***  
(0.069) 
-0.266*** 
(0.069) 
-0.285*** 
(0.071) 
-0.162** 
(0.083) 
-0.259*** 
(0.070) 
-0.249** 
(0.103) 
PSRR -0.375*** 
(0.052) 
 
 
        
Corruption  
 
-1.094*** 
(0.153) 
  
 
      
Cash Balance/GDP -0.173** 
(0.076) 
 
 
      
Unemployment  
 
  0.024*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
 
    
Voice and Accountability    
 
 -1.537*** 
(0.211) 
     
Regulatory Quality      -1.361*** 
(0.187) 
    
Rule of Law        
 
    -1.296*** 
(0.178) 
   
GDP growth      -0.612*** 
(0.123) 
 
 
 
GOV.EFFECT       -1.260*** 
(0.174) 
 
Cyclically Adjusted Balance /GDP          -0.165*** 
(0.039) 
CONSTANT 1.323 
(2.335) 
-1.541** 
(0.697) 
-2.605*** 
(0.374) 
-2.390*** 
(0.428) 
-0.047 
(1.613) 
-1.240 
(0.999) 
-0.913 
(0.814) 
-1.713*** 
(0.366) 
-0.985 
(0.829) 
-2.333*** 
(0.351) 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.26 
LR Stat 59.4*** 58.4*** 63.7*** 57.4*** 59.0*** 58.2*** 60.0*** 99.7*** 59.6*** 57.4*** 
Akaike Info 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.69 0.91 0.92 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The values in parentheses are standard deviations.
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After having obtained the most significant variables that explain the debt crises from the 
SOM analysis, we use logit estimates where our dependent variable is the fiscal stress index 
reduced to a binary form. As previously stated, the dependent variable here takes the value 1 
during periods of debt crisis and 0 for noncrisis periods. Logit estimation results are based on 
the leading indicators with the highest significance levels are presented in Table 2.12 
Table 2.12 presents the results of ten different estimations. Because of multicollinearity 
problem, we estimated each indicator separately. One may observe in Table that all 
explanatory variables used in the model are significant at 1% or 5% a statistical significance 
level. According to the econometric results, increases in budget balance, PSRR, corruption, 
cash balance, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, GDP growth, rule of law, 
government effectiveness, and cyclically adjusted balance are associated with lower 
probabilities of crisis while increases in NPL / TL and unemployment increase the likelihood 
of crisis.  
Figure 2.34 presents the actual and fitted values of the models estimated for the EU-15, 
except for Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. One may observe that the crisis in 
Europe can be said to has started in 2007 and has ended in 2010. On the other hand, Figure 
2.35 indicates that the crisis in Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland started in 2007 but 
ended only in 2014. 
Table 2.13 presents the forecast performance matrices for the logit model. Accordingly, 
the success of the 10 models for predicting crises varies between 50% and 90% for different 
cut-off values. In addition, if we include the models’ success at predicting noncrisis periods, it 
varies from 14% to 99%. 
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Figure 2.34. Predicted probability of crises in the logit models (EU-15). 
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Figure 2.35. Predicted probability of crises in the logit models (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). 
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Table 2.13. Forecast Performance of Logit Models 
Cut-off level Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
C = 0.5 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
95.10% 
(136/143) 
93.71% 
(134/143) 
95.10% 
(136/143) 
83.22% 
(119/143) 
95.10% 
(136/143) 
95.10% 
(136/143) 
95.10% 
(136/143) 
97.20% 
(139/143) 
93.71% 
(134/143) 
66.43% 
(95/143) 
 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 50% 
(26/52) 
55.77% 
(29/52) 
57.69% 
(30/52) 
51.92% 
(27/52) 
50% 
(26/52) 
55.77% 
(29/52) 
55.77% 
(29/52) 
67.31% 
(35/52) 
55.77% 
(29/52) 
53.85% 
(28/52) 
C = 0.25 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
76.22% 
(109/143) 
74.83% 
(107/143) 
85.52% 
(118/143) 
40.56% 
(58/143) 
75.52% 
(108/143) 
72.03% 
(103/143) 
76.22% 
(109/143) 
85.31% 
(122/143) 
75.52% 
(108/143) 
21.68% 
(31/143) 
 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 69.23% 
(36/52) 
73.08% 
(38/52) 
75% 
(39/52) 
76.92% 
(40/52) 
69.23% 
(36/52) 
69.23% 
(36/52) 
73.08% 
(38/52) 
78.85% 
(41/52) 
73.08% 
(38/52) 
88.46% 
(46/52) 
C = 0.2 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
68.53% 
(98/143) 
66.43% 
(95/143) 
72.72% 
(104/143) 
34.27% 
(49/143) 
67.83% 
(97/143) 
69.93% 
(100/143) 
65.73% 
(94/143) 
78.32% 
(112/143) 
69.93% 
(100/143) 
13.94% 
(20/143) 
 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 76.92% 
(40/52) 
75% 
(39/52) 
76.92% 
(40/52) 
88.46% 
(46/52) 
75% 
(39/52) 
73.08% 
(38/52) 
75% 
(39/52) 
78.85% 
(41/52) 
76.92% 
(40/52) 
90.38% 
(47/52) 
 
 82 
 
We have used the panel Markov as the third analysis method. In this model, the 
dependent variable (the fiscal stress index) is in the continuous form. Like the logit model, 10 
different models are estimated to avoid multicollinearity. Broadly speaking, the results 
obtained from the Markov approach are similar the results obtained from the logit model. 
According to Markov estimations, while NPL / TL, corruption, cash balance / GDP, voice and 
accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, government effectiveness, and cyclically 
adjusted balance / GDP are statistically significant in only Regime 1, primary balance / GDP, 
PSRR, unemployment, and GDP growth are statistically significant in Regimes 1 and 2. If we 
interpret the results collectively, the ratios of NPL / TL and unemployment increase the 
likelihood of crisis, while increases in budget balance, PSRR, corruption, cash balance, voice 
and accountability, regulatory quality, GDP, and rule of law reduce the likelihood of crisis.  
As in the logit model, the Markov model estimates also include the forecast 
performance of each model and the diagnostic test results. According to the results, no 
problems are found such as normality or autocorrelation in the estimated models. In addition, 
the linearity test shows that using the Markov regime switching model is more appropriate 
than the linear models. The Davies test also indicates the number of regimes chosen to be 
appropriate for the predicted models. As in the case of Abiad (2007), Alvarez-Plata and 
Schrooten (2006), and Lopes and Nunes (2012), who used the Markov model for crises, our 
study also assumes two different regime periods. The period with lower mean and volatility 
indicates the tranquil or noncrisis regime, while the second regime with higher mean and 
volatility is said to be crisis. Crisis probabilities obtained from the Markov Regime Switching 
Model are presented separately for the EU-15 and PIIGS (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and 
Ireland). Unlike the logit model, Markov model forecasts show that the crisis started in late 
2007 and lasted until 2013, both in PIIGS and other 11 countries. 
The forecast performance results obtained from the Panel Markov model are given in 
Table 2.15. According to the results, the models are able to predict, at 0.5 threshold level, all 
crisis episodes occurred in the EU-15 in the period of 2003-2015 and nearly 80% of noncrisis 
periods. 
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Table 2.14. Markov Estimation Results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
NPL/TGL (Regime 1) 0.0852*** 
(4.6928) 
0.0860*** 
 (4.6168) 
0.0840***  
(5.6005) 
0.0691**  
(2.5123) 
0.0799***  
(4.3170) 
0.0824***  
(4.4995) 
0.0740 ***  
(4.4310) 
0.0429***  
(2.9431) 
0.0850***  
(4.6662) 
0.0840***  
(5.6520) 
NPL/TGL (Regime 2) 0.0020 
 (0.0193) 
0.0081  
(0.0748) 
0.0223  
(0.2283) 
0.0170  
(0.1403) 
0.0064 
(0.0550) 
0.0120 
(0.1178) 
0.0057  
(0.0551) 
0.0364  
(0.3093) 
0.0005  
(0.0049) 
0.0398  
(0.4684) 
Primary Balance/GDP (Regime 1) -0.3012***  
(-4.2105) 
-0.0316***  
(-9.8841) 
-0.2882*** 
 (-7.0861) 
-0.3030*** 
 (-10.6341) 
-0.2977***  
(-9.6040) 
-0.2997***  
(-10.0140) 
-0.2967***  
(-9.7860) 
-0.2192***  
(-11.2549) 
-0.3010***  
(-9.6911) 
-0.3076***  
(-7.4115) 
Primary Balance/GDP (Regime 2) -0.2277** 
(-2.0433) 
-0.2347**  
(-2.0862) 
-0.2100*  
(-1.7335) 
-0.2210*  
(-1.9493) 
-0.2290**  
(-2.0338) 
-0.2362**  
(-2.0885) 
-0.2399**  
(-2.0749) 
-0.1864  
(-0.9240) 
-0.2273**  
(-2.0389) 
-0.1602  
(-1.0865) 
PSRR (Regime 1) -0.5258**  
(-2.3573) 
         
PSRR (Regime 2) -1.6070*  
(-1.6448) 
         
Corruption (Regime 1)  -0.5181***  
(-2.8380) 
        
Corruption (Regime 2)  -0.8653  
(-0.9782) 
        
Cash Balance/GDP (Regime 1)   -0.1913*** 
(-6.4542) 
       
Cash Balance/GDP (Regime 2)   -0.0698 
(-0.75690) 
       
Unemployment  
(Regime 1) 
  
 
 0.0893** 
(2.1616) 
  
 
    
Unemployment  
(Regime 2) 
  
 
 0.1897* 
(1.8022) 
  
 
    
Voice and Accountability (Regime 1)     -1.8370*** 
 (-3.6224) 
     
Voice and Accountability (Regime 2)     -3.2583 
 (-1.2709) 
     
Regulatory Quality (Regime 1)            -1.0375***  
(-2.8681) 
    
Regulatory Quality (Regime 2)            -1.5038  
(-0.9755) 
    
Rule of Law      
(Regime 1) 
  
 
    -0.8168*** 
(-3.0846) 
   
Rule of Law      
(Regime 2) 
  
 
  -1.3201 
(-0.9453) 
   
GDP growth (Regime 1)        -0.4262*** 
(-11.7979) 
  
GDP growth (Regime 2)        -0.5844*** 
(-3.4714) 
  
GOV.EFFECT (Regime 1)         -0.6890** 
(-2.4132) 
 
GOV.EFFECT (Regime 2)         -1.9062 
(-1.5911) 
 
Cyclically Adjusted Balance /GDP (Regime 1)          -0.2166*** 
(-6.4593) 
Cyclically Adjusted Balance /GDP (Regime 2)          -0.2517 
(-1.5493) 
CONSTANT (Regime 1) 3.0353**  
(2.3498) 
0.7753** 
 (2.4738) 
-0.6157*** 
 (-4.8374) 
-0.7358** 
(-2.2208) 
2.4941***  
(3.5863) 
1.4636***  
(2.7435) 
1.2027*** 
(2.8605) 
0.7648*** 
(7.2357) 
1.0208** 
(2.2128) 
-0.5427*** 
(-4.6762) 
CONSTANT (Regime 2) 11.6515**  
(2.1514) 
3.9409***  
(2.9538) 
2.3620** 
 (2.5289) 
0.7188  
(0.5726) 
6.9388** 
(2.1365) 
4.9064**  
(2.3032) 
4.6355** 
(2.3107) 
2.4270*** 
(4.1550) 
5.2348*** 
(3.0322) 
1.7041** 
(2.0224) 
Note: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The values in parentheses are t-values.
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Table 2.15. Forecast Performance of PMRSM (EU-15) 
Cut-off level Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
C=0.5 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100% 100% 
C=0.25 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
72.72% 54.54% 63.63% 63.63% 63.63% 63.63% 63.63% 90.90% 63.63% 72.72% 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
C=0.2 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
54.54% 45.45% 45.45% 27.27% 45.45% 45.45% 36.36% 81.81% 45.45% 54.54% 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 2.16. Forecast Performance of PMRSM (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) 
Cut-off level Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
C=0.5 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 66.66% 66.66% 83.33% 66.66% 83.33% 83.33% 50.00% 33.33% 83.33% 83.33% 
C=0.25 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
42.86% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 85.71% 28.57% 28.57% 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 83.33% 100% 100% 
C=0.2 
          
% and number of correctly predicted non-
crises 
42.86% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 28.57% 57.14% 28.57% 28.57% 
% and number of correctly predicted crises 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 83.33% 100% 100% 
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Table 2.17. Test Statistics for the Markov Regime Switching Models 
MODELS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Sigma 0 -0.3609 -0.3618 -0.3417 -0.3967 -0.3563 -0.3652 -0.3619 -0.3880 -0.3605 -0.3658 
Sigma 1 1.4222 1.4276 1.6380 1.4162 1.4281 1.4235 1.4327 1.5241 1.4219 1.4227 
P00 0. 7944 0. 7942 0.8001 0.7859 0.7953 0.7937 0.7959 0.8327 0.7944 0.7940 
P11 0.4819 0.4800 0.4790 0.4826 0.4746 0.4800 0.4705 0.3092 0.4816 0.4843 
Log-Likelihood -365.36 -365.51 -365.54 -364.98 -365.04 -365.17 -363.92 -327.11 -365.35 -365.50 
Linearity Test 
2  168.13*** 168.60*** 168.32*** 168.17*** 168.84*** 168.79*** 170.34*** 204.02*** 168.15*** 168.59*** 
Serial correlation
2  19.66 [0.10] 21.30 [0.07] 19.45 [0.11] 21.41 [0.07] 21.26 [0.07] 20.68 [0.08] 24.23 [0.03] 9.46 [0.73] 19.33 [0.11] 19.63 [0.10] 
Normality
2  4.27 [0.12] 4.51 [0.10] 5.47 [0.06] 7.16 [0.03] 3.89[0.14] 4.97 [0.08] 3.88 [0.14] 3.24 [0.20] 4.33 [0.11] 5.03 [0.08] 
Davies p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The values in brackets are p-values.
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Figure 2.36. Predicted probability of crisis in the Markov Regime Switching Models (1-5). 
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Figure 2.37. Predicted probability of crisis in the Markov Regime Switching Models (6-10). 
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2.6. Conclusion 
As the results obtained from the SOM, Logit, and Markov models are very similar, we 
propose an overall interpretation in this subsection. All three models indicated that NPL / TL, 
Primary Balance / GDP, PSRR, Corruption, Cash Balance / GDP, Unemployment, Voice and 
Accountability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, GDP growth, Government Effectiveness, 
and Cyclically Adjusted Balance / GDP are all correctly signed and significant in explaining 
the occurrence of the debt crisis in the EU-15. Hence, on may affirm that increases in NPL / 
TL and unemployment are likely to increase the likelihood of a crisis, while increases in the 
Primary Balance / GDP, PSRR, Corruption, Cash Balance / GDP, Unemployment, Voice and 
Accountability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, GDP growth, Government Effectiveness, 
and Cyclically Adjusted Balance / GDP reduce the probability of a crisis. The similarity of the 
results obtained in all three models is an important indicator of consistency for our 
investigation.  
The fact that these variables have played a significant role in the emergence of the debt 
crisis suggests that changes in these variables are due to specific systematic movements. 
Accordingly, we see that the growth rates of countries in the crisis zone had fallen before the 
outbreak of the crisis. Having low growth rates poses two major threats for these countries. 
First, significant reductions in tax revenues draw attention due to these countries’ decreasing 
total income. Tax income reductions increase the difficulties encountered for paying current 
public debts, which leads to a degradation in the overall fiscal situation. The second problem 
is the dramatic increase in unemployment due to the economic contraction. The rise in 
unemployment benefits and the presence of social safety nets exert an additional pressure on 
public finance.  
Along with the decrease in these countries’ incomes, they have had to face a sharp 
contraction of both their imports (resulting from income reduction) and exports (due to the 
contraction of world trade and, in particular, intra-European trade). Economic contraction is 
accompanied by a significant rise in the ratio of banks’ non-performing loans to total loans 
during the crisis period. As banks’ financial health dramatically deteriorated, new pressure on 
public finance appeared. Indeed, investors expected government interventions to save the too-
big-to-fail banks. SOM results indicate that the banking crisis index reached to high levels 
during the debt crisis period. This supports the claim that banking sector problems are an 
important determinant of the European debt crisis. In the case of a debt crisis, governments 
have to pay high interest rates because they cannot pay their principal or interest on time. 
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However, this rise in risk premiums induces a vicious cycle by exacerbating tensions on 
public finances. This is precisely the situation that Greece experienced during the European 
debt crisis. Figure 2.38 shows the share of Greece’s interest payments in terms of expenses, 
revenue, and GDP. According to the Figure, Greece’s share of interest payments started to 
increase especially after reaching its highest value in 2011 through three indicators. This 
clearly indicates that Greece had financed its public spending through large-scale borrowing 
after entering the Eurozone; in turn, this increased the country’s interest payments along with 
its debt burden on the budget. As seen, this situation turned into a debt crisis for Greece. 
 
Figure 2.38. Indicators for Greece’s interest payments. 
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This also applies to other EU member states in which interest payments reached very 
serious levels. This conclusion supports the SOM-analysis results, according to which interest 
payments increased substantially in crisis countries. Another noteworthy result from the 
estimations is that despite the similar deteriorations in macroeconomic variables that Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain had experienced, some other European countries had 
overcome the crisis in a shorter period. A closer inspection suggests governance indicators to 
play an important role.  
The following graphs show the variables of Control of Corruption, Government 
Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability for the EU-15 countries. One can argue through 
these Figures that Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal have the lowest governance values before 
and after the establishment of the European monetary union. This has also played an 
important role in these countries as they could not quickly recover from the crisis. Among the 
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PIIGS, Ireland has relatively better governance indicators (closer to the average values in the 
Eurozone) that may explain why Ireland could exit the crisis zone while other four countries 
are still in crisis zone. In addition, this may also explain why France, the Netherlands, and the 
UK, despite deterioration in their core macroeconomic indicators, could quickly recover from 
the crisis, by assuring the fiscal discipline. This implies that the existing crisis further 
deepened with the mismanagement of public resources during the crisis. Consequently, the 
soundness of governance indicators is said to have also had an impact on crisis duration.  
Figure 2.39. Control of corruption. 
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Figure 2.40. Government effectiveness. 
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Figure 2.41. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. 
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Figure 2.42. Regulatory Quality 
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Figure 2.43. Rule of law. 
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Figure 2.44. Voice and accountability. 
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Besides, the fact that each country has different fiscal policies despite the common 
monetary policy is important to recall. In this case, the countries that benefitted from Europe’s 
prestige have lost their financial discipline over time, causing them to implement 
expansionary fiscal policies for populist objectives. This played an important role in reaching 
excessive debt stocks.  
Another important issue that needs to be considered is whether the Eurozone is an 
optimal money area. As well known, Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) 
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pioneered the study of optimal money area theory. Basically, in addition to the geographical 
closeness of the countries that make up this area, economic similarity is crucial for the success 
of an optimum money area. Initially, this similarity for the EU members was provided by the 
Maastricht Criteria (1992) for economic and monetary union, and the Copenhagen Criteria 
(1993) for full membership. As the objective of the Maastricht Criteria is to bring member 
countries closer to each other economically, they are called convergence criteria. 
Accordingly, there are five important convergence criteria.3 The first on is the price stability 
which is evaluated by considering the consumer prices. According to this criterion, countries’ 
annual inflation rate should not exceed the average of the three best performing countries by 
1.5 percentage points. The second convergence criterion is sound public finance. This 
criterion is evaluated by considering Government Deficit / GDP ratio. The ratio should not 
exceed 3% for countries. The third one is sustainable public finance that considers the ratio of 
Government Debt / GDP. Accordingly, countries should not exceed 60% of the Government 
Debt / GDP ratio. The fourth one is the durability of convergence, measured by taking into 
account the long-term interest rate. According to this, the long-term interest rate of countries 
should not exceed the three best performing countries by more than 2 percentage points. The 
final criterion is exchange rate stability. This criterion is measured through deviations from 
the central rate. This criterion is evaluated according to whether the money of the country has 
devalued within the last two years.  
When we examine the movements of the EU-15 countries over time in terms of macro, 
financial, and governance indicators, there is no homogenous structure within the EU-15 in 
the framework of the Maastricht criteria. This situation can be followed easily from the 
Figures obtained from the SOM analysis which show the movements of these countries over 
time: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain show quite different economic indicators 
from the other countries not only in periods of financial and debt crises but also in the pre-
crisis period of 2002-2006. Compared to other countries, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy 
seem to be in crisis well before the occurrence of the global financial crisis. This may have 
created negative pressure on the EU and Eurozone. An interesting feature of these countries is 
that, except for Ireland, they are located in Southern Europe. What is interesting here is that 
although Ireland is a northern country, it has been severely affected by the crisis just like the 
other southern countries. Zestos (2015) described Ireland economically as a southern country 
                                                 
3 For more information on these criteria, see European Commission (2018).  https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/euro-area/enlargement-euro-area/convergence-criteria-joining_en. 
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despite its location in Northern Europe. Perhaps Ireland can be considered as a transition 
country between the two regions as it seriously suffered the crisis just like Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and Italy; however, it has managed to recover from the crisis contrary to other four 
countries. Our results indicate that European countries appear to be gathered under two 
different groups: southern and northern countries. 
From a literary perspective, the success of a monetary union is based on four basic elements 
(Frankel & Rose, 1998): a) the extent of trade, b) the similarity of the shocks and cycles, c) 
the degree of labor mobility, and d) the system of risk-sharing, usually through fiscal 
transfers. In accordance with these criteria and based on results of this study, the Eurozone 
obviously does not precisely fulfill these conditions. As emphasized above, the fact that the 
Eurozone has a bilateral structure means that economic similarity cannot be achieved among 
these countries. Moreover, the fact that the degree of impact from external shocks was higher 
in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain implies that the EMU is in violation of another 
requirement for success. This can easily be seen when considering the crisis probabilities after 
the Markov estimates. Figures 2.34 to 2.37 show that the northern countries easily overcame 
the financial crisis while the southern countries were affected more severely by it. 
Considering these conditions, the EU-15 countries do not have the minimum requirements for 
a monetary union. This can also be seen in the countries’ 10-yr. government bond rates before 
and after the monetary union, as shown in Figure 2.45.  
Figure 2.45. 10-year government bond rates for EU-15. 
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Accordingly, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy could only borrow with high interest 
rates before the monetary union, while after entering the union, they have been able to borrow 
with low interest rates like the other countries thanks to the prestige of the Eurozone. 
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However, these countries can be seen to have reached pre-monetary union borrowing interest 
rates after the financial crisis starting in 2007 and afterwards spreading to Europe. 
The fact that these countries could borrow cheaply led to serious increases in public 
debt. The effects of the expanding fiscal policies in these countries can also be seen from their 
increase in public debt (see Figure 2.46).  
Figure 2.46. Government debt as % of GDP for EU-15. 
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After becoming a member of the EMU, the share of the public debt stock in GDP has been 
constantly growing in parallel with the decline in interest rates for Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece, and Spain. This shows that these countries were able to borrow cheaply and, 
consequently, increase their spending. However, the expenditures are made not in order to 
increase the income of the country in the long term but rather in the housing sector for short-
term profit. De Jong et al. (2017) emphasized that an increase in public spending will have 
long-term positive effects on the potential output of the economy and public finance, 
depending largely on the efficiency of the investment and the productivity of public capital. If 
this ratio is low, an increase in public investment results in greater deterioration of the debt 
ratio and less permanent output. However, public investments are not being used effectively 
when observing the recent developments in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain.  
In addition, EU-15 countries can be said to have similar levels over time in areas such 
as education and health spending. This is evidenced by the fact that these indicators have a 
very similar appearance in the SOM results. While convergence has been successful for some 
of the major social and developmental indicators of Europe, the funding methods for 
improvements in these indicators are quite different: the northern countries less affected by 
the crisis finance this social spending by income generated with increases in production, while 
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the southern countries mostly finance it by borrowing which is mostly acquired through 
European prestige-based cheap borrowing facility. More importantly, this funding was not 
used for long-term sustainable growth that would guarantee to pay public debts in the future. 
Instead, they used this funding opportunity to produce more low value-added goods. 
On the other hand, model test results do not indicate any diagnostic problem and the 
linearity test results suggest that using nonlinear models such as the Markov and logit is 
appropriate to predict debt crisis. When we assess the forecast performance of different 
models, one should note that comparing the results obtained through the SOM with the logit 
and Markov forecasts can be misleading for two reasons. The first is that SOM uses 51 
different leading indicators while the logit and Markov model employ only 12. The second is 
that different thresholds cannot be used in the SOM approach. The forecast performance 
results from SOM show the model can predict crisis periods for the EU-15 more successfully 
than the noncrisis periods. The forecast performance of the logit and Markov models differs 
according to the selected threshold value. But, Markov estimates predict crisis periods more 
successfully than logit, while logit estimates predict noncrisis periods more successfully than 
the Markov estimates. Markov models could predict approximately 100% of the crisis periods 
correctly, while the logit model predicted 100% of the noncrisis periods. Selecting a lower 
threshold for both models improves the number of correctly predicted crisis periods but also 
causes non-crisis periods to be perceived as crises (Type II errors). Markov estimates can be 
said to have more Type II errors. In contrast, choosing a higher threshold value reduces the 
number of false alarms but at the expense of increasing the number of missed crises (Type I 
errors), particularly in logit models. This may be due to the technical features of these models; 
in logit models the crisis index takes the binary form (1 or 0), and the method attempts to 
forecast these crisis (1) and non-crisis (0) episodes, while the Markov method uses the 
dependent variable in a continuous form that measures increases in crisis probability.  
When analyzing the crisis probabilities measured by the logit and Markov models, we 
observe that the models signal a crisis for Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain over the 
period of 2008-2013 and an increasing fiscal pressure in other countries in 2008 and 2009. 
This is consistent with the reality since the financial crisis started to spread to Europe 
following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Here one should note that the 
PIIGS were much worse affected by the crisis as their debt stock was already quite high and 
the possibility of borrowing even at higher rates stopped after the crisis. Even though policy 
measures (expansionary monetary and fiscal policies) achieved a relative success in restoring 
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confidence in the financial sector and in reducing the effects of the crisis on the real sector, 
the nationalization of private debt naturally led public debts to rise to very high levels. As 
credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) lowered the country rates and 
the debate on who will bear the cost of the crisis was not clarified, the Europe went through 
the most severe crisis of its recent history. 
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Chapter 3 
Revisiting Fiscal Convergence in the European Union with 
Combined Unit Root Tests 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to analyze whether the PIIGS, the most affected 
crisis countries in the EU, and the new member states to the EU fiscally converge with the 
EU-10 and EU-15 countries, respectively. Here, the EU-10 countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom. The EU-15 is obtained by adding Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain to the 
EU-10 countries. The new member countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The 
main reason for comparing the PIIGS with the EU-10 is to determine whether these countries’ 
fiscal factors differ since they are most affected crisis countries in the EU. In addition, the 
new member states are compared with the EU-15 countries to determine these countries’ 
fiscal similarities or differences and to get an idea about the future of the EU. Here, following 
De Bandt and Mongelli (2000), Blot and Serranito (2006), Kočenda et al. (2008) and 
Bertarelli et al. (2014) we check the fiscal convergence by considering two fiscal criteria 
underlined in the Treaty of Maastricht.4 The first one is that the ratio of public debt stock to 
GDP should not exceed 60% while the second one is that the budget deficit should not exceed 
3% of the GDP. The Maastricht criteria (also known as the euro convergence criteria are the 
criteria which EU member states are required to meet to enter the third stage of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the euro as their currency. Here, some countries 
included in the analysis are not members of the EMU, hence this may provide us with 
information about the possibility of their future membership to the EMU.  
In this study, we test the fiscal convergence among the EU member countries over the 
period from 1995Q1 to 2017Q2. To do so, the study employs two dependent variables based 
on Maastricht Criteria, i.e. public debt over GDP and budget deficit over GDP, and uses 
                                                 
4 The studies of Esteve et al. (2000), Sosvilla Rivero et al. (2001), Zodrow (2003), Delgado (2006), Kemmerling 
(2010), Delgado and Presno (2010, 2011), Vintilă et al. (2014) and Ioana-Laura (2015) consider the definition of 
convergence in terms of taxation. 
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traditional unit root tests (ADF, Dickey and Fuller, 1979), nontraditional one (Zivot and 
Andrews, 1992)- and two-structural breaks (Lee and Strazicich, 2003) along with nonlinear 
unit root tests (KSS). The results indicate that Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain 
(PIIGS) diverge from other EU-15 countries in terms of public debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, 
results also show that all PIIGS countries except for Greece converge to EU-10 in terms of 
budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. This result is interesting since the accumulation of public debt is 
not mainly related to budget deficits but other structural factors like trade and/or current 
deficits.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the data and 
methodology. Section 3.3 presents and evaluates the estimation results. Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
3.2. Data and Methodology 
 
The study uses the period from the 1995Q1 to 2017Q2 as the analysis period. As 
underlined by Kočenda et al. (2008), the main reason for choosing this period is that countries 
that have joined the EU in 2004 made their official membership applications to the EU in 
1995. The data used in the study is gathered from the IMF and OECD databases. As the time 
series techniques used in this study do not allow missing observations, we fulfilled the 
missing observations by using the cubic spline method.  
In the literature, convergence analysis is realized using both different measurement 
methods and data types. When we check the previous studies, we observe that the 
convergence has often been used to test cross-country income convergence. However, studies 
conducted in the last 10 years have tested also convergence in different areas of economics. 
Energy (Mulder & de Groot, 2012; Burnett & Madariaga, 2017), health (Wang, 2009; Lau et 
al., 2014), military spending (Lau et al., 2016; Arvanitidis et al., 2014), income inequality 
(Lessmann & Seidel, 2017; Apergis et al., 2018), transportation (Beyzatlar & Yetkiner, 2017), 
financial development, (Kılınc et al., 2017), and housing costs (Kim & Rous, 2012) are some 
examples. In the literature, absolute or conditional convergence, sigma-convergence, and 
stochastic convergence are measured through different methods. Additionally, the 
econometric techniques used in convergence analysis studies differ from each other. 
Accordingly, studies on convergence use cross sections, time series, and panel datasets. For 
example, studies using cross-sectional data include Baumol (1986), Dowrick and Nguyen 
(1989), Barro (1991), and Barro and Salai-Martin (1992); time-series studies include Bernard 
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and Durlauf (1995), Oxley and Greasley (1995), Carlino and Mills (1996), Greasley and 
Oxley (1997), Oxley and Greasley (1999), Li and Pappel (1999), Datta (2003), Bentzen 
(2005), Chong et al. (2008), and Ayala et al. (2013); and, studies using panel data technique 
include Islam (1995), Weeks and Yudong Yao (2003), Westerlund and Basher (2008), and 
Hao et al. (2015). In this study, we opt for time-series techniques by using unit root tests. 
Unit root tests were first used in convergence analysis with the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test to test the stochastic convergence among countries. In convergence 
analysis, the model with constants and trends is used as a suitable model for the ADF test. In 
the unit root tests, the null hypothesis is that the series is not stationary; the alternative 
hypothesis is that the series is stationary, or that it does not contain unit roots. According to 
the ADF test results, stating that the series is stationary indicates stochastic convergence 
between countries, but the regression model below should be estimated to determine the 
presence of β convergence (Ayala et al. 2013): 
t ty t u     (3.1) 
For analyzing β convergence, the following different situations may occur. 
a) C (β convergence): There is β convergence if µ and β have opposite signs and are 
statistically significant (µ ≠ 0 and β ≠ 0). 
b) D (divergence form different levels): If µ and β have the same polarity and are 
statistically significant, divergence exists from different levels (µ ≠ 0 and β ≠ 0). 
c) c (constant at different levels): If µ is statistically significant while β is not, the 
constant is found to stay at different levels (µ ≠ 0 and β=0). 
d) d (divergence from same level): If µ is not statistically significant while β is, there is 
divergence from the same level (µ = 0 and β ≠ 0 ). 
e) E (remains at the same level): If neither µ nor β are statistically significant, they remain 
at the same level (µ = 0 and β = 0). 
β convergence is tested according to the polarity and statistical significance of µ and β. 
The presence of structural breaks in a time series can significantly affect the stability of 
results achieved through conventional unit root tests (Dickey & Fuller, 1979; Phillips & 
Perron, 1988; Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). Hence, new unit root tests that take into 
consideration structural break(s) have been developed in the literature. For instance, Perron 
(1989) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) have considered single breaks in the series. The main 
difference between Perron’s (1989) and Zivot and Andrews’s (1992) structural break unit root 
tests is that Perron’s (1989) breakdown period is exogenous to the model while Zivot and 
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Andrews’s (1992) one is endogenously included in the model. As this study tests for the 
existence of fiscal convergence among EU member countries, Zivot and Andrews’s (1992) 
structural break unit root test is applied due to the decision of endogenous over single break 
unit root tests. Analyzing convergence via unit root tests with a structural break, the null 
hypothesis is that the series is not stationary, as in traditional unit root tests; therefore, no 
convergence exists between countries, and the alternative hypothesis is that the series is 
stationary with a structural break, namely, convergence between countries. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected in the analysis, then the following equation must be estimated to test β 
convergence among countries. 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2t t t t t ty DU DU TIME TIME u         (3.2) 
where DU1t = 1 if t ≤ TB, otherwise DU1t = 0; DU2t =1 if t > TB, otherwise DU2t = 0; TIME1t = 
t if t ≤ TB, otherwise TIME1t = 0; TIME2t = t - TB if t > TB, otherwise TIME2t = 0. Interpreting 
the coefficients here is done in the same way as the previously predicted equations. 
In the presence of more than one structural break, both the traditional unit root tests and 
the single-break unit root tests (i.e. Perron, 1989; Zivot & Andrews, 1992) can give biased 
results. For this reason, deciding whether convergence or divergence exists between countries 
would be incorrect. To solve this problem, unit root tests that take into account more than one 
structural break have been used in the convergence literature. In the time series literature, two 
unit root tests (i.e., Lumsdaine & Papell, 1997; Lee & Strazicich, 2003) have been used to test 
convergence between countries. In this study, Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) two-break unit root 
test is used to test for fiscal convergence between EU countries. As in the case of unit root 
tests with one structural break, the null hypothesis here emphasizes the series to not be 
stationary and thus no convergence to exist between countries, while the alternative 
hypothesis is that the series is stationary with structural breaks. In order to test β convergence 
between countries, the following equation must be estimated: 
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 3 3t t t t t t t ty DU DU DU TIME TIME TIME u             (3.3) 
where DU1t =1 if t ≤ TB, otherwise DU1t = 0; DU2t =1 if T1B < t ≤ T2B, otherwise DU2t = 0; 
TIME1t = t if t ≤ T1B, otherwise TIME1t = 0; TIME2t = t - T1B if T1B < t ≤ T2B, otherwise TIME2t 
= 0; and TIME3t = t - T2B if t > T2B, otherwise TIME3t = 0. Here, the interpretation of the 
coefficients is done in the same way as the previously predicted equations. 
Finally, the nonlinear nature of some series causes the linear unit root test results to 
become misleading. In order not to encounter such a situation, firstly the appropriate unit root 
test should be selected and applied after the linearity of the series. Early studies on nonlinear 
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convergence have mainly employed the nonlinear unit root test developed by Kapetanios et al. 
(2003). Kapetanios et al. used the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) process to 
incorporate the ADF unit-root test into non-linearity. This process is expressed in the equation 
below. 
3
1 1
1
p
t j t t t
j
x x y v   

     
 (3.4)
 
Although this test is an important tool for convergence analysis, it does not distinguish 
between convergence and long-term catch-up (Chong et al., 2008). Chong et al. combined the 
nonlinear unit root test from Kapetanios et al.’s (2003) and Oxley and Greasley’s (1995) time 
series convergence analysis tests by adding an additive intercept and trend component to the 
KSS model. In this case, the new estimation equation is defined as: 
3
1
1
( )
p
t j t j t t
j
y y y G trend     

      
 (3.5)
 
where the yt series indicates the original state of the series as different from the de-meaned 
and de-trended xt series; G (trend) is the linear and nonlinear trend. In this study, as in Chong 
et al. (2008), the square trend has been used for the nonlinear trend. To interpret this equation 
in economic terms as in Oxley and Greasley (1995), the absence of a nonlinear unit root (δ < 
0) implies either that the nonlinearity is catching up given the presence of a deterministic 
trend (ϕ ≠ 0) or that the nonlinearity is converging in the long term if the deterministic trend is 
absent (ϕ=0). If there is a nonlinear unit root in the series, the conclusion is divergence. 
To examine a potential convergence process in public debt and budget deficit, we start 
with an endogenous system design that considers the government’s existence. As in an 
endogenous growth model, all endogenous factors should grow at the same rate; any 
convergence process in the rate of economic growth will reflect the dynamics of the other 
endogenous indicators which are two specific government indicators in this study. The 
government’s existence in this model is based on the essentials of Barro and Sala-i Martin 
(1995). 
 
Household Utility Function: 
1
0 1
 t
c
U e dt



 
   
 

 (3.6) 
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where c stands for consumption, θ is the elasticity of substitution, and ρ is the subjective 
discount rate. 
 
Government:  
(asset) ( ) w a C FG V wL r C Firm earning         (3.7) 
where G is the government expenditures, V represents the transfer expenditures, w signifies 
wage, L indicates labor, C denotes consumption, and τ refers to taxes levied for (0,1)  . The 
dot matrix gives the derivative with respect to time. 
 
Household Budget Constraint:  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )w a Ca w ra C na v           (3.8) 
where n means population growth, a demonstrates assets per capita, and v explains transfer 
expenditures per capita. 
 
Consumption Growth Rate: 
1
[(1 ) ]a
c
r
c
 

  
 (3.9)
 
Household determines the decision to consume, whether it increases or decreases, 
according to the after-tax return of assets. 
 
Firm Production: 
( , )Y F K L  (3.10) 
 
ˆ(1 )[ ( ,L) ]F F K wL K rK     After-Tax Profit  (3.11) 
In order to maximize profit, one needs to take the derivative of the function with respect 
to K, setting the derivative equal to zero. First, if the expression is written explicitly as: 
ˆ(1 ) ( , ) (1 ) (1 ) K rKF F FF K L wL            (3.12) 
ˆ ˆ(1 ) f (k) (1 ) r 0 f (k)
(1 )
  F F
F
r
   

        

 
Then the capital accumulation function is derived as follows: 
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ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
 
   xt
k f k c x n k g
c G
where c ce and g
L L


     
  
 (3.13)
 
where x shows the rate of increase in technology. 
 
Marginal Efficiency of Labor: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ( )] xtw e f k k f k   (3.14) 
ˆ
ˆ
c c
x
c c
   the consumption increase rate is constructed as effective consumption. In this 
case, after adding c c  if it is written in its extended form: 
ˆ 1 ˆ(1 )(1 )[f (k) ]
ˆ a F
c
x
c
    

      
   (3.15) 
where the capital is exposed to two different taxes. 
 
Steady State: 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( ) c ( )f k x n k g      
ˆ(k) ˆ(k)
kˆ
  
f
x n f x n 

      
  (3.16)
 
If we bring this together with the structure in ˆ ˆ
c
c  
we get the Transversality Condition: 
0
ˆ ˆlim .exp( [(1 )(1 ).( (k) ) ] 0
t
a F
t
k f x n du  

  
       
  

 (3.17)
 
 
In short, to increase the net product of capital in Steady State, the condition of
* ( )ˆ(k )
(1 )(1 )a F
x n
f f
 

  
 
 should be provided. 
Greiner (2007): 
B Br S   (3.18) 
where B describes public debt, r states real interest rate, and S stands for government surplus. 
S T Ip
Ip G V
 
   (3.19)
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Greiner (2007) assumes the ratio of public surplus to GDP to be the linear difference of 
Debt / GDP and to be constant: 
T Ip B
Y Y
 

 
 (3.20) 
where ϕ and   are constant, ϕ reflects how S reacts in reality to the increase in Y. 
T Ip Y B   
 
S Y B    (3.21) 
then it can be written as 
(3.22) 
 
and becomes  
 
         (3.23) 
The equations up to now include capital, consumption, public expenditures and, 
accordingly, a structure in which public debt is endogenous. Let us assume that τ→ τa, τF, τw, 
τc, is the weighted average where τ represents the general tax rate. T - Ip= ϕY + βB has been 
assumed above. Let’s leave Ip alone. In this case, if Y= T / τ then ϕY = ϕ(T / τ) and the 
equation can be written as:  
 
If Ip=T(1 - (ϕ / τ) - βB and  Ip = 1 - (ϕ / τ) then it becomes Ip = T(Ip – βB). 
Every public expenditure made can be considered as an accumulated public 
expenditure. Suppose that the public expenditure accumulation function is not subject to 
detrition: 
Ip ipT B           (3.24)
 
then Ip becomes  
1  and ip B Br B Y

 

    
       (3.25) 
Then the public debt accumulation function can be written as follows: 
( ) ( 1)B r B T ip           
 (3.26)
 
The positive difference between the real interest rate and the β parameter showing the 
public surplus of public debt is observed to increase the accumulation of public debt and tax 
revenues to decrease this accumulation as the parenthesis (Ip - 1) is negative. In short, the 
Ip T Y B T Y      
( )B Br T Ip Br Y B      
( )B B r Y   
107 
 
 
simple system here is a structure where Y, K, Ip (i.e. G and V), C and B are internal. In the 
balanced growth path, all grow at the same rate: 
Y K G V C B
Y K G V C B
     
       (3.27) 
where µ indicates the growth rate in the balanced growth path.
 
So, a growth (or convergence 
process) to be defined for one of these will actually reflect the growth (or convergence) of all. 
The convergence process of GDP per capita can be defined as: 
*ˆln ( ) ˆ ˆ(ln( ) ln ( ))
d y t
y y t
dt
 
       (3.28) 
where *yˆ may represent the level of the stationary state GDP per capita (or any time after any 
time t). The process of convergence between any period t1 - t2 is as follows:
 
*
2 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ( ) ln ( ) (1 e )ln (1 e )ln ( )y t y t y y t
          (3.29) 
The process that applies to GDP per capita is also valid for B (public debt) and public 
budget deficit (let's say DF). Here DF actually refers to a negative S. 
Let’s write 
DF
DF
 = /S S  = µ. This is due to the fact that S = T-  Ip,
 
and (T - Ip) / Y = ϕ 
+ β(B / Y) has been previously defined (see Eq. 3.20).  
 
3.3. Empirical Results 
 
The results of the analysis on whether fiscal convergence exists among the EU countries 
are presented in Table 3.1. According to the ADF unit root test results for the general 
government debt-to-GDP ratio, no fiscal convergence is found among the EU countries since 
the series are not stationary. One may then argue that the shocks related to the fiscal 
differences among EU countries can be said to be permanent. This confirms the validity of 
divergence between the EU-10 and PIIGS (in total, the EU-15), and the new member states. 
However, in the case of one or more structural breaks, the resulting ADF unit root test results 
may be misleading. For this reason and in order to make a clearer decision about whether 
convergence or catch-up exists between countries, the Zivot-Andrews structural break unit 
root test results are included. According to the results presented in Table 3.1, no fiscal 
convergence is found between the EU-10 and the PIIGS, and new member countries. The test 
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results indicate the fiscal differences between countries to not disappear with models that 
consider a single structural break; the shocks related to fiscal differences between countries 
are permanent. 
In the next stage of analysis, the results of Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) unit root test 
with two breaks are taken into consideration in light of the possibility of more than one 
structural break in the series. The results presented in Table 3.1 indicate that Greece, Latvia, 
Portugal, and Croatia are stationary with structural breaks. For the other countries included in 
the analysis, financial differences are not stationary, as in the other unit root tests. Hence, 
these countries do not show convergence and the shocks related to fiscal differences are be 
permanent. Greece, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, and Croatia are stationary with structural 
breaks; Greece and Portugal show stochastic convergence with the EU-10, and Latvia and 
Croatia with the EU-15, but in order to state this information as certain, Equation 3.3 should 
be estimated and the results should be interpreted accordingly. In other words, for the 
countries that we find stochastic convergence, β convergence should be tested.
 
Table 3.2 
shows the estimation results for Greece, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, and Croatia. According to 
the results, the structural break periods for Greece are in 2007Q1 and 2011Q4. Hence, Greece 
seems to have fiscally diverged from the EU10 countries before the occurrence of the global 
financial crisis. Besides, Greece shows weak convergence between 2007Q1 and 2011Q4, and 
weak divergence after 2011Q4. According to these results, Greece is generally seen to fiscally 
diverge from the EU-10 countries during the analysis period.
 
For Latvia, 2007Q2 and 2013Q4 
have been determined as structural breaks. Latvia shows β convergence before 2007Q2, weak 
convergence between 2007Q2 and 2013Q4, and β convergence after 2013Q4. According to 
these results, Latvia can generally be concluded to have fiscally converged with the EU-15 
countries during the analysis period.
 
When we examine the results for Portugal, the break 
periods are 2000Q3 and 2010Q4. In the pre-2000Q3 period, Portugal showed weak 
convergence with the EU-10 countries, β convergence between 2000Q3 and 2010Q4, and 
weak divergence after 2010Q4.
 
For Slovenia, β convergence to EU-15 countries has been 
determined in the pre-1999Q4 period, weak convergence between 1999Q4 and 2011Q3, and β 
convergence to EU-15 countries post 2011Q3.
 
According to these results, Slovenia can be 
said to generally converge with EU-15 countries fiscally during the analysis period.
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Table 3.1. Unit Root Tests for Debt/GDP Convergence 
 ADF ZA LS 
 τ k  k Break Dates  D DT Break Dates λ1 λ2 k 
Czech Republic 
-0.492  
[-3.460] 
0 
-3.911  
[-5.080] 
0 2003Q1 
-4.752 -2.039 
1.650 
3.076 
-5.088 
2000Q4 
2009Q1 
0.264 0.637 10 
Estonia 
-1.091  
[-3.460] 
0 
-2.569  
[-5.080] 
0 2008Q4 
-5.401* 2.334 
2.354 
1.174 
-6.237 
2000Q3 
2008Q2 
0.253 0.593 11 
Greece 
-2.739  
[-3.460] 
0 
-4.604  
[-5.080] 
0 2010Q3 
-5.757** -0.661 
-16.194 
-0.822 
3.556 
2007Q1 
2011Q4 
0.538 0.747 9 
Ireland 
-1.621  
[-3.461] 
2 
-3.402  
[-5.080] 
2 2010Q1 
-5.311 0.099 
-1.144 
0.033 
2.420 
2006Q1 
2011Q1 
0.495 0.714 10 
Italy 
-1.054  
[-3.462] 
4 
-3.581  
[-5.080] 
4 2010Q1 
-4.371 0.372 
-0.628 
-3.031 
4.435 
1999Q3 
2012Q3 
0.209 0.769 8 
Latvia 
-3.341  
[-3.461] 
2 
-4.466  
[-5.080] 
2 2012Q1 
-7.214*** -1.482 
1.021 
5.878 
-4.222 
2007Q2 
2013Q4 
0.549 0.835 11 
Poland 
-1.345  
[-3.461] 
1 
-3.031 
[-5.080] 
1 2001Q2 
-5.087 -2.534 
0.596 
2.648 
-3.179 
2004Q3 
2010Q4 
0.429 0.703 11 
Portugal 
-2.758  
[-3.462] 
4 
-4.527  
[-5.080] 
4 2010Q4 
-5.990** 2.393 
-2.679 
-1.615 
5.672 
2000Q3 
2010Q4 
0.253 0.703 10 
Slovak Republic 
-2.257  
[-3.461] 
1 
-2.797  
[-5.080] 
1 2001Q1 
-5.375* 1.667 
-1.649 
-4.300 
-2.751 
2003Q3 
2007Q3 
0.220 0.736 10 
Slovenia 
-1.908  
[-3.462] 
1 
-3.921  
[-5.080] 
1 2008Q4 
-5.701** 0.459 
-2.189 
0.644 
8.082 
1999Q4 
2011Q3 
0.455 0.795 10 
Spain 
-1.967  
[-3.462] 
4 
-3.150  
[-5.080] 
4 2005Q1 
-5.133 0.156 
-1.224 
-2.690 
3.616 
2004Q4 
2012Q2 
0.407 0.835 8 
Bulgaria 
-0.443  
[-3.460] 
0 
-2.715  
[-5.080] 
0 2011Q1 
-5.006 0.727 
-1.002 
-4.038 
6.590 
2004Q1 
2013Q4 
0.242 0.626 5 
Cyprus 
-1.296  
[-3.460] 
0 
-3.198  
[-3.198] 
0 2008Q2 
-5.101 -1.533 
5.239 
2.590 
-3.526 
2000Q2 
2009Q1 
0.231 0.747 9 
Lithuania 
-2.434  
[-3.460] 
0 
-4.218  
[-5.080] 
0 1998Q3 
-5.154 0.470 
4.578 
-0.267 
-4.370 
2000Q1 
2011Q4 
0.396 0.659 9 
Malta 
-2.041  
[-3.460] 
0 
-3.879  
[-5080] 
0 2000Q4 
-4.065 -1.678 
-0.439 
-3.104 
-3.871 
2003Q4 
2009Q4 
0.308 0.747 4 
Romania 
-2.627  
[-3.460] 
0 
-3.618  
[-5.080] 
0 2003Q1 
-5.127 -2.404 
4.765 
-3.002 
-3.293 
2001Q4 
2011Q4 
0.308 0.747 8 
Croatia 
-2.391  
[-3.462] 
1 
-3.465  
[-5.080] 
1 2008Q4 
-6.964*** 1.004 
-2.790 
-9.632 
9.993 
2002Q4 
2011Q4 
0.364 0.773 11 
Hungary 
-1.683 
[-3.460] 
0 
-3.429 
[-5.080] 
9 2005Q1 
-4.333 -2.816 
0.143 
-6.535 
-0.688 
1999Q3 
2009Q1 
0.208 0.626 6 
Note: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, ZA: Zivot-Andrews (1992), LS: 
Lee and Strazicich (2003). 
 110 
 
Table 3.2. β Convergence Estimation Results for model with two structural breaks for Debt to GDP ratio
   
            
Country µ1 β1 Decision Tb1 µ2 β2 Decision Tb2 µ3 β3 Decision 
Greece 
25.378*** 
(1.341) 
0.598*** 
(0.049) 
D 2007Q1 
-84.746 
(12.909) 
2.597*** 
(0.224) 
c 2011Q4 
7.487 
(19.120) 
1.154*** 
(0.243) 
d 
Latvia 
-53.805*** 
(0.530) 
0.197*** 
(0.019) 
C 2007Q2 
16.219 
(13.070) 
-0.823*** 
(0.209) 
c 2013Q4 
-258.313*** 
(40.066) 
2.645*** 
(0.478) 
C 
Portugal 
-4.287*** 
(0.280) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
c 2000Q3 
-40.126*** 
(2.630) 
1.306*** 
(0.044) 
C 2010Q4 
14.494 
(11.450) 
0.643*** 
(0.149) 
d 
Slovenia 
-50.708*** 
(0.371) 
0.591*** 
(0.035) 
C 1999Q4 
-33.943*** 
(0.796) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
c 2011Q3 
-107.001*** 
(11.834) 
1.161*** 
(0.153) 
C 
Croatia 
-40.024*** 
(0.681) 
1.0111*** 
(0.039) 
C 2002Q4 
-1.339 
(1.140) 
-0.523*** 
(0.023) 
c 2011Q4 
-78.439*** 
(16.229) 
0.866*** 
(0.209) 
C 
Note: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. C indicates β convergence, c indicates β convergence with only one 
estimate statistically significant, D indicates divergence, d indicates divergence with only one estimate statistically significant and E indicates equilibrium growth. The values 
in parentheses are standard errors.
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For Croatia, 2002Q4 and 2011Q4 are found to be the structural break periods. Croatia 
has β convergence to EU-15 countries before 2002Q4, poor convergence between 2002Q4 
and 2011Q4, and β convergence after 2011Q4.
 
Finally, the non-linear unit root tests will be 
analyzed through the KSS unit root test for the countries. Determining whether a series is 
linear or nonlinear is important in time series. For nonlinear data, testing the stationarity of 
the data with linear unit root tests will significantly reduce the power of the tests and lead to 
false results. For this reason, results from the KSS unit root tests are given to determine the 
stationarity of variables and thus make a clearer decision on whether convergence exists 
among the countries of study. Before deciding whether the series are linear or nonlinear, 
Harvey and Leybourne’s (2007) and Harvey et al.’s (2008) linearity test are presented in 
Table 3.3.
 
 
Table 3.3. Harvey and Leybourne (2007) and Harvey et al. (2008) linearity tests for 
Debt to GDP ratio. 
Country *
10%W  
*
5%W  
*
1%W  W  
Czech Republic 2.02 2.03 2.05 1.76 
Estonia 7.27 7.29 7.33 5.96 
Greece 7.44 7.55 7.74 6.67* 
Ireland 31.65*** 31.87*** 32.25*** 19.53*** 
Italy 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.89 
Latvia 2.01 2.02 2.03 1.02 
Poland 3.96 3.99 4.04 4.36 
Portugal 4.14 4.15 4.18 0.86 
Slovak Republic 2.91 2.94 2.99 2.38 
Slovenia 2.43 2.43 2.44 2.86 
Spain 7.62 7.68 7.80* 2.57 
Bulgaria 1.70 1.70 1.71 1.54 
Cyprus 9.91** 9.95** 10.01** 7.70** 
Lithuania 4.57 4.59 4.62 3.09 
Malta 2.12 2.14 2.19 1.86 
Romania 2.18 2.19 2.21 1.75 
Croatia 2.25 2.26 2.27 2.13 
Hungary 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.09 
Notes: The critical values for W  are 9.21 (1%), 5.99 (5%) and 4.60 (10%). The critical values for 
*W  are 
13.27 (1%), 9.48 (5%) and 7.77 (10%). The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
Table 3.3 shows the linearity test statistics results of W* for Harvey and Leybourne 
(2007) and Wλ for Harvey et al. (2008). For both linearity tests, exceeding critical values 
indicates rejecting the null hypothesis of the series’ linearity and accepting the alternative 
hypothesis of the series’ nonlinearity.
 
According to these results, both W* and Wλ test 
statistics exceed 1% for Ireland and 5% for Cyprus. As the Ireland and Cyprus series are 
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nonlinear in this case, conducting the nonlinear unit root tests to check the stationary nature of 
the series would be more appropriate.
 
Table 3.4 and 3.5 show the nonlinear KSS unit root test 
results for all countries used in the study. The models in Table 3.4 are models with linear 
trends.
 
Here, the results of the KSS unit root test have not been interpreted, as the series apart 
from Ireland and Cyprus are considered to be linear.
 
The Ireland and Cyprus series are 
concluded not to be stationary due to not exceeding the critical values, hence they do not 
converge with the EU-10.
  
In addition to these analyses, Sigma convergence has been tested for all countries.
 
The 
presence of Sigma convergence is generally interpreted using the coefficient of variation 
(CV).
 
In addition, some studies have shown that sigma convergence is measured using 
variation or standard deviation. The coefficient of variation is calculated using the formula 
where CV = standard deviation / mean. In order to test the existence of convergence more 
easily, the trend coefficient has also been added to the CV (Vojinovic et al. 2009). In this 
study, Sigma convergence has been tested using standard deviation.
 
In the convergence 
literature, the absence of convergence β indicates that no Sigma convergence.
 
Hence, the 
previously analyzed countries not showing β convergence according to the linear/nonlinear 
unit root tests are assumed to not show Sigma convergence in terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
 
Accordingly, countries other than Latvia, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, and Croatia are 
accepted to not show Sigma convergence due to the lack of β convergence.
 
The results of the 
Sigma convergence are given in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.  
Results for Sigma convergence show that Greece generally diverges fiscally from the 
EU-10 countries.
 
This also supports previous unit root analyses.
 
Latvia is the second country 
whose Sigma convergence has been checked.
 
Latvia is observed to converge with the EU-15 
countries fiscally during the analysis period.
 
This situation supports the results from the two-
break unit root test.
 
Portugal is another country whose Sigma convergence has been tested.
 
The results obtained for Portugal show limited convergence with the EU-10 countries by 
2010; after this period, there is divergence.
 
This is consistent with the results from the two-
break unit root tests. Slovenia shows β convergence with the EU-15 countries fiscally, except 
for weak convergence between 1999-2011.
 
This is also confirmed by the unit root test results.
 
Croatia’s Sigma convergence results show convergence with the EU-15 countries. This also 
supports the unit root tests with two breaks. Accordingly, in addition to the weak convergence 
between 2002 and 2011, Croatia shows β convergence fiscally with the EU-15 countries. 
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Table 3.4. KSS test with constant and linear trend (Debt/GDP convergence) 
Country Lag δ ϕ Results 
  Estimator t statistic Estimator t statistic  
Czech Republic 0 -0.555 x 10
-5 -1.772 -0.679 x10-2 -1.826 - 
Estonia 0 -0.181 x 10
-5 -1.129 -0.015 -1.481 - 
Greece 0 -0.557 x 10
-5 -1.683 0.067 2.436 - 
Ireland 0 -0.123 x 10
-4 -1.215 0.010 0.635 Divergence 
Italy 0 -0.229 x 10
-5 -0.732 0.010 1.301 - 
Latvia 1 -0.212 x 10
-5 -1.114 0.002 0.202 - 
Poland 1 -0.219 x 10
-4 -1.880 -0.005 -1.491 - 
Portugal 0 -0.720 x 10
-5 -2.622 0.033 3.568** - 
Slovak Republic 1 -0.464 x 10
-4 -2.522 -0.020 -2.441 - 
Slovenia 4 -0.254 x 10
-5 -1.860 0.002 0.802 - 
Spain 1 -0.222 x 10
-4 -1.263 0.014 0.036 - 
Bulgaria 1 -0.835 x 10
-5 -2.890 -0.032 -3.341** - 
Cyprus 3 -0.135 x 10
-3 -2.549 0.003 0.476 Divergence 
Lithuania 0 -0.723 x 10
-5 -3.074* -0.014 -2.467 - 
Malta 1 -0.381 x 10
-4 -2.878 -0.013 -3.154** - 
Romania 0 -0.817 x 10
-5 -3.202** -0.019 -3.170** - 
Croatia 4 -0.984 x 10
-5 -2.283 -0.001 -0.475 - 
Hungary 0 -0.001 -3.483** -0.015 -2.485 - 
Note: The critical values of the t statistics for δ are -3.05 (%10), -3.35 (%5) and -3.96 (%1).  The critical values of the t statistics (left tail) for ϕ are -2.57 (%10), -2.94 (%5) 
and -3.68 (%1). The critical values of the t statistics (right tail) for ϕ are 2.59 (%10), 2.93 (%5) and 3.65 (%1). All critical values are obtained from Table 1a and Table 1b of 
Chong et al. (2008). The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.5. KSS test with constant and nonlinear trend (Debt/GDP convergence) 
Country Lag δ ϕ Results 
  Estimator t statistic Estimator t statistic  
Czech Republic 0 -0.558 x 10
-5 -1.893 -0.108 x 10-3 -2.254 - 
Estonia 0 -0.772 x 10
-6 -0.698 -0.135 x 10-3 -1.231 - 
Greece 0 -0.123 x 10
-4 -1.915 0.002 2.275 - 
Ireland 0 -0.111 x 10
-4 -1.030 0.745 x 10-4 0.306 Divergence 
Italy 0 -0.167 x 10
-5 -0.792 0.131 x 10-3 1.757 - 
Latvia 1 -0.190 x 10
-5 -1.349 0.435 x 10-4 1.796 - 
Poland 1 -0.225 x 10
-4 -1.382 -0.688 x 10-4 -1.382 - 
Portugal 0 -0.130 x 10
-4 -2.899 0.001 3.450** - 
Slovak Republic 1 -0.438 x 10
-4 -2.332 -0.269 x 10-3 3.451** - 
Slovenia 4 -0.281 x 10
-5 -2.007 0.357 x 10-4 1.004 - 
Spain 0 -0.595 x 10
-4 -2.540 0.337 x 10-3 3.181** - 
Bulgaria 1 -0.928 x 10
-5 -2.570 -0.001 -2.614 - 
Cyprus 3 -0.136 x 10
-3 -2.398 0.721 x 10-4 0.737 Divergence 
Lithuania 0 -0.545 x 10
-5 -3.100* -0.140 x 10-3 -1.960 - 
Malta 1 -0.616 x 10
-4 -3.887** -0.279 x 10-3 -4.865*** - 
Romania 0 -0.330 x 10
-5 -1.715 -0.116 x 10-3 -1.781 - 
Croatia 8 -0.115 x 10
-4 -2.329 -0.171 x 10-4 -0.588 - 
Hungary 0 -0.001 -3.483** -0.015 -2.485 - 
Note: The critical values of the t statistics for δ are -3.07 (%10), -3.40 (%5) and -4.02 (%1).  The critical values of the t statistics (left tail) for ϕ are -2.65 (%10), -2.98 (%5) 
and -3.74 (%1). The critical values of the t statistics (right tail) for ϕ are 2.63 (%10), 2.97 (%5) and 3.70 (%1). All critical values are obtained from Table 1a and Table 1b of 
Chong et al. (2008). The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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 Figure 3.1. Sigma Convergence for Debt to GDP ratio 
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Figure 3.2. Sigma Convergence for Debt to GDP ratio (Continued) 
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Figure 3.3. Sigma Convergence for Debt to GDP ratio (Continued) 
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According to the above results, new EU members and Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, 
and Spain do not converge with EU-10 countries in terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
 
Now, we 
test fiscal convergence with budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. Table 3.6 shows the unit root test 
results for testing budget deficit-to-GDP ratio convergences. According to the ADF unit root 
test results, the series of all countries except Ireland, Latvia, Spain, and Hungary are 
stationary. Therefore, all countries except Ireland, Latvia, Spain, and Hungary converge with 
the target country groups. When we check 
 
the Zivot-Andrews single-break unit root test 
results 
 
countries except for Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Spain, Lithuania, Croatia, and Hungary 
show stochastic convergence in terms of the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio with target country 
groups.
 
However, to test whether these countries show β convergence, the equation 3.2 must 
be estimated.
 
The estimation results for testing β convergence are presented in Table 3.7. 
According to the results, 2004Q1 is a structural break period for the Czech Republic.
 
The 
Czech Republic is seen to show weak divergence from the EU-15 countries before 2004Q1 
and β convergence with the EU-15 countries in terms of the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio after 
2004Q1.
 
For Estonia, 2010Q3 is found as a structural break period. Estonia has fiscally weak 
convergence with the EU-15 countries before 2010Q3 while showing β convergence with the 
EU-15 countries after 2010Q3.
 
The structural break period for Greece is in 2013Q4. Hence, 
one may argue that Greece converges with the EU-10 countries in the pre-2013Q4 period.  
For Italy, 2008Q2 is found to be a structural break period. Italy has low convergence 
with the EU-10 countries in the period before 2008Q2 in terms of the budget deficit-to-GDP 
ratio and to have remains at the same level in the following periods.
 
The period of 2011Q3 is 
the structural break period for Portugal.
 
This means that Portugal has β convergence with the 
EU-10 before the 2011Q3 period and to have remained at the same level in the following 
period.
 
The structural break period for the Slovak Republic occurrs in 2003Q1.
 
The Slovak 
Republic shows fiscal β convergence with the EU-15 countries before and after 2003Q1.
 
For 
Slovenia, 2013Q4 was determined as the structural break period. Slovenia is concluded to 
have remained at the same level in the period following its weak convergence with the EU-15 
countries in the pre-2013Q4 period. The structural break period for Bulgaria is 2014Q2.
 
Bulgaria shows weak convergence with the EU-15 countries before and after its structural 
break period.
 
The structural break period for Cyprus is 2013Q4.
 
Cyprus shows weak 
convergence with the EU-15 countries before and after its structural break date. 
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Table 3.6. Unit Root Tests for Budget Deficit Convergence 
 ADF ZA LS 
 τ k  k Break Dates  D DT Break Dates λ1 λ2 k 
Czech Republic 
-6.317** 
[-3.461] 
0 
-9.032** 
[-5.080] 
0 2004Q1 
-8.781*** -0.573 
1.934 
-3.622 
-6.256 
2001Q4 
2012Q1 
0.311 0.767 0 
Estonia 
-4.819** 
[-3.463] 
4 
-5.681** 
[-5.080] 
4 2010Q3 
-7.678*** 2.454 
1.734 
-4.356 
2.704 
2002Q4 
2009Q2 
0.356 0.644 6 
Greece 
-6.839** 
[-3.461] 
0 
-10.665** 
[-5.080] 
0 2013Q4 
-9.674*** 1.816 
1.008 
-3.891 
3.191 
2005Q4 
2013Q3 
0.489 0.833 0 
Ireland 
-1.424 
[-3.462] 
2 
-3.806 
[-5.080] 
2 2008Q2 
-6.457*** -1.287 
-8.990 
-1.084 
5.844 
2007Q4 
2009Q4 
0.578 0.667 10 
Italy 
-4.838** 
[-3.461] 
1 
-6.803** 
[-5.080] 
1 2009Q2 
-9.848*** 1.503 
-0.430 
0.356 
4.102 
2007Q2 
2009Q3 
0.556 0.656 0 
Latvia 
-2.968 
[-3.464] 
5 
-3.762 
[-5.080] 
5 1999Q3 
-6.658*** -1.967 
2.176 
4.573 
-3.875 
2003Q1 
2006Q4 
0.367 0.533 9 
Poland 
-3.505** 
[-3.462] 
3 
-4.038 
[-5.080] 
3 2009Q2 
-7.907*** -7.485 
2.412 
7.147 
-6.956 
1999Q4 
2008Q4 
0.222 0.622 6 
Portugal 
-9.462** 
[-3.461] 
0 
-11.754** 
[-5.080] 
0 2011Q3 
-10.864*** -0.843 
-1.662 
1.682 
1.819 
2009Q3 
2013Q4 
0.656 0.844 0 
Slovak Republic 
-4.565** 
[-3.461] 
0 
-6.209** 
[-5.080] 
0 2003Q1 
-6.684*** -5.090 
0.712 
6.048 
-4.685 
2002Q3 
2007Q3 
0.344 0.567 10 
Slovenia 
-8.526** 
[-3.461] 
0 
-11.053** 
[-5.080] 
0 2013Q4 
-15.377*** 0.593 
-21.590 
-3.625 
15.995 
2000Q3 
2013Q3 
0.256 0.833 11 
Spain 
-1.751 
[-3.463] 
4 
-4.799 
[-5.080] 
4 2008Q1 
-6.355*** -1.375 
-7.078 
-2.400 
6.460 
2007Q3 
2012Q3 
0.567 0.789 11 
Bulgaria 
-3.604** 
[-3.462] 
3 
-5.429** 
[-5.080] 
3 2014Q2 
-9.384*** -1.216 
-1.609 
4.321 
3.287 
2012Q2 
2015Q2 
0.778 0.911 2 
Cyprus 
-8.200** 
[-3.461] 
0 
-8.872** 
[-5.080] 
0 2013Q4 
-9.833*** -2.442 
-12.310 
8.407 
10.101 
2007Q1 
2013Q4 
0.544 0.844 10 
Lithuania 
-3.906** 
[-3.461] 
1 
-4.770 
[-5.080] 
1 2007Q4 
-8.620*** 4.183 
-0.231 
-4.853 
6.370 
2006Q1 
2010Q1 
0.500 0.678 0 
Malta 
-4.341** 
[-3.461] 
1 
-5.498** 
[-5.080] 
1 2009Q1 
-5.514* -5.497 
2.033 
5.075 
-4.614 
2003Q3 
2013Q1 
0.389 0.833 9 
Romania 
-9.724** 
[-3.461] 
0 
-10.678** 
[-5.080] 
0 2006Q4 
-4.676 -2.479 
-3.551 
3.824 
3.253 
2003Q2 
2011Q3 
0.035 0.744 11 
Croatia 
-3.616** 
[-3.462] 
3 
-3.846 
[-5.080] 
3 2002Q1 
-8.770*** 0.784 
-0.412 
3.460 
-1.370 
2007Q2 
2013Q3 
0.556 0.833 1 
Hungary 
-2.171 
[-3.462] 
3 
-3.645 
[-5.080] 
3 2008Q1 
-9.303*** -6.509 
-1.131 
7.565 
-5.705 
2005Q4 
2011Q1 
0.489 0.722 0 
Note: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. ADF: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, ZA: Zivot-Andrews (1992), LS: 
Lee and Strazicich (2003). 
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Table 3.7. β Convergence Estimation Results for model with one structural break for Budget Deficit to GDP ratio
 
        
Country µ1 β1 Decision Tb1 µ2 β2 Decision 
Czech Republic -0.822 
(0.806) 
-0.125*** 
(0.040) 
d 2004Q1 
-4.184*** 
(1.008) 
0.078*** 
(0.016) 
C 
Estonia 2.825** 
(1.064) 
-0.005 
(0.030) 
c 2010Q3 
24.949*** 
(3.001) 
-0.243*** 
(0.039) 
C 
Greece -3.207*** 
(0.829) 
-0.090*** 
(0.019) 
C 2013Q4 
-31.002 
(17.577) 
0.361 
(0.213) 
E 
Italy -1.809*** 
(0.437) 
-0.027* 
(0.014) 
c 2008Q2 
0.163 
(1.107) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
E 
Portugal -1.422** 
(0.617) 
-0.075*** 
(0.016) 
C 2011Q3 
-13.140 
(7.771) 
0.130 
(0.099) 
E 
Slovak Republic -3.073*** 
(1.048) 
-0.179*** 
(0.058) 
C 2003Q1 
-2.398*** 
(0.751) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
C 
Slovenia -0.973** 
(0.477) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
c 2013Q4 
-17.336* 
(8.742) 
0.198* 
(0.105) 
E 
Bulgaria 1.166 
(0.876) 
0.029 
(0.020) 
E 2014Q2 
-27.106 
(27.301) 
0.324 
(0.327) 
E 
Cyprus -1.363* 
(0.770) 
0.022 
(0.018) 
E 2013Q4 
-67.817 
(49.318) 
0.813 
(0.597) 
E 
Malta -9.968*** 
(0.878) 
0.159*** 
(0.028) 
C 2009Q1 
6.056* 
(3.054) 
-0.054 
(0.041) 
E 
Romania -3.920*** 
(1.269) 
0.107** 
(0.047) 
C 2006Q4 
-5.709** 
(2.355) 
0.074** 
(0.034) 
C 
Note: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. C indicates β convergence, c indicates β convergence with only one 
estimate statistically significant, D indicates divergence, d indicates divergence with only one estimate statistically significant and E indicates equilibrium growth. The values 
in parentheses are standard errors.
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The structural break period for Malta is 2009Q1.
 
Before the structural break period, 
Malta shows convergence with the EU-15 countries and remains at the same level in the 
following period.
 
Finally, the structural break period for Romania in in 2006Q4.
 
Romania 
shows β convergence to the EU-15 countries fiscally before and after its structural break 
period.
  
After the Zivot-Andrews single break unit root test results, Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) 
two-break unit root test results are included.
 
In accordance with Lee and Strazicich, the results 
of the two-break unit root test conclude countries other than Malta and Romania to be 
stationary with structural breaks. As stated earlier, this indicates stochastic convergence but 
does not provide information on β convergence. Therefore, the equation 3.3 should be 
estimated.
 
The results of estimating whether the countries apart from Malta and Romania 
show β convergence with the target countries are given in Table 3.8.
 
According to these 
results, the structural break periods for the Czech Republic are 2001Q4 and 2011Q2. This 
means that the Czech Republic had the same level of fiscal standing as the EU-15 countries 
before 2001Q4, β convergence between 2001Q4 and 2011Q2, and the same levels after 
2011Q2.
 
Estonia’s structural break periods are 2002Q4 and 2009Q2. Accordingly, Estonia 
remains at the same level in the pre-2002Q4 period as the EU-15 countries, while β 
convergence appears in the subsequent periods. For Greece, structural break periods are in 
2005Q4 and 2013Q3, thus Greece diverges from the EU-10 countries in the pre-2005Q4 
period. Results indicate that Ireland’s structural breaks are 2007Q4 and 2009Q4, and Ireland 
shows β convergence with the EU-10 countries before the 2007Q4 period.
 
For Italy, the 
structural breaks are in 2007Q2 and 2009Q3. Italy is fiscally divergent from the EU-10 
countries prior to 2007Q2, staying at the same level between 2007Q2 and 2009Q3, and 
achieving β convergence after 2009Q3. Latvia’s structural breaks are in 2003Q1 and 2006Q4. 
Latvia seems to have β convergence with the EU-15 countries in terms of budget deficit-to-
GDP ratio after 2006Q4. Poland’s structural break periods are 1999Q4 and 2008Q4. This 
means that it has β convergence between 1999Q4 and 2008Q4. The structural break periods 
obtained for Portugal are in 2009Q3 and 2013Q4.
 
Accordingly, Portugal diverges fiscally 
from the EU-10 countries prior to 2009Q3. The breakdown periods for the Slovak Republic 
are in 2002Q3 and 2007Q3 and it fiscally diverges from the EU-15 countries before 2002Q3.
 
The structural breaks for Slovenia are 2000Q3 and 2013Q3 and it has weak β convergence 
between 2000Q3 and 2013Q3. 
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Table 3.8. β Convergence Estimation Results for model with two structural breaks for Budget Deficit to GDP ratio
 
            
Country µ1 β1 Decision Tb1 µ2 β2 Decision Tb2 µ3 β3 Decision 
Czech Republic -1.142 
(0.900) 
-0.085 
(0.059) 
E 2001Q4 
-10.428*** 
(1.497) 
0.202*** 
(0.032) 
C 2011Q2 
-0.819 
(3.167) 
0.032 
(0.041) 
E 
Estonia 3.219* 
(1.626) 
-0.044 
(0.093) 
E 2002Q4 
14.173*** 
(3.452) 
-0.268*** 
(0.077) 
C 2009Q2 
22.796*** 
(3.469) 
-0.254*** 
(0.047) 
C 
Greece -3.093*** 
(0.817) 
-0.096*** 
(0.033) 
D 2005Q4 
-2.263 
(5.818) 
-0.103 
(0.098) 
E 2013Q3 
-26.269 
(15.363) 
0.305 
(0.187) 
E 
Ireland 3.281*** 
(0.589) 
-0.056*** 
(0.020) 
C 2007Q4 
42.436 
(38.649) 
-0.930 
(0.702) 
E 2009Q4 
-69.410*** 
(11.461) 
0.843*** 
(0.153) 
C 
Italy -1.712*** 
(0.452) 
-0.033** 
(0.016) 
D 2007Q2 
-12.792 
(12.205) 
0.188 
(0.228) 
E 2009Q3 
2.658** 
(1.188) 
-0.047*** 
(0.016) 
C 
Latvia 3.085** 
(1.284) 
-0.190** 
(0.071) 
C 2003Q1 
-0.719 
(5.515) 
0.047 
(0.139) 
E 2006Q4 
-6.707*** 
(2.270) 
0.104*** 
(0.033) 
C 
Poland  -0.115 
(0.801) 
-0.155* 
(0.076) 
E 1999Q4 
-5.456*** 
(0.95) 
0.066** 
(0.025) 
C 2008Q4 
1.455 
(2.222) 
-0.024 
(0.030) 
E 
Portugal -1.513** 
(0.609) 
-0.071*** 
(0.018) 
D 2009Q3 
-25.142* 
(12.090) 
0.306 
(0.181) 
E 2013Q4 
-36.059* 
(17.696) 
0.402* 
(0.214) 
E 
Slovak Republic -2.284** 
(1.105) 
-0.198*** 
(0.065) 
D 2002Q3 
1.906 
(4.097) 
-0.094 
(0.101) 
E 2007Q3 
-1.064 
(1.165) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
E 
Slovenia -0.458 
(0.870) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
E 2000Q3 
-2.082** 
(0.965) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
c 2013Q3 
-66.959* 
(36.119) 
0.783* 
(0.442) 
E 
Spain 0.180 
(0.708) 
0.013 
(0.025) 
E 2007Q3 
5.533 
(5.196) 
-0.186** 
(0.086) 
c 2012Q3 
-21.987** 
(8.185) 
0.219** 
(0.102) 
C 
Bulgaria 1.249 
(0.961) 
0.025 
(0.024) 
E 2012Q2 
54.852 
(30.198) 
-0.714 
(0.402) 
E 2015Q2 
14.657 
(24.938) 
-0.160 
(0.292) 
E 
Cyprus -0.096 
(0.944) 
-0.056 
(0.035) 
E 2007Q1 
12.744*** 
(4.060) 
-0.191*** 
(0.066) 
C 2013Q4 
-67.817 
(49.318) 
0.813 
(0.597) 
E 
Lithuania -7.005*** 0.066 c 2006Q1 104.483*** -2.218*** C 2010Q1 -11.916 0.169 E 
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(2.157) (0.086) (23.810) (0.456) (7.559) (0.100) 
Croatia -2.139** 
(0.975) 
0.002 
(0.035) 
c 2007Q2 
0.701 
(3.454) 
-0.026 
(0.056) 
E 2013Q3 
-29.324*** 
(6.787) 
0.346*** 
(0.083) 
C 
Hungary -2.194*** 
(0.734) 
-0.099*** 
(0.030) 
D 2005Q4 
-43.443*** 
(5.025) 
0.769*** 
(0.093) 
C 2011Q1 
2.100 
(4.805) 
-0.021 
(0.062) 
E 
Note: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. C indicates β convergence, c indicates β convergence with only one 
estimate statistically significant, D indicates divergence, d indicates divergence with only one estimate statistically significant and E indicates equilibrium growth. The values 
in parentheses are standard errors.
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Spain’s structural breaks are 2007Q3 and 2012Q3 and it has weak β convergence 
between 2007Q3 and 2012Q3 and β convergence after 2012Q3. The
 
structural breaks for 
Bulgaria are 2012Q2 and 2015Q2 and
 
Bulgaria remains at the same level as the EU-15 
countries during the analysis period. As for the last country, Cyprus has 2007Q1 and 2013Q4 
for its structural breaks.
 
Cyprus has β convergence between 2007Q1 and 2013Q4, and 
remains at the same level in post-2013Q4.
  
In the next stage of the study, linearity tests have been performed to determine whether 
the series are linear or nonlinear within the variable of budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. This aims 
to prevent erroneous stationary results due to misidentifying the series type.
 
In Table 3.9 are 
presented Harley and Leybourne’s (2007) W* and Harvey et al.’s (2008) Wλ linearity test 
statistics.  
 
Table 3.9. Harvey and Leybourne (2007) and Harvey et al. (2008) linearity tests for Budget 
Deficit to GDP ratio. 
Country *
10%W  
*
5%W  
*
1%W  W  
Czech Republic 1.56 1.57 1.59 0.68 
Estonia 3.44 3.73 4.29 0.89 
Greece 3.79 4.21 5.09 3.46 
Ireland 10.19** 10.30** 10.49** 5.92* 
Italy 0.69 0.79 0.99 3.34 
Latvia 17.43*** 17.52*** 17.67*** 7.70** 
Poland 3.60 3.63 3.69 1.08 
Portugal 19.60*** 20.00*** 20.74*** 2.28 
Slovak Republic 2.83 2.85 2.88 1.70 
Slovenia 2.19 2.23 2.30 0.98 
Spain 10.50** 10.57** 10.70** 8.56** 
Bulgaria 17.47*** 17.53*** 17.66*** 6.70* 
Cyprus 1.49 1.50 1.53 0.81 
Lithuania 21.82*** 21.95*** 22.19*** 4.09 
Malta 7.49 7.60 7.81 3.03 
Romania 8.96* 9.14* 9.47* 8.75** 
Croatia 5.18 5.21 5.27 1.08 
Hungary 11.00** 11.08** 11.23** 9.52*** 
Notes: The critical values for W  are 9.21 (1%), 5.99 (5%) and 4.60 (10%). The critical values for 
*W  are 
13.27 (1%), 9.48 (5%) and 7.77 (10%). The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
According to the results, at least one of either the W* and Wλ test statistics for Ireland, 
Latvia, Portugal, Spain, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, and Hungary exceed the critical value 
at 5%. Accordingly, the series obtained for these countries are nonlinear in form and thus 
using nonlinear unit root tests is more appropriate than linear unit root tests for determining 
whether these countries converge with the target country groups. Table 3.10 shows the 
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nonlinear KSS unit root test results obtained for the model with constant and linear trends. 
According to the KSS unit root test results, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary show 
convergence with the EU-15 countries. In addition, Lithuania is has fiscally diverged from the 
EU-15 countries.
 
Ireland has been converging with the EU-10 countries while Portugal and 
Spain have been catching-up. Table 3.11 shows the nonlinear KSS unit root test results 
obtained for the constant and nonlinear trend models. Similar results are obtained with the 
linear trend model. This situation shows that results are quite consistent.
 
In contrast to the 
linear trend model, Portugal shows convergence with the EU-10 countries.
 
The point to note 
here is how countries are determined to be diverging from, converging with, or catching up to 
the target countries.
 
Accordingly, if both δ and ϕ are statistically significant, the country is 
catching up to the target country group, if only δ is significant we conclude that the country is 
converging, and if neither δ nor ϕ are statistically significant the country is diverging from the 
target country group.  
After all these unit root tests and β convergence, we now analyze the Sigma 
convergence results. As in the debt-to-GDP ratio,
 
Sigma convergence will go untested if no β 
convergence exists in the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. The Sigma convergence results for all 
countries are shown in Figure 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.
 
The fact that the standard deviation has a 
decreasing trend indicates that Czech Republic has shown sigma convergence in fiscal terms 
to EU-15 countries.
 
This also supports both single- and double-break unit root test results.
 
The Sigma convergence results indicate Estonia to be fiscally converging with the EU-15 
countries. This situation confirms the β convergence estimates.
 
Sigma convergence analysis 
for Greece shows the divergence from the EU-10 countries.
 
This is observed from the β 
convergence analysis showing mostly divergence. The sigma convergence results for Ireland 
shows that Ireland has fiscally diverged from the EU-10 countries. The results of β 
convergence show general convergence with the EU-10 countries. Here, β convergence 
should be noted as insufficient for Sigma convergence. For this reason, β convergence was 
obtained for Ireland while sigma convergence could not. Italy has Sigma convergence. This 
corresponds to the conclusion that Italy converges with the EU-10 countries in terms of the 
budget deficit-to-GDP ratio within the estimates of β convergence. The sigma convergence 
analysis for Latvia states that Latvia has converged with the EU-15 countries fiscally over 
time.
 
This is consistent with the nonlinear KSS unit root test results.
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Table 3.10. KSS test with constant and linear trend (Budget Deficit to GDP Convergence) 
Country Lag δ ϕ Results 
  Estimator t statistic Estimator t statistic  
Czech Republic 0 -0.008
 -3.321* -0.442 x 10-3 -0.174 - 
Estonia 0 -0.003 -3.351** 0.008 1.282 - 
Greece 0 -0.001 -8.645*** -0.015 -1.844 - 
Ireland 0 -0.001 -11.155** -0.018 -1.386 Convergence 
Italy 0 -0.015 -3.596** -0.005 -2.453 - 
Latvia 0 -0.011 -3.914** 0.003 0.925 Convergence 
Poland 0 -0.022 -4.836*** -0.006 -2.923* - 
Portugal 0 -0.007 -5.439*** -0.023 -3.202** Catching-up 
Slovak Republic 0 -0.001 -1.849 -0.201 x 10
-3 -0.129 - 
Slovenia 0 -0.001 -44.990*** -0.010 -0.956 - 
Spain 0 -0.007 -4.978*** -0.018 -3.695*** Catching-up 
Bulgaria 0 -0.010 -6.684*** -0.260 x 10
-3 -0.039 Convergence 
Cyprus 0 -0.001 -49.054*** -0.012 -1.215 - 
Lithuania 0 -0.001 -3.031 -0.015 -1.529 Divergence 
Malta 0 -0.002 -1.970 -0.001 -0.357 - 
Romania 1 -0.001 -4.099*** -0.002 -0.578 Convergence 
Croatia 0 -0.002 -1.806 0.162 x 10
-3 0.065 - 
Hungary 0 -0.003 -4.950*** -0.006 -1.375 Convergence 
Note: The critical values of the t statistics for δ are -3.05 (%10), -3.35 (%5) and -3.96 (%1).  The critical values of the t statistics (left tail) for ϕ are -2.57 (%10), -2.94 (%5) 
and -3.68 (%1). The critical values of the t statistics (right tail) for ϕ are 2.59 (%10), 2.93 (%5) and 3.65 (%1). All critical values are obtained from Table 1a and Table 1b of 
Chong et al. (2008). The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.11. KSS test with constant and nonlinear trend (Budget Deficit to GDP Convergence) 
Country Lag δ ϕ Results 
  Estimator t statistic Estimator t statistic  
Czech Republic 0 -0.008 -3.261* 0.184 x 10
-4 0.604 - 
Estonia 0 -0.003 -3.357 0.829 x 10
-4 1.018 - 
Greece 0 -0.001 -9.561*** -0.181 x 10
-3 -1.366 - 
Ireland 0 -0.001 -10.836*** -0.221 x 10
-3 -1.239 Convergence 
Italy 0 -0.015 -3.740** -0.468 x 10
-4 -2.227 - 
Latvia 0 -0.011 -3.899** 0.407 x 10
-4 0.994 Convergence 
Poland 0 -0.021 -4.696*** -0.438 x 10
-4 -1.929 - 
Portugal 0 -0.007 -5.574*** -0.270 x 10
-3 -2.413 Convergence 
Slovak Republic 0 -0.001 -1.829 0.379 x 10
-5 0.211 - 
Slovenia 0 -0.001 -37.138*** -0.160 x 10
-3 -0.936 - 
Spain 0 -0.007 -5.068*** -0.248 x 10
-3 -3.049** Catching-up 
Bulgaria 0 -0.010 -6.727*** -0.335 x 10
-3 -0.357 Convergence 
Cyprus 0 -0.001 -45.325*** -0.197 x 10
-3 -1.244 - 
Lithuania 0 -0.001 -2.935 -0.141 x 10
-3 -1.149 Divergence 
Malta 0 -0.002 -1.982 0.913 x 10
-5 0.254 - 
Romania 1 -0.001 -4.096*** -0.308 x 10
-4 -0.738 Convergence 
Croatia 0 -0.002 -1.811 0.901 x 10
-4 0.266 - 
Hungary 0 -0.003 -4.481*** -0.476 x 10
-4 -0.855 Convergence 
Note: The critical values of the t statistics for δ are -3.07 (%10), -3.40 (%5) and -4.02 (%1).  The critical values of the t statistics (left tail) for ϕ are -2.65 (%10), -2.98 (%5) 
and -3.74 (%1). The critical values of the t statistics (right tail) for ϕ are 2.63 (%10), 2.97 (%5) and 3.70 (%1). All critical values are obtained from Table 1a and Table 1b of 
Chong et al. (2008). The superscripts ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Figure 3.4. Sigma Convergence for Budget Deficit to GDP ratio 
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Figure 3.5. Sigma Convergence for Budget Deficit to GDP ratio (Continued) 
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Figure 3.6. Sigma Convergence for Budget Deficit to GDP ratio (Continued) 
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Poland has Sigma convergence, which means that Poland has fiscally converged over 
time with the EU-15 countries.
 
This corresponds to the results obtained from the unit root 
tests.
 
The Sigma convergence results for Portugal indicate Portugal to have diverged from the 
EU-10 countries, while the non-linear KSS unit root test results show it to be catching up in 
the linear trend model and converging in the nonlinear trend model. As stated before, β 
convergence does not mean that sigma convergence will occur. The Sigma convergence 
results for the Slovak Republic indicate the Slovak Republic has fiscal convergence with the 
EU-15 countries during the period.
 
The results of Sigma convergence for Slovenia indicate 
divergence from the EU-15 countries in terms of the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, whereas the 
β convergence results mostly show convergence.
 
The Sigma convergence results for Spain 
indicate Spain to have diverged fiscally from the EU-10 countries, but the KSS unit root test 
results indicate Spain to be catching up.
 
For Bulgaria, the Sigma convergence results show it 
has diverged fiscally from the EU-15 countries. However, the β convergence results indicate 
convergence for Bulgaria. The Sigma convergence results for Lithuania indicate that 
Lithuania has fıscally converged with the EU-15 countries over time, but the KSS unit root 
test results indicate the country has diverged.
 
The Sigma convergence for Cyprus indicates the 
convergence with the EU-15 countries over time. This corresponds to the convergence result 
obtained from both the single- and double-break unit root tests.
 
The Sigma convergence for 
Croatia shows convergence with the EU-15. This situation is also confirmed by the results of 
the double-break unit root tests. The results of Sigma convergence for Hungary indicate that 
Hungary has converged with the EU-15.
 
Similarly, Sigma convergence for Romania shows 
both Sigma and β convergence to have occurred and Romania has been fiscally converging 
with the EU-15 countries. Finally, the results of Sigma convergence for Malta indicate Malta 
to converge with the EU-15 countries. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
The study aimed to test whether the fiscal differences among countries have played a 
role in the emergence of the European debt crisis and to determine how fiscally the new EU 
member states, which are likely to be included in the monetary union, converge with the EU-
15 countries. This analyzes whether the weakness of the countries affected by the crisis has 
been caused by the loss of fiscal discipline as well as the extent to which the new member 
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states have met the criteria required for becoming a member of the EMU after their 
membership to the EU.
 
Here, the criteria for fiscal convergence are that public debt stock does 
not exceed 60% and that budget deficits as a ratio of GDP do not exceed 3%.  
We designed an endogenous system in which the public authority exists in order to 
analyze the potential convergence of public debts and budget deficits.
 
To test the fiscal 
convergence between countries, we first used the ADF test, then Zivot and Andrews’s (1992) 
and Lee and Strazicich’s (2003) unit root tests with structural breaks.
 
The structural break 
periods obtained from the unit root tests are particularly concentrated in the periods when the 
European debt crisis occurred.
 
Finally, this study also used the KSS (2003) nonlinear unit root 
tests, unlike other studies in the literature, to determine the existence of convergence.
 
In 
addition to testing the existence of β convergence for all countries included in the analysis, 
Sigma convergence analysis was also estimated. The study found that, although the test 
results are quite consistent with each other, inconsistencies exist between the Sigma and β 
convergence results for some countries.
 
According to the results, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece, and Spain show divergence from the EU-10 countries in terms of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Besides, tests using the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio as fiscal convergence criterion show 
that all countries except for Greece have managed to converge fiscally with the EU-10 
countries. The new member countries except for Croatia, Latvia, and Slovenia are said to have 
converged with the EU-15 countries in terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
 
When analyzing the 
convergence for new member countries in terms of the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, Croatia, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have 
shown fiscal convergence.
 
When interpreting these results, both the PIIGS and new member 
countries have difficulty to converge with the target country groups in terms of the debt-to-
GDP ratio, but more countries provide fiscal convergence in terms of the budget deficit-to-
GDP ratio. Accordingly, countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Cyprus, 
which have suffered from the crisis, have differentiated and lost their fiscal discipline 
especially compared with other countries in terms of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. These 
countries need to take important steps to prevent public debt to increase so they can maintain 
their presence in the EMU.
 
The results of this study, as in Kocenda et al. (2008), argue that 
monetary unions do not generally guarantee the fiscal convergence.
 
Additionally, the 
convergence in terms of public debt of the new member states except for Croatia, Latvia, and 
Slovenia with the EU-15 and even the EU-10 countries may prevent the negativity of other 
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countries affected by the debt crisis if they become members of the monetary union in the 
future.
 
In addition, possible policy mismatches can be prevented by ensuring that the union is 
homogeneous in terms of its fiscal conditions. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The recent European debt crisis led to huge social and economic costs such as loss of 
production, unemployment, and increasing debt stock. Hence, we first aimed to identify the 
determinants this crisis. To do so, in the first chapter of this thesis we constructed a fiscal 
pressure index for the EU-15 countries, since defining the crisis and identifying the crisis 
periods is crucial to all econometric models that focus on financial crises. The problem, here, 
is there is no consensus on how to define fiscal pressure in the literature. Thus, we calculated 
the fiscal pressure index for each of the EU-15 countries by taking into account the studies of 
Baldacci et al. (2011a, 2011b) and Hernandez de Cos et al. (2014). However, our definition 
differs from the definition of previous studies since they focus on mainly to default events and 
their fiscal pressure index takes the value of 1 or 0. However, defining the fiscal pressure as a 
binary variable brings a constraint to the empirical analysis. This is why we developed a new 
continuous-time financial pressure index using BYP (Bond Yield Pressure), Government 
bond spreads (relative to 10-year US Treasury bonds) i, r-g imputed interest rate on general 
government debt minus real GDP growth rate i, PSBPR (Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement), GGGD (General Government Gross Debt), Net debt to GDP, and the CAPB 
(Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Balance to GDP). After building the fiscal pressure index for 
each EU-15 country, we calculated threshold values for the index.
 
When the index exceeds 
the calculated threshold value, the index signals a crisis episode. 
 
However, as there is no 
consensus on what the optimal threshold should be for an index, we tended to use different 
measures such as the accuracy measures, sensitivity-specificity figures, and KLR cut-off 
method methods as in Candelon et al. (2012).
 
The results indicate that all EU-15 countries 
except for Germany seem to have suffered a debt crisis following the global financial crisis.
 
Moreover, our results show that the debt crisis in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
the UK lasted longer than in other countries. The similarity of our results with the the results 
of the previous studies can be considered as an important indicator of accuracy and 
consistency and may orient future researchers to employ continuous fiscal pressure indexes.
 
The second chapter of the thesis aimed to identify the variables that caused the 
emergence of the European debt crisis.
 
For this purpose, we first considered a very large set 
of 51 leading indicators.
 
The set of leading indicators consisted of six groups: public and real 
sector variables, external balance and capital flow variables, financial sector variables, debt 
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indicators, social indicators, and governance indicators. In addition to macro and 
microeconomic variables, we also considered governance indicators, mostly ignored in the 
existing literature. This is a significant contribution to the literature.
  
Besides, we also employed three estimation methods: SOM, Logit, and Markov models.
 
The main reason for choosing the SOM as the first estimation method is that it is a 
nonparametric method that allows one to observe the relationship among multiple variables.
 
In addition, while estimating a large number of variables is impossible with conventional 
econometric methods, the SOM can incorporate highly correlated variables with each other 
simultaneously. The SOM also gives us the possibility to rank the leading indicators 
according to their order of importance in the emergence of the debt crisis. To do so, we used 
different measures such as the structuring index (RI), cluster description index (CD) and 
Spearman rank correlation index (SRC). However, as there are discrepancies related to order 
the importance among different measures, we also constructed two different overall indexes to 
rank the variables.
 
We then selected the most significant 10 variables to be employed in Logit 
and Markov estimations. 
According to the results obtained from Logit and Markov estimations, the variables 
NPL / TL, Primary Balance / GDP, PSRR, Corruption, Cash Balance / GDP, Unemployment, 
Voice and Accountability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, GDP Growth, Government 
Effectiveness, and Cyclically-Adjusted Balance / GDP are all correctly signed and statistically 
significant in explaining the debt crisis. Note that the fact that the results obtained from all 
three estimation methods are quite similar is accepted as an important indicator of 
consistency.
 
Another interesting point in the estimation results is that despite the similar 
deterioration in macroeconomic variables, some European countries seem to have exited the 
crisis very quickly contrary to some countries like Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Spain, or Greece.
 
When comparing these two sets of countries in detail, governance indicators are seen to have 
played an important role. This situation is observed from the fact that good governance 
indicators in the SOM, Logit, and Markov results significantly reduced the possibility of debt 
crisis.
 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, which were affected by the crisis for a 
longer and deeper period, all have poor governance indicators.
 
Therefore, the convergence of 
countries in terms of governance is very important in addition to economic convergence. 
Moreover, our Logit and Markov models were quite successful in predicting the crisis 
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episodes over the period of 2003-2015. To be more precise, nearly all crisis and noncrisis 
periods in the EU-15 were correctly predicted by our models.  
The third chapter of the study analyzed the existence of fiscal convergence among EU 
countries. With the recent debt crisis, the question of a fiscal similarity among the member 
countries has gained great importance.
 
For this reason, this study tested the existence of fiscal 
convergence by considering the two basic indicators in the Maastricht criteria. These criteria 
are the debt-to-GDP and the budget deficit-to-GDP ratios.
 
Accordingly, Portugal, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, and Greece, which were severely damaged by the debt crisis in comparison to 
other countries, were compared with the EU-10 countries, and then the new member states 
were compared with the EU-15 countries over the period from 1995Q1 to 2017Q2.
 
Considering the analysis techniques, period gaps, and countries included in analyses, some 
important elements were ignored in analyzing fiscal convergence by the existing literature. 
Hence, we used a wide range of data and large set of countries, as well as new techniques (the 
ADF unit root test, Zivot and Andrews’s (1992) single-break unit root test. Lee and 
Strazicich’s (2003) double-break unit root test, and nonlinear KSS (2003) non-linear unit root 
tests) to fulfill the shortages of the early literature.  
Results indicate Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and Greece have not shown convergence 
with the EU-10 countries in terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
 
In addition, except for Greece 
there exists convergence among EU-15 countries in terms of the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio.
 
The results for the new member states show that there is no convergence in terms of the debt-
to-GDP ratio with EU-15 countries, aside from Croatia, Latvia, and Slovenia, while in terms 
of the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia show fiscal convergence. The general result 
obtained from this is that although most member countries have achieved convergence in 
terms of the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, they cannot show the same success in terms of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio.
 
This situation implies that the most affected countries from the crisis 
(Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Cyprus) had a significant difference of the debt-to-
GDP ratio with other member countries.
 
As in Kocenda et al. (2008), we conclude that being 
a member of the monetary union does not guarantee fiscal convergence. Hence, beside 
implementing a common monetary policy, the EU needs also to homogenize fiscal policies of 
its member countries. Otherwise, similar crises will be likely to emerge in the future.
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What are the policy implications of our findings? The first one is that constructing the 
continuous-time fiscal stress index which produces consistent and robust results in identifying 
fiscal pressure and/or crisis episodes may allow the authorities to take measures to prevent 
crises. The second one is that governance quality matters both in the outbreak and the length 
of debt crises. Hence, increasing governance quality could be a significant preventive 
response to future crises and the EU may exert pressures on member countries to harmonize 
governance indicators.  
On the other hand, our empirical analysis also indicates that EU member states do not 
converge fiscally, in particular in terms of public debts. As the member states do converge in 
terms of budget deficits, we think that there may be some structural factors such as trade and 
current deficits leading to steady increases in public debt stock of some member countries. A 
closer look at Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, which were severely affected by the 
crisis, shows that these countries significantly differ from other member countries in terms of 
current account deficits. Until the outbreak of the global crisis, these deficits were easily 
financed by external borrowing at low rates although their debt stock steadily increased. This 
shows that those countries largely benefited from the ‘prestige’ of the Union. Hence, one may 
affirm that current account balance may be considered as another convergence criteria for the 
countries that want to join the EMU. However, one may argue that as some countries like 
Germany have constantly current current account surpluses, the member countries may find 
ways to finance each other. However, as clearly seen in the recent debt crisis, countries may 
be reluctant to pay debts of other member countries. This definitely increases both the 
duration and the severity of the crisis. Therefore, it is important for the Union to set and 
announce how, under what conditions, and by whom the financing will be provided in a more 
clear and faster way.  
In addition, the member states of the monetary union have common monetary policy 
while they do not have a common fiscal policy. The inconsistencies between two policies can 
lead countries to the crisis. Thus, it is a very important for countries to converge not only 
financially but also fiscally. Considering this, the debate on whether the European Union is an 
optimal currency area is still up-to-date as it was in the first day of establishment of the 
Union. The main conclusion reached here is that the convergence criteria should be revised by 
taking into account the above-mentioned issues in addition to the existing conditions in order 
to keep the UE continuing. This rises another question on how to reform the EU, but more 
importantly the Eurozone: Should the authorities in the EU allow member states which have 
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increasing debt ratios and worsening macroeconomic balances to leave the Eurozone. By 
leaving the EMU, the country suffers a sharp deterioration in its economy, a rapid 
depreciation of its ‘new’ national currency and an inflation spike. The country will probably 
announce debt default. Real depreciation will then give the country the competitive power to 
drive economic growth. However, allowing the exit of a member state may affect the 
sustainability of the Union, ultimately leading to its collapse. 
Further studies can be carried out to include both a wider time period and a larger 
country set. In this way, more comprehensive results can be achieved for the constructed 
fiscal stress index and these results can be presented in a comparable way with previous 
studies. Besides, a very large set of indicators can be used to identify the factors that construct 
the fiscal stress index; it is thus possible to convert these indicators into the index by methods 
such as principal component analysis. Convergences between countries can also be tested for 
the governance quality. This also allows us to conclude to what extent countries are similar in 
terms of governance. 
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